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“A labyrinth of symbols,” he corrected. “An invisible labyrinth of time.”
—Borges
It’s not information that wants to be free; it’s us. The Message is Murder 
deduces from the informatic flux that informs the screen-mediated mis-
recognition endemic to the phrase “information wants to be free,” the 
concept computational capital in order to track the background calculus 
of capitalized power as it restructures representation, finance, identity 
and sociality from the mid-twentieth century forward. Engaging in 
discrepant readings of Jorge Luis Borges, Alan Turing, Claude Shannon, 
Alfred Hitchcock and Karl Marx in a first section on discourse, 
informatics and the value-form, and in studies of photography, cinema 
and computation as deployments of a logistics of racialized and gendered 
domination in a second section, The Message is Murder analyzes the 
unthought formations of violence presupposed by and consequent 
upon the everyday functions of communication’s media, media that are 
increasingly programmed and programmable—informatic.
It’s not the brand that wants to free itself from the slave. To register 
the violence endemic to everyday transmissions, this book argues—and 
in its own way demonstrates—that the rise of information itself is an 
extension of the ongoing quantification and instrumentalization of the 
life-world imposed by early capitalism, and further that the abstraction 
of “information” and its mechanization as “computation” take place 
in the footprint of the calculus of the value-form and the leveraged 
value-expropriation of labor by capitalized industry.
The decline of the Fordist factory and the rise of post-Fordism make 
ambient computation the mise en scène of new types of work and new 
types of exploitation. This situation is most familiar today—if also 
poorly understood—as “digital culture.” The fact that the worldwide 
generation of inequalities relies on the generation and intensification of 
discursive, visual and screen-mediated social difference resultant from 
its processing by “digital culture” is not an incidental factor in the rise of 
computational capital and its metrics of quantification but a key feature 
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of its formation. Built on an axiomatics of racial inequality and gender 
inequality, today’s codifications, abstractions and machines, far from 
being value-neutral emergences intelligible in some degree-zero history 
of technology, are rather racial formations, sex-gender formations, and 
national formations—in short, formations of violence. As we shall see, 
digital culture is built on and out of the material and epistemological 
forms of racial capitalism, colonialism, imperialism and permanent war. 
This violence is literally inscribed in machine architectures and on the 
bodies and lives of all who are other, particularly those of the Global 
South, and increasingly the rest. It is recapitulated and re-inscribed by 
the normal functioning of informatic machines under the protocols of 
computational capital—an assemblage that as with the name “digital 
culture,” is once again indexed while being conceptually reduced when 
rendered in the vernacular as “the media.”
Brief introduction to the study
The Message is Murder offers a sustained riposte to Marshall McLuhan’s 
oft-repeated formulation “the medium is the message” which locates the 
primary significance of a new medium in its far-reaching transformation 
of the sense ratios and its secondary significance in the new practices 
its mediation of another (prior) medium’s content makes possible. Here 
we see that the world-media system is a means to securitize violence. 
The book is written in a dissident relation to the burgeoning field of 
media studies and the deracinated technocratic imaginaries that too 
often inform its practices. It views the generalized stupidity, ignorance 
and psychosis as well as the criminal avarice and securitization of 
countries like the United States of America as screen products—direct 
results of cinema, television and computation functioning as media of 
capitalism. Both content fetishism and platform fetishism obscure the 
geo-political implantation of these media formations—an implantation 
that is inseparable from both political economy and coloniality. The 
forces that not only shape our intellect and imagination, but also have in 
fact become inseparable from what these are, create and indeed are the 
media infrastructure of capitalization. This text then, as a work of writing, 
of media theory, and necessarily, of financial counter-speculation, must 
go to some lengths to argue that informatic media formations neither 
emerge nor function in spaces without qualities, histories, or, for that 
matter, inequalities. This re-mediation means to say that math, science 
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and information are not as is usually presumed value-neutral, degree 
zero conditions of emergence. To take the measure of today’s machines 
and their constitutive operations, to understand the message that is our 
media, we must do more than focus on technics; we must attend to the 
surround.
In doing so, that is, in paying attention in one way or another to the 
colonized, the variously embodied and enminded, the possessed and the 
dispossessed, and, in general to the incorporation and erasure of what 
from the dominant standpoint appears as external to machines and to 
fixed capital today, I hope to demonstrate convincingly that most of what 
we currently think of as technologies, computing machines, and modes 
of abstraction are imbricated with social practices to such an extent 
that they themselves cannot properly be said to be stand-alone entities 
or platforms. Dominant technologies must therefore be seen as racial 
formations and gender formations as well as programs of capitalization. 
By this somewhat shocking claim (shocking, at least, to purists of all 
stripes—for what I am saying here suggests racist machines and not just 
racist academics, racist programmers and racist electorates) I do not mean 
to assert and do not assert anything ontological about race and gender. 
Rather, aim is taken at various forms of platform fetishism that draw 
artificial boundaries between the abstract or technical and everything 
else. This approach shows—is designed to show—that race, gender, media 
are co-constituents and co-constituted—in short, co-emergent historical 
formations. Unavoidably today, this co-emergence takes place within and 
indeed as the matrix of capital. Media theory cannot do without critical 
race theory or critique of political economy. In the current conjuncture, 
arguably no communiqué is exempt from a decisive relation to what 
Cedric Robinson rightly termed racial capitalism—or in the formulation 
I use almost synonomously, computational capital.1
The over-arching argument of Message is that “the media” as we 
now call them, are in large part developmental outgrowths of racial 
capitalism. As such, they (and in a rigorous sense, “we”) are not only 
means of representation or communication, but means of production. 
To put this point even more directly, what go under the sign “media” 
today are in addition to whatever else they are, almost always means for 
value extraction and for the production and reproduction of inequality. 
It seems obvious, but inequality is neither just about income nor is it 
not about income; it is organized and enforced in a matrix of valuation 
that tracks and weights factors of whiteness, masculinity, geo-location, 
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citizenship and much more. As this book endeavors to make clear 
utilizing a variety of attacks on traditional forms of understanding, 
dominant media formations—including, for example Claude Shannon’s 
landmark mathematical theory of communication that underpins 
the capacity to assign numbers to linguistic signs, or, to give another 
example, the rise of photography—emerge directly out of formations of 
violence already presupposed and thus firmly rooted and re-incorporated 
in the social and in the imaginary. In their function these and other 
machines, abstract, concrete, cybernetic, with roots in the plantation, 
the factory, the colony, the patriarchal household, the university and 
the jail, reproduce and exacerbate inequality, oftentimes under the guise 
of a value-neutrality that tends to render their exploitative operations 
unconscious even if many of the resultant effects do not remain in the 
unthought, or the unfelt. As we shall see, chemistry, as in the case of 
photography, and statistics, as in the case of the mathematical theory 
of communication, cannot be separated from their social basis in racial 
violence. Suffering (the suffering of others) can never be fully separated 
from the fact of “Westernized” consciousness and thus logically from 
capitalizing mediation. Critical race media theory must make these 
connections.
It is in many ways remarkable that Marx’s labor theory of value has 
not been widely recognized as being as important as Newton’s theory of 
gravity. But then again, the orthodoxy of the church was less entrenched 
than that of capital. Indeed, as 1492 makes abundantly clear, Christian 
ideology was commandeered by capital as a platform. Ultimately, we 
must conclude, capital goes deeper than Christ. Consequently, just as 
Marx set out to reveal the dirty secret of the value form as dissymmetrical 
exchange between capital and labor, we find ourselves in the position of 
having to once again investigate that relation as it has mutated or evolved 
in relation to new machines of value extraction—those that operate on 
discourse or images by means of number—from within a context that 
does not perceive the universality of capitalist exploitation. Time and 
again it seems we must reinvent the wheel. Understanding the historicity 
of media formations and their (or, again, “our”) current instrumental-
ization of the bios is a matter not merely of intellectual history, or the 
history of technology; it is, in view of the argument made here, a matter 
of liberation, and, in the long view, of revolution. It is for this reason—
the deferral of revolutionary justice—that I believe that The Message is 
Murder is particularly suited to the current conjuncture characterized by 
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what, politically at least, looks like fascism. The revanchist return of the 
phallic pig as leader, this time, as leader of the “free world,” with its racist 
and sexist id-grunts causing so much pain, is a systemic iteration—the 
output of an alien calculus capable of capturing and/or bypassing everyday 
intelligence. One is reminded here of the AI prosthetic composed of the 
old white man/corpse with a cable plugged into his open skull in China 
Miéville’s Perdido Street Station. In response to the inter-facialization 
of power in such ghoulish form (and leaving aside for the moment 
the tremendous aesthetic repulsion generated by the mere faces of the 
white monsters in White Houses everywhere), this book is in dialogue 
with and is to some extent written by the long-standing protests and 
movements organized against inequality from multiple quarters on the 
left. Here, but polemically stated, not just here, race, gender, mediation, 
financialization, and exploitation are of a piece and must be thought 
together if a radical left is to reinvent itself in the rising geopolitical con-
catenation of the many fascisms—what I think of as a new geopolitical 
form: fractal fascism interfacing what has become a kind of platform 
totalitarianism. This thinking of the separated (and indeed segregated) 
together, in terms suggested by the notion of an historical or planetary 
totality organized by computational media working as the fixed capital 
of the distributed social factory is a disturbingly difficult task given its 
profound importance. What is at stake in a critical race media theory is 
the very question of radical comprehensive transformation. The inertial 
structures of understanding, perception and semiosis inveigh against a 
concerted revolutionary praxis of theory, in part because of institutional 
pressures and conventions of “disciplines,” and in larger part because 
these resources of the senses, the intellect, and the will are subsumed 
and automated in the operations and renderings of “technology” itself.
This latter issue of cognitive sumbsumption by ambient technology 
poses the problem of so-called common sense—particularly as 
technologies and the thoughts they script are increasingly vectors 
of capitalization. With media convergence and the rise of what I 
call Digital Culture 2 (DC 2) all prior media platforms: books, films, 
videos, photographs and even language itself, are being subsumed by 
computation. I say DC 2 because I argue in this book that what passes 
today for “digital culture” (and therefore as a kind of radical break) is 
actually digital culture 2.0. Global commodification, settler colonialism, 
the mercantile system, the middle passage, slavery, plantations, and 
industrial capitalism instantiated a first order digital culture (Digital 
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Culture 1 or DC 1) with universalizing aspirations through the globally 
expansive assignation of quantity to qualities from the early modern 
period forward. This earlier period of digitization had many names, most 
tellingly if also disavowingly perhaps, “Humanism,” but its overarching 
operation was the (uneven) commodification of life. “Man,” the new 
trump card that legitimated historically unprecedented forms of violence 
and genocide, was the measure of all things, but few thought to ask, what, 
was the measure of “man?” We no longer really have to wonder about 
the answer to that question since financial relations have so thoroughly 
and humiliatingly taken even his measure as a matter of practice. Those 
dispossessed of wealth cannot claim humanity and indeed “humanity” 
constitutes itself in and through the very dispossession of those who are 
denied communion in its sweetness and light. The legitimation of these 
relations of exploitation by which certain minority populations lord 
their humanity over the very people and peoples from whom they have 
procured it—precisely the peoples whom they have reduced in their own 
self-serving narcissism and psychosis to sub- and in-human status—are 
among the many pyrotechnics of the value form—one if its messages, 
you might say. Today media recreates Lords of humankind, as lords 
of the various media pathways to devaluation and dispossession. One 
technical effect among many, one message that inheres in the operations 
of “the media.”
But even this ruse of humane sovereignty is collapsing from its internal 
contradictions. From airline accommodations to state proclamations, the 
civil veneer peels off, leaving only aggression, crass vindictive behaviour 
and bad manners. From a decolonizing perspective, the movement of 
“Humanism” (DC 1) to “Posthumanism” (DC 2), along with the rise of 
digital machines represents not a break but a shift in the granularity and 
scale of exploitation and struggle. Colonialism merely gives way to Com-
putational Colonialism. “Man,” formerly the subjective presentation of 
the universal value form of capital is an antiquated technology slated 
for replacement by a new order of colonization. Where for the subject 
“Man” the colonial world was perceived as populated by a sea of infantile 
sub-humans, in the post-human world, machine-dividuals perceive a 
matrix of images to be managed. Those of us who perceive that vital 
aspects of our extended being are enslaved, othered, black, see the master, 
whether embodied, machinic, affective, spatial, proprietary, algorithmic 
or whatever, as an alien presence, a body-snatcher. We strain ourselves to 
warn each other, “Get out!”
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With that warning in mind, another of the fundamental theses 
informing this book is that discrete-state machines, that is, “computers,” 
emerge in the footprint of problems scripted by the value-form. One 
could indeed argue this thesis by tracing the modern computer back 
to the brilliance of Charles Babbage and Lady Lovelace and their early 
nineteenth century efforts on “the analytic engine” and “the difference 
engine” to industrialize mathematical calculations via steam in order to 
save human labor in calculation. Or one could look to Marx’s fragments 
on the machine that describe the fixed capital of industrialization as a “vast 
automaton.” We might see clearly from these texts that the blueprint for 
modern computation already lay in the routinizing and bureaucratizing 
functions of the industrial machine as it applied not only to labor but to 
thinking, and as consequent from the suddenly apparent God-like power 
and range of machinic calculus following upon capital’s “liberation of 
the productive forces;” their liberation, that is, from the producers. The 
“conscious organ” of the industrial machine, namely the worker, gives 
rise to the conscious organ of the post-industrial machine—you.
The expropriation of the worker’s product meant and always means 
not just expropriated labor in a deracinated sense, but expropriated 
subjectivity—the early Marx’s “sensuous labor.” The mechanization of 
routine mental processes was a dream of both industry and computation. 
For capital, even in the industrial period, there was and remains a 
use-value for the development of metrics, the sytematicization of most 
efficient means, and the development of systems of account: the factory 
code, the streamlining of work-flow charts, the “one best way,” Tayloriza-
tion, and elsewhere “Fordism” or “Americanism,” shows us that. “The 
one best way” set its sights on not just corporeal but on the cognitive 
function of the “trained gorilla.” The expanding footprint of industrial 
capital required the mechanization and automation of the development 
not simply of machines of value extraction and disciplinary regimes of 
work through the by now traditional methods of wage-labor, but of the 
very methods and techniques of capital expansion: banking, management 
and communications infrastructure, monitoring of work-flow, inventory 
tracking, and the increasing integration of all human processes with 
methods of account: in short, cybernetics and information management. 
The overtaking of the icon “man” as the privileged point of subjectifi-
cation by the new and astonishing agency of financialized intelligent 
machines reveals man for what it was—a now obsolescent platform of 
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the operating system of heteropatriarchy and racial capitalism during 
DC 1.
Additionally, when bureaucratic (scientific) management becomes 
an industry in its own right, information becomes the general name 
for its product, its medium. The stuff we call “information,” though 
ostensibly ahistorical, has a history—we are only beginning to discover 
how important that history is. For this book however, in order to expose 
certain aspects of information that are generally unacknowledged, I will 
rely not on industrial history, nor strictly speaking on the history of 
information theory, but upon various mid-twentieth century accounts 
of information that show it to function homologously to valuation. In 
historical hindsight the glimmers of an emergent informatics can be 
quite clearly apprehended as the direct and necessary elaboration of 
aspects of the operation of the value form in domains from which it 
was historically excluded but nonetheless needed to be colonized if the 
algorithm of profit was to continue its do or die expansive course. As will 
be indicated, the story of information is the story of the financialization 
of the formerly extra-economic domains including culture, communi-
cation and cognition. Information becomes the privileged medium of 
capital’s message.
As with the argument that contemporary media are media of racial 
capitalism, I will be less invested here in offering a historical proof 
that information evolves in the footprint of the value form and more 
interested in deploying the argument as a heuristic device. If these two 
arguments: 1) that contemporary media are media of racial capitalism 
and 2) that information evolves in the footprint of the value-form, 
explain multiple phenomena better than other schemas, if they offer 
unexpected connections and provide new possibilities for thought, 
research and action, I will consider the arguments made.
Informatics implies the generalization of a quantifiable environment, 
an environment quantifiable in principle and one that opens everything in 
its purview not only to mathematical analysis but to a computable calculus 
of risk/reward, that is, to statistical analysis and to capitalist exploitation. 
It opens, in short, a new territory extending to all scales of space and time. 
It penetrates and surveys the colonial surround while inventing new 
forms of employ. As we shall see, “information” is not just “a difference 
that makes a difference” as Gregory Bateson famously suggested, it is a 
dialectical advance of the calculus of the value-form as historically worked 
up in the organization of the life-world by the system of abstractions 
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short-handed as “capital,” innovated in order that the financialization of 
all that appears, has appeared or could ever appear becomes historically 
possible, historically probable. The difference that information makes 
is in the first and last instance a social difference: revising Bateson, 
information is the difference that makes a social difference.
The development of digital metrics of account—discrete state 
machines and their many affordances—are in fact new ways of 
pricing what are effectively the productive and reproductive metabolic 
activities of socio-historical life. Along with that comes the invention 
of new forms of work and new modes of valorization. One could hope 
for more from critical theory than simply finding out that as a new 
condensation of social logic the Facebook “like” is a pinnacle of human 
achievement—and it would be overhasty to conclude that the present 
regime of financialization exhausted the possibilities that inhere in 
the paradigm of information, just as it would be overhasty (or at least 
pointless) to conclude that there was no hope for a planet playing host 
to the virulent, material intelligence of computational capital. But, for 
there to be some new, salient hope, we must clearly mark the transfor-
mation of labor (attention economies, neuro-power), of the value-form 
(derivatives, web-based “likes,” crypto-currencies), of fixed capital 
(social-media, computers, codifications of race and gender through 
encoding skin, fashion, bodies, minds, religions and regions) and of 
accumulation strategies (media companies, sovereign debt, border walls, 
spectacle, clouds)—as symptoms of DC2 and its far reaching liquidation 
of tradition … and of traditions, and we must solemnly note, of many 
of the people who had and still have them. “We” must begin to reckon 
with historical tragedies and crimes, as well as with ongoing tragedies 
and crimes as precisely the racial, gendered, nationalist formations of 
violence that inhere in what we think of simply as “technologies.”
Though it may be as obvious as it is troubling to point this situation 
out, in some circles it is still necessary to underscore as significant that 
there are those whose chances of liquidation are for programmatic, 
but nonetheless historical reasons, proportionally higher. Witness the 
brilliantly statistical ring to Ruthie Gilmore’s widely cited definition 
of racism: “Racism, specifically, is the state-sanctioned or extralegal 
production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to 
premature death.”2 What are the media of this calculus and what are their 
histories of formation? In this text we will find that racism, in addition 
to being state-sanctioned, extra-judicial, institutionalized and otherwise 
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legitimated is machine-sanctioned, data-visualization-sanctioned, and 
financialization-sanctioned as well. As statistically mediated, racism is 
part of what became “the science of distribution.”3
From this description of a relationship between financialized 
machine-media and “group-differentiated vulnerability to premature 
death,” the reader may perceive in outline the overarching media 
theoretical claim that informs this book: Racial Capitalism plus the 
notion of informatics as an extension and intensification of the dynamics 
of the value form diagrams a rudimentary notion of what I call Compu-
tational Capital. This term means not just capitalism as a computer, nor 
simply capitalism with or by means of the digital computer, it means 
capitalism as a digitally enabled program of accumulation and dispos-
session; capitalism as the deployment and intensive development of 
algorithms of inequality.
Digitization as we know it and live it is inseparable from financializa-
tion, informationalization and statistical analysis, and inseparable again 
from the imposition of standards of normativity and deviance that encode 
and thus over-determine the semiotic parameters of bodily phenotype, 
geo-location, gender and sexuality, among many other variables. As 
Robin Kelley explains in “Thug Nation: On State Violence and Dispos-
ability," and as Katherine Mckittrick, drawing on Simone Browne shows 
in “Mathematics Black Life,” archives, metrics, words, and mass media 
representations, are the result of and repository of racial violence, and 
they reproduce racial violence.4 If digitization results in what Matteo 
Pasquinelli has called “algorithmic governance” and what Benjamin 
Bratton terms “platform sovereignty,”5 then the rise of DC 2 means a 
new stage of colonization. These descriptors, it must be emphasized, 
are ways of talking not about information in the abstract, but about the 
current form of capitalist society, where “control,” as Sebastian Franklin 
calls it, has been submerged into the material operations of apparatuses, 
without any necessary alleviation of inequality. Rather than seeing 
an abatement of racism in the play of “color-blind” technologies, we 
experience its automation. What I am calling computational colonialism 
means an extractive and violent mediation at scales ranging from the 
sub-atomic to the planetary that result in the devaluation and dispos-
session of people(s). It is presided over by in/post-humans (though for 
the satisfaction of some “humans”). “Platform totalitarianism” more 
accurately reflects my own view of a systemic aspiration that must be 
fought at every turn; it flags the degree of capture and the multiple 
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foreclosures organized by statistical analysis and confronted by what we 
used to call, in its most general term, life.
The “financialization of everyday life,” the emergence of what Randy 
Martin terms “the society of risk,” the submitting of all possible acts 
to a cost-benefit analysis (do I dare eat a peach?), all emerge by means 
of digitization—a digitization that has a long history of recursivity in 
relation to social practice. Real needs are addressed, but at a price, and as 
the mesh of valuation expands and becomes finer, neither the rewards nor 
the costs are evenly distributed. Norbert Weiner’s definition, “statistics 
is the science of distribution,” fails to mention that this science is a 
social science, or that it is directly relevant to political economy, though 
Weiner was acutely aware that this science would have consequences on 
both. The incessant development of digital technologies from monetary 
instruments to quantum computing has meant the intensification, along 
with the miniaturization and macro-expansion not just of machinic 
or computational apparatuses, but of financializing logics. In their 
shattering of the traditional notions and indeed categories of subjects 
and objects these developments, when taken together, appear as a kind of 
culmination of post-structuralism and postmodernity—bringing about 
by material means the disappearance of the referent by simulation in 
an economy of “likes.” From the perspective of information, there are 
no subjects or objects left, only strategically constituted networks and 
virtual realms. The computational calculi of capital, already operative 
in the accounting systems of the industrial factory (the calculus of the 
commodity) or the cinema (the calculus of the image), have scaled up 
and scaled down several orders of magnitude and have co-evolved with 
the dynamism of geopolitical history (of domination and of struggle) 
organized in strict accord with the law of profit to create crowdsourcing, 
swarms, programmable images, augmented and virtual “realities,” 
neurological, affective and libidinal strip mines. The metrics of valuation 
now accompany nano-shifts in affect and perception—each new 
attentional-communicative possibility is also a financial exploit. These 
social practices of production and consumption (both as domination 
and as struggle) that have for a long time now been part of the passion 
play of the dialectic have, over the course of this history, been sedimented 
into ideologies, institutions, perceptions and machines such that the 
resolution of financialized metrics are increasingly fine grained. Today 
dialectically advanced systems of control lay heavy upon the planetary 
bios. Capital: You want to talk to your fellow humans? It’s going to cost 
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you. You want to tweet your revolution? That’s fine so long as your 
neuronal function helps the platform make money for my shareholders. 
You want to get rid of “man?” No problem, welcome to networked 
computing! With the colonization of communication, the means to 
an end logic imposed on work by mandatory wage labor has become 
the means to a means to an end imposed on discourse and images by 
mandatory unwaged labor (paid in informatic-social currencies such as 
likes). We work to communicate to commune but must do so in a circuit 
of graduated expropriation. The abstract end that was living recedes 
even as the concrete end of living approaches. Hope is giving way to 
Armageddon. For many the latter is fast approaching; and for many it 
is already here.
There is a logic here, a media logic to this semio-material system, and 
it is operative in the materiality of societies and their machines. Simply 
put, the logic is to use meaning for the purposes of accumulation and 
dispossession beyond all possible meaning. The abstractions of capital 
and indeed what now appears quite clearly as its algorithmic character 
emerge historically through the very concreteness and materiality of its 
history—its globally distributed productions and reproductions. This 
history, resultant in the planetary crisis for environments, migrants, 
the impoverished, the colonized, the enslaved, people of color, women, 
people who are gender non-conforming, those who are prisoners of 
men, of machines and of states, is all one with the full-blown realization 
of computational capital. What remains and/or exceeds all this digitality 
also happens to be “our” history—or at least what is left of it.
The book
The first part of The Message is Murder is effectively a long, improbable 
essay on different aspects of information. It is divided into five sections. 
The focus is the relationship between information and linguistic 
function and the attendant shattering of language-based ideas about 
humanism, philosophy and value. I endeavor to show that the conversion 
of difference (social difference, but then, what difference that makes a 
difference isn’t social?) into information recapitulates historical forms of 
racialized and gendered violence and makes the world over in a form—
puts it “in-formation” as Laurie Anderson might say—functionalized 
for a new order of capital. In brief, the informationalization of life and 
nature was an extension of the violence of its instrumentalization under 
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the rationality of capitalism: Information appears as a formalization and 
encoding of practices of violence and violation, an ever more granular 
extension of the violence of abstraction under capitalism into the cosmos.
The second part of Message is a re-viewing of the seeming mess of 
visuality and visual technologies pre- and post-discrete state machine, 
undertaken with an understanding that the visual field can be retrospec-
tively understood as being prepared as a domain of data-visualization. 
Visual and semiotic infrastructures for attentional production and the 
metrics thereof were being built by pre-Digital 2 images and apparatuses. 
Many of the structures and conventions of visuality developed and in some 
respects “perfected” by the still camera and the cinema will be imported 
wholesale and to a large extent unconsciously into machinic digitization 
and data visualization—a fact that implies that psycho-dynamics 
associated with visuality and the scopic are increasingly incorporated into 
a cybernetic system. Cinema is discussed in relation to the emergence 
of what I describe as pathologistics of perception and the photographic 
camera is analyzed as a machine of racialization. The final section 
positions the contemporary visual interface, or data-visualization, as a 
decisive worksite of computational capital running on informatic labor.
Part I of The Message is Murder understands the rise of informatics by 
considering its effects on aspects of linguistic operation. The dynamic 
play introduced by the incipient coupling of semiotics and informatics 
is surfaced through a consideration of Antonio Gramsci and Marshall 
McLuhan in Chapter 1, and detailed through analysis of the following: 
In Chapter 2, narrative structure and the codification of race in Borges; 
Chapter 3, thinking in drag in Alan Turing; Chapter 4, mathematical 
transcoding of discourse in Shannon and a related algorithmic repression 
and psychosis with respect to the qualitative life-world in Hitchcock; 
and in Chapter 5, the value-form as proto-informatic communication 
in Marx, particularly as computed in the function known as “price.” 
The readings offered here are by necessity limited, and as emphasized, 
not those that a historian of technology might choose, however, they 
have been selected to underscore key aspects of the generalization of 
information and computation as they overcode the socius, transform 
the quotidian, and ostensibly separate process (and processing) from 
historical violence. Atypically given these fairly canonical materials and 
media-theory-type concerns, the analysis is attendant to race, gender 
and class—indeed these forms of social difference that will be encoded 
such that they make a difference are shown to be inseparable from the 
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emergence and ultimate hegemony of computational capitalism. It will 
be shown that though information is a difference that makes a difference, 
this difference is, in any and all instances, social after all. Social differences 
are understood as co-evolving informatic vectors that, as historical results 
of prior regimes, are abstracted, encoded, recoded and re-inscribed on 
bodies in various ways: social, structural, military, carceral, epistemic, 
cybernetic, biometric, ideational computational etc. Information striates 
the field dominated by computational capital and exploits all domains 
through the creation, intensification and measurement of differences. 
The analysis here allies itself with the fact of struggle generally speaking, 
as well as to specific moments and modes of struggle against a virulent 
informational enclosure of peoples’ futurity, aspiration, happiness, and 
living. In other words, the analysis is informed by an insurrectionary 
and subaltern relation to the hegemony of the capitalist overcode and its 
prolix forms of capture. This subaltern perspective allows us to glimpse 
something of extreme importance: information emerges in the footprint 
of the value-form and is an extension of its functionality. Computation, 
it will be shown, turns out to be financialization by other means. Com-
munication, or what Charles Sanders Peirce calls “joint-acting,” is the 
raw material of both.6 This linking of communication to computation by 
means of information and financialization poses an urgent question for 
these times: If everyday communication results in the everyday murder 
of subalterns, how do we send a different message?
Part II of The Message is Murder makes the link between visuality and 
information by exploring the organization of the visual field in terms of 
social difference and the dialectics of attention vis-à-vis the machinic 
organization of the gaze. Chapter 6 considers photography as fundamen-
tally a technique of graphing and fixing skin, and locates its antecedent 
form in slavery and the optics of racism (“the color line”) of the early 
nineteenth century. It reads Barthes’ Camera Lucida and the inquiry into 
“the essence of photography” offered there, as an elaborate utilization of 
a tropology of race deployed as a basis to make presumably value-neutral 
technical claims about the unique features of a medium. Chapter 7 takes 
the rise of the attention economy and cinema’s productive organization 
of attention for capital as axiomatic, and then explores several of the 
paradigmatic consequences of the extraction of attention by visual 
machines. Historically speaking this absorption of human sensual 
capacities by mechanization results in the loss of gesture (Chaplin), the 
loss of sensibility (Wells) and psychosis (Hitchcock). Chapter 8 shows 
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that cinema, like photography, profitably fixes agents as objects and then 
as targets by means of machine-mediated attention to strategically confer 
scripted forms of agency on spectators. This agency is built atop a deadly 
disavowal and oftentimes denial of black life and the life of numerous 
(and fungible) others. In a subsequent moment (analytically considered), 
spectators identified with the value-form (white, patriarchal, capitalist) 
are themselves dispossessed of much of the product of their attention. 
The loss of the power of thought and decision automate historical 
racism and psychosis in and as the drone. The drone-subject is at 
once prosthetic extension of the white-supremacist, capitalist gaze and 
paradigmatic symptom of what Donna Haraway called “the informatics 
of domination.” Taken together, these pathologistics of cinemated 
looking reveal important aspects of the optics, psycho-dynamics, 
economics and informatics of speculative value extraction in the visual 
domain alongside their murderous and extractive consequences. At 
bottom, we confront an extractive cybernetic system of representation, 
floating atop the negation of racialized and gendered others, particularly, 
but not exclusively the Black, the Native, the Woman, the other. Chapter 
9 analyzes the formalization of these specular and discursive relations 
as means to extract informatic labor and proposes a modification of the 
labor theory of value adequate to the age of computational capital. This 
new formulation rewrites the general formula for capital, M-C-M ', as 
M-I-C-I '-M ', where I is image and C is code. This, it turns out, can be 
rewritten more concisely as M-I-M ', where I is information.

PART I




Gramsci’s Press: Why We Game
Anyone who makes a prediction has in fact a “programme” for whose 
victory he is working, and his prediction is precisely an element 
contributing to that victory … because reality is the product of the 
operation of human will to the society of things (the machine operator’s 
to his machine).
—Antonio Gramsci1
An injunction to game
Communicative acts are directly or indirectly inscribed on desubjectified 
bodies. The extent of this desubjectification varies, but it follows racial, 
gendered, financial and national logics, among others; and in many 
cases approaches or achieves radical exclusion, extreme dis-mediation 
and social death. Surprisingly perhaps, computation, understood now in 
accord with the logic of media convergence to be the ultimate medium 
of communication, is not simply ancillary to this process of inscribing 
the messages of others on living bodies, but the very means by which 
this process has achieved a new level of efficiency, inexorability and 
hegemony.
Simply put, global communication and information processing 
utilizes planetary dispossession as its substrate. All of our high-tech 
communiqués are written on the backs of modern slaves. This book 
included.
How did this situation, in which it is statistically likely that your very 
utterance (whatever you might say) not only depends upon radical 
dispossession but also reinforces impoverishment and environmental 
degradation, come to pass? The Message is Murder endeavors to sketch 
an answer.
The strategy of The Message is Murder is a selective decoding of various 
moments of encoding: a consideration of the tips of various icebergs in 
what is very loosely a field called media studies that when considered 
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together begin to tell a different history of four seemingly separate 
domains: capitalism, racialization, gender formation and information.
Western Marxism’s poor record in relation to decolonization, 
blackness, critical race studies and queer activism, and the seemingly 
autonomous emergence of cybernetics and computation make these 
ostensibly separate sectors of social transformation known as capital, race, 
gender and informatics unlikely bedfellows at first glance. Capital, race, 
gender and information have been most often considered separately and 
in relative if not complete isolation from one another. But a second look 
informed by anti-racist, feminist, queer, postcolonial and indigenous 
struggles to understand that what is called “convergence” indicates not 
just media convergence (the fact that audio, video and text can all be 
digitized), but rather a total informatic convergence in which financial, 
biometric, and computational operations are increasingly unified. This 
convergence has a brutal history as well as dire implications.
A near total and becoming totalitarian convergence comes about 
because what we currently call digital culture is actually the second 
digital culture built atop a first order digitization by a racial capitalism 
that included colonialism, slavery, hetero-patriachy and industrializa-
tion. The commodity form, which imposed an exchange value on every 
use-value, was already the incipient digitization of the bios. In dictating 
the exact dimensions of the slave ship cargo hold during the Middle 
Passage and in pricing the slave on the Mississippi auction block, this 
digitization of living persons and their qualities lay its representational 
code upon bodies. Price, it turns out, was a digital message, though not 
the only one. The horrifying example of the slave ship’s hold, designed 
for maximum profits reveals the imposition of digital metrics on bodies, 
and here specifically on African bodies, on black bodies, with flagrant 
disregard for their person. It shows the convergence of a digital calculus 
on space, on movement, and on bodies and the ability of this calculus 
to marginalize or eliminate any sympathetic relation. This convergence 
results in an impossible-to-apprehend unmaking of black bodies, their 
reduction, as Hortense Spillers writes to “flesh,” and their reconstitution 
by an unimaginable history of violence that gets reified as “race.”2 The 
media of commodification was also a message. Yes, money clearly, but so 
much else too that we are still at pains to decode.
What happens in the digital ether is not, as we have been sold, 
immaterial, fully abstract, or free, but rather ineluctably linked to the 
material conditions of the info-sphere’s emergence and sustenance, and 
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that in a way that includes all those externalities known (and indeed, 
unknown) as “the environment.” This “environment,” an externality 
from the standpoint of capitalism (Sean Cubitt, as we shall see shortly, 
has taught us to understand “the environment” as itself the symptom of a 
colonial logic), may and does take the form of forests, rivers, animals and 
people. Logically then, the included excluded of computational capital 
process may include not only forests and peoples but sectors of your 
mind that very possibly you thought were somehow exempt from finan-
cialized digitization. The breaking news is that they’re not. Vast swathes 
of our outsides and of our insides are within the enclosure of computa-
tional capital’s number crunch. That capture too is part of the message 
of The Message is Murder. In the domains traversed by messages, we play 
the odds or we get played.
The discrete laws of chance
Metrics are developed in relation to concrete practices with concrete 
goals in mind. The continuous amortization of consciousness through 
its sedimented encryption in the very techniques and instruments 
of rationality, not only as commodities for direct sale but as factories, 
machines, archives, the digital computer, data profiles, likes is the 
condition by which subjective practices are converted into fixed capital 
and their measure taken. If the factory floor, the slave ship’s manifest, 
the spread sheet, the stock exchange and also the book, the cinema, 
television and electronic computation testify that the last seven centuries 
have approached a state in which, the medium is (the media are), in the 
most general sense capital, then so too is the message. Generally speaking 
then, messages are determinations of capital.
McLuhan’s pithy phraseological condensation gave us a premonition 
that from a systems point of view, the hard distinction between medium 
and message was fast evaporating. A growing awareness of mediation 
suggested that beyond any particular affordance of an instance of com-
munication, a systemic shift in the sense ratios and in the organization 
of society was brought about by any new transmission process—and 
that such ecological changes were ultimately more significant than any 
message in particular. “The medium is the message,” sounded mysterious 
because it flew in the face of hermeneutics, referentiality and common 
sense. It heralded a new ontology from a future profoundly organized 
by media. The phrase was not just a historical insight into print and the 
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epistemic and sensual instantiations of print culture suddenly made 
analytically available by the waning of print with the rise of electronic 
culture. It was also a prediction and therefore a program. Media platform 
shifts and the proliferation of new media suddenly made it apparent that 
human societies were, in Regis Debray’s significant term, “mediological,” 
and that as had been noticed with increasing frequency by philosophers, 
psychoanalysts and language theorists, there was no im-mediate access 
to anything like reality or truth. McLuhan’s brilliant intuition at the dawn 
of the electronic age was that the long dominant and now disappearing 
print-media and, more particularly, the segmentation of language by 
moveable type lay the groundwork for shifts in perception, literary form, 
industrialization, finance, subjectivity and the scientific revolution. This 
insight into the consequences of breaking continuous flow into differ-
entiable segments insisted upon and convincingly demonstrated the 
widespread collateral effects of a medium precisely at a moment when 
print was becoming one medium among many. This constellation of 
socio-cultural shifts identified by McLuhan’s sudden awareness of the 
specificity of print is undeniable, but was it really print, as McLuhan 
gloriously argues in his consideration of “the Gutenberg Galaxy” that 
got linear history steaming forward? Or was print already an emergent 
medium of capital?
We are sympathetic with McLuhan’s effort to give a non-capitalist 
accounting, but we also recognize that one must account for capitalism 
to do this well. Thus attention must be directed to capitalist mediation. 
The summation of subjective activity (sensuous labor) that produced the 
commodity (any commodity) became a medium not only for capital, 
but also for the development of capital. Labor merged with commu-
nication and workers’ energy was absorbed wholesale. But from the 
standpoint of capital expansion, the particulars could be damned. Like 
Claude Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication, capital’s 
exchange-value was “content indifferent” so long as it increased. This 
relationship of indifference to content, shared between base 2 commu-
nication and capital as they shattered and fragmented traditional social 
media is no mere analogy. In considering the general formula for capital, 
M-C-M' (where M'>M), we will see that McLuhan’s most famous phrase, 
“the medium is the message,” was made precisely of and for that medium, 
namely capital, even if he did not recognize it.
In a society organized and indeed governed by profit algorithms, lived 
social formations and technologies also lose their hard distinction. If it 
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be granted that boundaries between media and message along with those 
between technology and social form blur, then this dissolution of objects 
and agents also applies to genre problems of theory and narrative. For 
if, as argued here, the medium is at once capital and the message, then 
logically the message as capital poses a real dilemma for revolutionary 
consciousness and revolution. Theory must seek to outmaneuver the 
programmed logistics of the sign aware, as it must be, that its principle 
affordances have been subsumed by capitalist production. With this 
problem made explicit, the reader of Message should consider themself 
hereby warned that some odd passages await them—indiscrete passages 
at odds with the laws of chance.
The general shift in the modality of the dispensation of sensuous 
labor time—its emerging combinations with semiotics, informatics 
and computation that colonize language and thought—requires a 
poetico-theoretical exploration of social-media (written with a hyphen) 
and of the new world-historical situation of the global organization of 
production and value extraction. The anti-capitalist account considers 
distributed production, the re-organization of space, time, bodies, 
senses and consciousness, new modes of exploitation and new strategies 
of accumulation, layered, it must be said on top of the old modes and 
strategies, some of which have been conveniently brought up to date. 
Brought up to date, at least, from the perspective of “The Lords of Things 
as They Are”—as “the father of cybernetics,” Norbert Wiener, designated 
the ruling class in 1948. The persistent forms of domination that underlie 
new media and its cybernetics include settler colonialism, plantations, 
factory work, military and prison industrial complexes, migrant labor, 
forced migration, detention centers, camps, contemporary forms of 
enslavement, genocides. What type of poetry can disrupt all that?
Among the foundational insights of early cybernetics and information 
theory was the understanding of historical social relations in terms of 
systems of communication. In his search for insights into feedback and 
recursivity, Wiener observed numerous natural and social phenomena 
including among his observations of nature the mongoose and its battle 
with the rattler. From his social observations he clearly grasped the 
necessity of the control of communication as a means of governance:
Thus small, closely knit communities have a very considerable 
measure of homeostasis; and this whether they are highly literate 
communities in a civilized country or villages of primitive savages. 
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Strange and even repugnant as the customs of many barbarians may 
seem to us, they generally have a very definite homeostatic value, 
which is part of the function of anthropologists to interpret. It is only 
in the large community, where the Lords of Things as They Are protect 
themselves from hunger by wealth, from public opinion by privacy 
and anonymity, from private criticism by laws of libel and the 
possession of the means of communication, that ruthlessness can 
reach its most sublime levels. Of all of the anti-homeostatic factors in 
society, the control of communication is the most effective and 
important.3
Ruthlessness, then, is a means to volatility, and volatility (anti-homeostatic 
opportunity) is to be correlated with the centralized control of commu-
nication. The Lords of Things as They Are do not leave chance to chance. 
We will see this ruthlessness again in Borges, and it goes a long way to 
explaining anti-poetic phenomena such as ISIS, POTUS and derivative 
finance. Necessarily, then, this text before you, entering, as it must into 
nothing less than a regime of communication, is also a negotiation of 
practices of inscription. Ye olde poético is upon us, like it or not, for 
the discursive field is increasingly organized by algorithms of chance 
management. Utterance, positioned as standing reserve by ambient 
computation (the electronic replacement of homogenous segmentation 
in print culture), scripted in advance, generative like much of metabolism 
itself of swathes of data and meta-data for capture, is largely programmed 
for capitalist harvest. The book worth reading, sentenced to serve as an 
advertisement for itself, must seek to do more than merely to accomplish 
its own turnover.
The processes of inscription, description, prescription, subscription, 
ascription, conscription, layered and intercalated with the older 
techniques of expropriation and control and common to all forms of tex-
tualization, were for much of the twentieth century, generally understood 
as more or less connected to institutionalized practices of writing 
(pedagogy, the canon, the press, ideology, the law), but are today to be 
seen as at once informatic and directly related to digital technologies. 
Digitization, and more explicitly capitalist digitization, already begun by 
means of the commodity form and double entry bookkeeping, explodes 
to subsume all prior analogue mediations. We are still living through this 
mathematical and indeed political process and any analytic endeavor to 
take the measure of this result must also take the measure of its own 
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strategy of engagement with the informatic field. “In every from of 
society there is a particular [branch of] production which determines 
the position and importance of all the others, and the relations obtaining 
in this branch accordingly determine those in all other branches.”4 
Concisely and in accord with their own financial interests, the business 
pages of today’s “newspapers” identify as ascendant that “particular 
[branch of] production,” that is definitive in Marx’s sense, as “Tech.” 
Of “Tech” we may observe that “the relations obtaining in this branch 
accordingly determine those in all other branches.” The tech industry is 
in fact the media industry and looking at the business pages with this in 
mind reveals that almost every story in the typical business section of the 
New York Times is in one way or another about media. Increasingly this 
is true of almost every story in the New York Times. As if in unconscious 
confirmation of McLuhan, media is constantly reporting on itself in 
order to say the message is the media. This fact underscores that com-
putational media have become the command and control platform for 
all other industries and indeed for social life. We remind ourselves that 
this medium of information management inexorably functions through 
the writing and unwriting of 1s and 0s: through the production and 
reproduction of writing and of other writing machines—very possibly 
including ourselves. Weiner’s prescient comparison between machinery 
that could learn and self-reproduce and “a virus [that] guides into its 
own form other molecules of the same virus out of the tissues and juices 
of the host”5 in 1961 meant that the writing of 1’s and 0s, implied the 
production of machinery that could both learn and reproduce itself out 
of what chanced by. Because we know that computation has saturated life 
in all its pores, and because we know that computation is the sine qua 
non of contemporary financialization—a financialization that has also 
colonized life—we observe that such viral machinery, with a capacity 
to learn through accumulation, storage and retrieval of knowledge has 
expanded to absorb writing and all other social practice. Who or what 
wrote that program?
Where the machine operator struggles to avoid being posited as chicken
Gramsci’s machine operator who applies their will to the machine 
to produce reality is, in addition to an image of the factory worker 
on the assembly line, also an image of the prisoner/writer Gramsci 
himself. Negotiating political history, industrialization, fascism, and 
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the miserable living conditions that included deprivation of freedom, 
health, and the constant oversight of the prison censor, Gramsci worked 
his machine to bring “the philosophy of praxis” or, in a word he could 
not write, “communism,” into the world. The machine operator at his 
machine is both the assembly-line worker putting their subjective 
labor-time into the commodified factory object and the intellectual 
encoding predictions with a language-machine. It is writing—at 
once—as part of a program and as programming. The revolutionary 
programmer required what Gramsci called “the dual perspective,” half 
animal and half human like the centaur, bound at once to an individual 
moment and a universal moment: “the more an individual is compelled 
to defend his own immediate physical existence, the more will he uphold 
and identify with the highest values of civilisation and of humanity, in 
all their complexity.”6 Nearly foreclosed by the accidents of history, the 
imprisoned intellectual, programming on a machinified language, seizes 
history’s highest aspirations—as a weapon.
Gramsci, the machine-operator’s image of the machine operator, 
speaks to the sedimentation of inequality in modern modes of creativity 
and thought, a sedimentation that is increasingly manifest in the vectors 
of force and manufactured consent mediated by our machines. The 
prison intellectual confronts the social mechanism, and the odds weigh 
heavily against them. Inequality sediments into and indeed informs 
machine-mediated thought, writing as always already cybernetics, as 
word processing, as organizing language function, navigating mass and 
computational media—manifesting the embattled AI that is us. The 
writer-machine is part of the structure of governance (and what is now 
algorithmic governance). We must take seriously Marx’s insight that the 
sedimentation of dead labor as the machinery of fixed capital is also 
the sedimentation of alienated subjectivity and history directly utilized 
to further exploit the living labor of the worker. We must consider the 
writer—the writer whose language has been all but subsumed by the 
operating system of the machine.
In seeing the extensivity of technical processes, Adorno and 
Horkheimer account for the rationale/rationality of industrialization as 
follows:
The technical process, to which the subject has been reified after the 
eradication of that process from consciousness, is as free from the 
ambiguous meanings of mythical thought as from meaning altogether, 
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since reason itself has become merely an aid to the all-encompassing 
economic apparatus. Reason serves as a universal tool for the fabrication 
of all other tools, rigidly purpose-directed and as calamitous as the 
precisely calculated operations of material production, the results of 
which for human beings escape all calculation. Reason’s old ambition 
to be purely an instrument of purposes has finally been fulfilled.7
“Fulfilled.” Yes, what price reason’s “old ambition,” its degree zero, its 
Cartesian (0,0,0) at the origin of modern subjectivity and mathematics, 
and literally the original subject?8 Ironically perhaps, if not also 
accurately, the subject of rationality is also a conduit to the almighty, since 
the fulfillment of reason is at once the emptying out of the subjective 
perceptions and proof of the divine. Cogito ergo sum. Ergo God. The 
path to the sublime of God for the modern subject, the subjectivity of 
zero, was also the path paved by instrumental rationality. Language 
became subject to a calculus that it could not calculate and surrendered 
its power of fabulation to generalized skepticism as a condition of its 
own continued operation. What price (what sum) the divine ideology of 
no ideology manifest in both radical skepticism and the oh-so practical 
activity of the cogito, the cogitation, the emergent scientific calculus 
that is materialized as our written symbolic concepts, our mathematical 
formulations and as our machines of metal and glass—the apparatuses 
that Vilém Flusser characterizes as a thinking in numbers extended into 
matter?9 One of Turing’s great achievements was the demonstration 
in 1936 that numbers, be they computable or incomputable, could be 
treated in the absence of the human brain—calculation could be made 
machinic and automated in accord with very simple rules.10 With Adorno 
and Horkheimer we see that the mechanics of industrialization feed 
forward and back into the conceptual mechanics of physics and math: 
these rational mechanics generate a media ecology of the subject, who is 
at once sovereign, ineffable, and disappeared into the rational material 
processes of his presencing. The subject’s linear inscription of meaning 
and time, organized by and as writing, drawn from the very letters and 
numbers, that at once express him and designed both the machines—
and their operations—that are his disavowed support, his infrastructure, 
and the world-historical accumulation resulting from his metabolism.
With the clean separation between science and poetry the division of 
labor which science had helped to establish was extended to language. 
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For science the word is first of all a sign; it is then distributed among 
the various arts as sound, image, or word proper, but its unity can 
never be restored by the addition of these arts, by synaesthesia or 
total art. As sign, language must resign itself to being calculation and, 
to know nature, must renounce the claim to resemble it. As image it 
must resign itself to being a likeness and, to be entirely nature, must 
renounce the claim to know it.11
Language becomes alienated intelligence while images become unintelli-
gible likenesses. These functions and effects on representation are among 
the techniques and indeed technics of the epic expansion of mediation, 
its accumulation of amortized sensual labor. The consequences of 
rationality “for human beings escapes all calculation,” while imposing 
calculation all the more.
McLuhan nonetheless endeavors to provide a rational account for the 
textual rationalization of discourse (by print) and its consequences:
Whitehead does not elaborate on the great nineteenth century 
discovery of the method of invention. But it is, quite simply, the 
technique of beginning at the end of any operation whatever and of 
working backwards from that point to the beginning. It is the method 
inherent in the Gutenberg technique of homogeneous segmentation, 
but not until the nineteenth century was the method extended from 
production to consumption.12
For McLuhan, it was the homogeneous segmentation that moveable 
type introduced into the flow of signs that gave rise not only to modern 
literature, with the novel’s “equitone prose,” but also Poe’s ingenious 
method of working backwards from the desired result of a narrative 
to the events of the story. Homogeneous segmentation presides over a 
generalized shift in the sense ratios in which eye-man overtakes ear-man 
or tactile-man, but also redounds to the Industrial Revolution, the 
autonomization of the economy relative to society (as McLuhan explains 
through the work of Karl Polyani) and, of course, the scientific method. 
Whether the sequence is print, science, industrialization and economy, 
or segmentation, grammatization, manipulation and distribution, it 
ends in programming. “Got a problem?” says science. Start with the 
future and work your way back to the present. Want to write a scary 
story?” say literature. Start with the desired effect and design the 
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objective correlative to create it. Here capital might say, “Want to make a 
profit?” Reverse engineer M' back to M. For McLuhan, the Gutenbergian 
segmentation into the discrete units of a string of symbols, that could, in 
a few short centuries and a hundred million murders later, be thought of 
as “the code,” also brought about the scientific method, industrialization, 
shifts in the sense ratios, capitalist economy, and, almost incidentally, the 
great formal migrations in literary history. As importantly, print, and the 
ignorance with regard to its effects as a medium, oversaw a generalized 
misidentification of the agents of history since, as McLuhan says, the 
nation and the subject were instantiated by print in the sixteenth century. 
Woe to historians and all peoples who have a stake in history if they 
misidentify its primary agents!
It’s the medium…. We can quibble about the details, particularly 
about what came first—capital or the Gutenberg press. But as McLuhan 
remarks about the chicken and the egg question post-electrification, 
“Instead of asking which came first, the chicken or the egg, it suddenly 
seemed that a chicken was an egg’s idea for getting more eggs.”13 Yeah … 
that’s it! The chicken seems like an egg’s idea to get more eggs: another 
case of M-C-M', where this time, in a slightly expanded frame, C stands 
for chicken (or any other medium) and M, the thinking money, is the 
capitalist’s nest egg, with M', the profit (more eggs), ready for the next 
cycle of chicken-driven expansion.
The capitalized egg dreamt the printed chicken to make more eggs. 
Post hoc ergo proctor hoc. Thus, from the protocol that calls for the 
commodification of chickens by eggs in order to increase the quantity 
of eggs, or for the production of readers by books to get more books 
we encounter once again the outlines of the argument I sketched with 
respect to computational capital, one that states that the germ of capital 
inaugurated the first universalizing digital culture and that history has 
been the multiply contested working out of this, its digital program. 
Like eggs, like books, like money: all things that were formerly con-
stellations of qualities were now and seemingly forever commodities, 
unified by exchange value, for sale on the market. Suddenly all things 
had a digital under-chassis. Digital culture 1.0, that is, capitalism was, as 
Nick Dyer-Witheford tells us, already a computer, running the program 
for the egg to get more eggs, the book to get more books.14 Let us not 
forget the (oftentimes migrant) farm labor that gets encrypted into this 
chicken and egg story, the Mexican and Latinx farm workers seeking 
reparations for having suffered colonial history and the innumerable 
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deaths caused by the colonial calculus, endeavoring to free themselves 
by crossing the border, fighting la migra, and working in some 
egg-identified white man’s agri-chicken business in the tireless pursuit 
to increase his egg-count. Nor should we lose sight of the design and 
manufacture of those little iron cages (of reason) or the use for heating of 
what is, for McLuhan perhaps the ur-medium of the electronic age, light 
bulbs. Famously without content—McLuhan regards the light bulb that 
allowed with equal facility study, surgery and late-night baseball, and 
loudly proclaims, “the medium is the message.”
What then is the message transmitted to the chickens in the agri-hen 
house? What can the chicken read? Let there be light? Perhaps that in the 
span from invisible hand to calculating egg we find the computational 
unconscious at work. The intensification of the logistics of commodi-
fication means the increasing capture of all aspects of life as a medium 
for quantum profit. I will have more to say about the computational 
unconscious in another book (Computational Capital) but this capitalizing 
capture of language, living, imagination, and the whole animal in turn 
means the incipient digitization of the life-world. The commodity form 
is precisely the instantiation of the protocol use-value/exchange-value, 
where exchange-value is at once the common denominator of all things 
of account, and, importantly, a de-qualification, that, via an implicit or 
explicit contract to exchange ownership rights removes said object, in 
this case a chicken, from its web of living connections, and renders it, 
in short, a number. This enclosure precedes most chicken’s lives today, 
and exceeds their conscious knowing. With this digitization comes 
abstraction and programmability and the transposition of chicken 
lives to another domain. Modern media history then is also about the 
production and organization of what computational physics calls the 
digiverse—a place where capital has your number—all your numbers. 
These are the numbers of everything within capital’s perceptual purview: 
from your presence (if not your “being”), to the universe, to all the 
multiverses posited by computational astrophysics and quantum theory: 
the digiverse would contain all.
When chicken development is commandeered by an unforeseen fork 
in the evolutionary road, and all the birds are bred for containeriza-
tion as a medium of money, so much for the Garden of Eden. From a 
systemic point of view it seems to matter little what the chicken thinks. 
Rather, in a world in which all things are enumerated and organized by 
alpha-numeric codes, contingencies are to be understood as operative in 
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a Borgesian garden, the Garden of Forking Paths, to be exact—a garden 
that is labyrinthine, no doubt, but also, as readers of this extraordinary 
parable will remember, one that is shot through with the inexorable 
crunching of operationalized information such that it’s mesh, crush and 
crunch overdetermines all moments of potential and thus of agency; over-
determines, we may dimly hope, not quite to the brink of annihilation. 
Mindful of the chicken’s fate, in which most paths lead to the grocery 
store, how then to game the machine (no pun intended)? What then of 
Gramsci’s machine operators and their/our, machines?
In the next section we will dwell for a moment on the poignant lines 
of a desperate writer that close off the Borgesian “garden,” even as 1) 
the thoroughgoing instrumentalization, rationalization and codification 
of the commodified life-world Earth reaches a new pitch, while 2) 
humans become functionally reduced to standing reserve in informatic 
capitalism and informatic capitalist war, and 3) they/we become func-
tionaries of its proliferating apparatuses—written, reading, writing, read 
and forced to play against the odds. “Functionary” is Flusser’s word for 
the photographer dominated by the omnipresent program of the camera, 
but it is also Gramsci’s term for the prole subjugated to the machine and 
the manager subjugated to the interests of ownership. As we shall see, the 
functionality of the functionary and the condition of the photographer 
who plays against the program of the machine has become the general 
case. The instrumentalization of the mentality by systemic rationality 
leads to both the extreme rationalism and simultaneously to the extreme 
irrationality noted by Adorno and Horkheimer and experienced by the 
subject forced into a continuous calculus of risk and reward, the subject 
forced to game.
2
A Message from Borges:  
The Informatic Labyrinth




Recall that at the outset of the path through “The Garden” (but already 
in the thrall of the middle of the action), the protagonist spy for the 
Germans, Yu Tsun, steadied himself with his own counsel: “The author 
of an atrocious undertaking ought to imagine he has already accomplished 
it, ought to impose upon himself a future that is as irrevocable as the past.” 
Composing himself thus he is able to send, through “the uproar of war” 
the message that is his to send. He sends that message by means of a man, 
a genius “great as Goethe” (and one who, by a twist of fate, was also able 
to reveal to Yu Tsun lost secrets of his own Chinese ancestry) precisely 
by killing him. This man’s name happened to coincide with the name of 
the English town Albert that German intelligence revealed needed to be 
bombed for the war effort. Captured and then imprisoned in England 
after the murder and condemned to the gallows Borges’ character writes:
I have communicated to Berlin the secret name of the city they must 
attack. They bombed it yesterday. I read in the same papers that offered 
to England the mystery of the learned Sinologist Stephen Albert who 
was murdered by a stranger, one Yu Tsun. The Chief had deciphered 
this mystery. He knew my problem was to indicate (through the 
uproar of war) the city called Albert, and that I had found no other 
means to do so than to kill a man of that name. He does not know (no 
one can know) my innumerable contrition and weariness.1
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“Innumerable.” A word that, in qualifying contrition and weariness, 
stands out in a universe becoming increasingly codified, calculated 
and calculating. In a world overrun by various forms of calculus and 
instrumental enumeration, it indicates something that cannot be 
counted. One may wonder: Is there anymore anywhere a beyond 
number? Something that evades enumeration and that exceeds what 
could only be algorithmic governance? Something not subordinated to 
calculation and encryption in a world at war, a something that persists 
as an incalculable remainder? Already, in 1941, under emergent regimes 
not just of instrumental rationality but instrumental mediation, that 
question became the question—at least for the blind librarian named 
Borges, who was what he read. Very likely his own serious political 
failings gave him pause.
Readers of “The Garden of Forking Paths” may remember, that Borges, 
through Albert, offers them a challenge midway through the story: “In a 
riddle whose answer is chess, what is the one word that is inadmissible?” 
And Albert, who is, in fact, a regular Einstein, provides us and the baffled 
Yu Tsun with that answer: “Chess,” of course. Some readers of the story, 
taking the bait, and engaging in a meta-analysis of the divergent paths 
indicated there have said that the answer to the riddle of “The Garden’s” 
own narratological and indeed cosmo-logical question is “time,” but to 
judge by the rules set out, they are mistaken: that word is actually given 
in the text—as the solution to Yu Tsun’s ancestor’s labyrinth. “Time,” 
unnamed by the ancestral author of the labyrinth/novel inside of Borges’ 
text, fragments, forks, runs parallel, reconnects, and though reportedly 
unwritten there, is indeed written by the author of “The Garden.” It is 
offered as the domain name for a core mutation in the flux of things 
that explains the narrative form created by Yu Tsun’s ancestor and author 
of the labyrinth, but not that of “The Garden” itself. What might seem 
like another promising candidate for the answer to the riddle of “The 
Garden,” “history,” seemingly absent from the narrative proper and thus 
quite possibly the medium that was required to be re-imagined in order 
to make the various elements of the story yielding Yu-Shun’s innumerable 
contrition and weariness cohere is also disqualified. “History” as it turns 
out is written in the very first line of our text as part of the title of another 
text that frames all the other mediated layers of text and acts of reportage 
dramatized within. The story begins, “In Liddell Hart’s History of World 
War I …” and so on.
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“History,” written within “The Garden” is not the answer to the riddle 
of the garden of forking paths wherein whose labyrinth all possibilities are 
inscribed, but more than 75 years from the moment of this inscription, 
it seems likely that the answer to Borges’ riddle is “information.” The 
word does not occur, but every word, thought, image and act in the 
story, including the programmatic intelligence required to send a 
message “through the uproar of war,” or what we might call “noise,” is a 
negotiation of its multiplex churn. Information is what must be gathered, 
negotiated and transmitted. It supersedes time and history; its surge 
transforms intelligence, character, the terms of engagement among 
people, and narrative form. In informatic war, where life is taken for the 
purpose of taking more life, and communication means the transmission 
of information, people are shown to be functionaries of its protocols and 
indeed media. The treatment of Albert, killed for the accident of his name 
with the express aim of targeting a military strike, concisely demonstrates 
that the medium is the message and the message is murder.
What might lie beyond the cruel calculus of the informatic combinatory 
of contingency and necessity that constitutes the substance, plot and 
drama of the war of maneuver and of the existential riddle posed by 
“The Garden of Forking Paths?” Only a residue or remainder, the closing 
inscription of Yu Shun, appearing at the end of the story and just beyond 
the threshold of communicable knowledge: precisely the “innumerable 
contrition and weariness” that “no one can know.” All the rest it seems is 
history, written by those with Liddell Hart.
With or without heart, things come to pass, numbers get crunched. 
The “innumerable contrition and weariness” that “no one can know” 
indicates the emergent historical sensibility of an emotional dominant 
that will at once result from and partially elide massive information 
processing. One might think of “Bifo’s” analysis, in his book After the 
Future, of the rampant depression and burnout characteristic of our 
times, or his scathing treatment of Lenin as a depressive who combated 
his bouts of nervous breakdown with responses of ironclad will. We 
could venture—and Borges’ story would support—that another name 
for this “innumerable contrition and weariness” today is Anne Cheng’s 
“racial melancholia.” It is a central, though underappreciated fact, that 
in the bibliophilic, nearly sightless Argentine’s story of informatics, the 
principle antagonists are racialized: “Madden [the character who pursues 
and captures Yu Tsun,] was implacable. Or rather, he was obliged to be 
so. An Irishman in the service of England, a man accused of laxity and 
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perhaps of treason, how could he fail to seize and be thankful for such 
a miraculous opportunity: the discovery, the capture, maybe even the 
death of two agents of the German Reich.”2 Against centuries of British 
colonialism, racial oppression, Edmund Spenser’s genocidal “View on 
the Present State of Ireland,” an Irishman “in the service of England” 
is indeed “obliged” to be implacable. His body and tongue, coded for 
suspicion by his racial legibility under English hegemony, obliges 
him. Referring to his own part as a spy for Germany in the info-war, 
the protagonist Yu Tsun, who is one of the German agents Madden 
has the good fortune of an opportunity to kill, remarks about his own 
intelligence activity:
I didn’t do it for Germany, no. I care nothing for a barbarous country 
which imposed upon me the abjection of being a spy … I did it because 
I sensed that the Chief somehow feared people of my race—for the 
innumerable ancestors that merge within me. I wanted to prove to 
him that a yellow man could save his armies.3
The contradictory implication that Yu Tsun honors his again “innu-
merable” Chinese ancestors by struggling against proto-Nazi German 
racism in a way that, by cruel irony, supports the German Reich, (at the 
time of the writing of this story the then current German Third Reich 
was organizing a holocaust) in no way mitigates the multiple impera-
tives of these codes. Rather, in making Yu Tsun’s negotiations of race, 
power and abjection parallel to Madden’s, we see coded bodies caught 
in an informatic meshwork, organized by and operative in a matrix of 
codification processes that overdetermines their options and drives 
them in ways that “no one can know.” Yu Tsun’s struggle against racial-
ization supports the Reich’s racist pursuits; he fights racism in support 
of racism—that is the hand he’s been dealt, and that one is still dealt 
today. Madden’s support of the English, serves a nation that would have 
exterminated him. Sound familiar? Reading, writing, written and read, 
all characters navigate a fully codified world, and somewhere do the 
math of risk management in order to respond to and send messages. 
They are awash in information, overrun by a matrix of code, destined by 
some incomprehensible emergence to function as computational media.
Borges’ garden of forking paths, less the garden of Eden and more a fully 
immersive discrete state machine, shows clearly how human qualities are 
becoming coded, instrumentalized, and structurally converted into tools 
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of communication—each semiotic instance offers a fork. The phonebook 
where Yu Shun finds an Albert along with his address becomes a 
database, the pistol used to shoot generates a “report.” History’s new 
mise en scène, with multiple channels and ambient code all bent by and 
towards the instrumentality of war nearly eliminates prior natural rela-
tionships to organic things such that an encounter with the uncodified 
becomes remarkable. On the path to Albert’s, for example, a fleeing Yu 
Tsun has a moment to reflect upon what he sees, “I thought that a man 
can be the enemy of other men, of the moments of other men, but not of 
a country: not of fireflies, words, gardens, streams of water, sunsets.”4 The 
uncodified natural world contrasts starkly with the adversarial capture 
and mobilization of all that can be informationalized. The codified world, 
shot through with information, demands of those historically enframed 
by ambient codification both strategy and willfulness, yet it makes of 
its subject-as-game-theorist’s singular intentions, only a pathway, a plot, 
for warding off contingency, “The author of an atrocious undertaking 
ought to imagine he has already accomplished it, ought to impose upon 
himself a future that is as irrevocable as the past.” Such a plot offers not an 
existential explanation of the reason for informatics but only a practical 
program for its reason. Here again, as with the case of “more eggs,” we 
begin with the desired end state and have the application of human will 
to the society of things: “the machine operator’s to his machine.” But 
the machine, no longer fixed in the factory, is ambient and omnipresent: 
The natural world appears marginal and strange when set against the 
relentless and menacing function of an increasingly codified world that 
demands to be read and written. And re-written. Action itself is captured 
by code, encrypted, and undertaken only for the sake of transmission. 
Thus what “information” explains is precisely this shift from temporal 
openness to programming, from fireflies to assassination. What still 
needs to be explained is the infiltration of informatics into lifetime itself 
and the innumerable remainders.5
Today, as we pass the hundredth anniversary of the Russian Revolution, 
when the abject fail to send their messages in the old school ways or 
on Instagram, other attention algorithms such as shooting up their 
schoolmates or killing their colored neighbors, or going on a killing spree 
in a queer club they might have otherwise found freedom in, present 
themselves as means of (re-)mediating their agency. Got to send our 
messages—or so they must feel. “White people” for example, white men, 
self-identified by virtue of being content to be the authors of atrocious 
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acts (the very thing that constitutes “the white race”) find that even their 
once seemingly irrevocable authority has been cut and mixed and thus 
needs buttressing. Not quite the abjection of being a spy perhaps, but 
the abjection of non-recognition, of not having one’s message received 
and acknowledged by the presumably sovereign community of white 
brethren and their murderous bond. On second thought, this extension 
of invisibility and non-recognition even to the white man is another 
version of the abjection of being a spy, of traveling incognito and never 
being able to come home. It drives white-identifying types to deport, 
incarcerate, murder, to vote for fascists, to declare war. They become 
spies, reading information off the skins, clothes and accents of others, 
coding their own actions in a struggle for legibility. They want to send a 
message through the uproar of what for them is still civil war.
Even as Borges was writing “The Garden of Forking Paths” in 
recognition that linguistic codes, including racial and national markings, 
were being functionalized as information, and even as eggs were being 
encouraged to engage in risk management and advertising to assure 
themselves of getting more eggs, the full mathematicization of these 
codes of representation was being consciously undertaken. Norbert 
Weiner, Claude Shannon, Warren Weaver, Alan Turing, among others 
were grafting signs to number in unprecedented ways, translating and 
indeed transducing messages using modalities that were number based 
and “content indifferent:” just as ALBERT the message was sublimely 
indifferent to Albert the man. Statistical methods, punchcards, paper 
tapes, discrete state machines cryptography, cybernetics, and artificial 
intelligence: Electricity, it seems, could be used to generate on a large 
scale not just content indifferent light, but content indifferent numbers—
and that would change the world. It was this indifference that made the 
difference that Adorno and Horkheimer called incalculable.
Admittedly much work on information and computation, on cryp-
tography and cybernetics, was not immediately economic, undertaken 
(and funded) as it was for the war effort(s), or at least in relation to it 
(them). Computation and information were considered means to new 
forms of steerage, from cryptography, to cybernetics, to control and to 
the atom bomb. But were these mid-century info masters populating 
Princeton, Bletchley Park and the Macy conferences creating ex nihlo 
or even ex mathematica?6 Or, were they formalizing a systemic shift 
in the operational logistics of a world—already grown abstract and 
increasingly codified by the exigencies of wars organized by crises in 
38 . the message is murder
capitalist production that, without a doubt, included vectors of racism, 
colonialism, gender oppression and homophobia? For the thought 
experiment at hand it seems advantageous to wager on the latter thesis, 
that information emerges not just in the foot print of evaluation, but of 
valuation—but more on that anon.
Guy Debord, arguably a brilliant theorist of data processing, 
understood with perhaps still unsurpassed clarity, some of the social 
consequences of digitization, even if he did not think in precisely those 
terms. What he called “the spectacle,” “the accumulation of capital to the 
point where it becomes an image,” became symptom, modality, and goal 
of capitalism. Spectacle had, in other words, a digital logic and was ideo-
logically if perhaps not entirely technically a pre-DC2 digital incarnation. 
The spectacle, a historically new form of social relation, was an inten-
sification of commodification. Retrospectively the spectacle meant a 
heightening of the incipient digitization of daily life, and the emergence 
of what today we might call data visualization. My conflation here of mass 
cultural forms with the more restricted and seemingly precise notion of 
data visualization reserved for computational design is purposeful. Data 
processing does not all take place at the same level, or with the same level 
of legibility for all concerned. Debord’s spectacle, as theorized in SOS, 
had deep links to ideology, that is, to forms of thinking and knowing, 
themselves organized to legitimate and sustain the material practices 
of capitalism and yet it also marked a wholesale liquidation of certain 
analytic capacities. The spectacle was not a narrative or any particular 
world view; the spectacle was rather “all that appears,” all that could 
appear, in a new stage of capital that for Debord was also the colonization 
of the senses and of time. For Debord the spectacle was “the guardian of 
sleep.” This modality of appearance, all of the practices that went into the 
creation of the spectacle as social relation, in turn, depended upon, and 
indeed were, the worldwide expansion of quantification. That is, it was 
part of the evolution of the commodity form and the expansion of the 
logic of exchange-value. The spectacle was in short for Debord the key 
interface with capital—the further codification of appearance by capital. 
Its multiplex operation extended from the commodity form to the screen 
and colonized perception, awareness and the imagination.
The cues around the block that for Christian Metz “invented cinema” 
were in fact digitized at the box office; before the rise of “digital culture;” 
digitization was already taking place and the cinema and spectacle 
were paradigmatic interfaces. Building on Debord, I understood in 
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The Cinematic Mode of Production that those analogue images, subject 
to background digitization by the box-office, the studio and the bank, 
were slated for further digitization and a dramatically increased func-
tionality by means of culturing, that is expanding, the digital feedback 
mechanism known as the market increasingly mediated by the digital 
computer. Qualitative theory was necessary to challenge the onslaught 
of quantification.
Marx’s project is the project of a conscious history whereby the 
quantitative realm that arises from the blind development of purely 
economic productive forces would be transformed into a qualitative 
appropriation of history. The critique of political economy is the first 
act of this end of prehistory: “Of all the instruments of production, the 
greatest productive power is the revolutionary class itself.”7
So, quantification against “the qualitative appropriation of history,” quan-
tification against the revolutionary class and the revolution. The greatest 
productive power, says Debord, is the revolutionary class itself, a class 
that for Debord needs to awake from the spell of the somnambulism of 
the spectacle, and “take up arms” against the society of the spectacle for 
its dialogue to be heard. This is the class recently re-imagined by Hardt 
and Negri as “the multitudes” and by Franco Berardi in a totally alienated 
form as “the general intellect in search of a body.” For these latter thinkers 
the revolutionary class today is composed of atomized bodies and 
nobodies. The revolutionary class is also not that revolutionary, and not 
a (self-conscious) class. Negri’s social factory, my own attention theory 
of value, Virno’s virtuosity, Berardi’s cellurization of labor, Lazzarato’s 
new work on “machinic enslavement,” and a litany of other terms 
developed over the last couple of decades, have testified that the deter-
ritorialized factory and the radical fragmentation of production (and of 
productive bodies) are among the fundamental features and problems 
of post-Fordism. Virtuosic social cooperation in the social factory, the 
“communism of capital,” all transpire under the fractal logic of quantum 
profiteering. Race, as Wendy Chun smiths it, appears “as a technology,” 
and intersectionality becomes a qualitative means by which to overcome 
hegemonic categoricality. These are among the social practices that 
will give rise to social media (social-media), the abstraction of and 
the technical realization of a computational processing of information 
that was already present in Borges. Everywhere we struggle with the 
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imposition of algorithmic overdetermination, yet who has really figured 
out how to send a message that does not also entail murder?
Derivative revolution
The abstraction and formalization of social practices as social-media 
marks the subsumption of social life that announces the arrival of 
full-blown computational capital. As the late Randy Martin, Bob Meister, 
Benjamin Lee, Robert Wosnitzer and others involved in the New York 
based “Cultures of Finance” group suggest, we are, with the financial-
ization of culture, for the moment at least irrevocably in the domain of 
the derivative. Everyone is seeking a hedge on volatility—such is the 
current condition. But derivative revolution can be captured as capitalist 
production and is locally navigated upon an ocean of inequality … 
Borges could not be a Marxist, but he well understood how subjective 
residues were deposited from the willful navigation by agents of infor-
mation’s capacity for sublime content indifference.
In addition to the fragmentation and indeed fractalization of the 
freedom seeking media edge-worker in processes of production 
distributed across the entire landscape of the social—even through the 
unremunerated labor of virtuosic cognitive-linguistic production— 
we need to understand within this transformed media-scape that the 
status of the object, and more particularly of the commodity has lost the 
very solidity that seemed to define it. Only an awareness of informatic 
transformation at the ontological level will allow us to fully grasp the 
dissolution of the prior epoch and its metaphysics in the vectoralized 
informatic swarms of capital. Swarms that when all is said and done, or 
even before, may have, in their executive opinion, better uses for you and 
your molecules than you do. All that is solid melts into computation, and 
attention metrics emerge to account for—as a system of accounts for—the 
AI-directed extraction and amalgamation of sensual labor. Everything 
sensible and indeed insensible becomes at once a solicitation to work 
and an advertisement for itself. Informatics is the key transition to the 
distributed production and consumption of integrated commodities, the 
bundling and re-selling of attentional products.
In the last chapter of Message there will be more to say about dif-
ferentiable objects and integrated commodities, understanding that in 
post-Fordist economies of distributed production and valorization a 
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new morphology of social form is emergent even if perhaps the basic 
rule set of capitalism has remained constant. One stumbling block on the 
path to unraveling the mysteries of computational capital and financial-
ized communication is precisely this prevailing confusion that conflates 
the object form and the commodity form. This misapprehension of the 
essence of the commodity has led to the mistaken notion that cognitive 
capitalism, semio-capitalism, neuro-capitalism and/or attention 
economy imply the death of the commodity-form. This confusion is 
analogous to another mistaken notion, namely, that under post-Fordism 
value has become immeasurable and that work has disappeared. In 
reality, the growth of social-media and financial derivatives are, from 
the standpoint of capital, nothing other than the development of new 
metrics for the evaluation—and indeed valuation—of a new phase of 
commodification and new forms of productive labor.8 In understanding 
that the discrete object (a coat, to use a famous example) represents an 
instance or stage in history of the commodity-form (and as a particular 
value in time is essentially a derivative in a calculus of value), it will be 
useful to recognize that Marx never presented the commodity-form as 
one with the object. Rather the commodity-form was itself a decoding 
of the capital-mediated object’s unsettling appearance and dynamics 
as a relation between use-value and exchange-value. The commodity 
exists in a regime itself organized by the complex—and indeed 
dynamic—logistics of wage-labor and private property. Thus, while the 
commodity-form expressed the abstract formation of a phenomenon 
most readily visible as the industrial object, its ostensibly objectivity was 
the consequence of a set of historical practices that were themselves but 
a stage in capitalist accumulation. The object was a result of the physics 
of a moment in the history of capitalization and resulted in that period’s 
metaphysics—it being understood that the subject was the other side 
of that equation, and money was the vanishing mediator, the general 
equivalent. Post-Fordism’s emergent dynamics include shifts not just 
in the objective character of the commodity, but also in the character 
of labor, the wage, affect, social currency. The mode of production has 
become computational. This fractalization of the relations of production 
produces a matrix of dividuals and monetization interfaces. The 
endeavor here would include the mandate to understand the central role 
of screens and computation as a dialectical development in capital, as 
well as the, often violent, (re-)organization and maintenance (policing) 
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of categories of social difference that indicate the experiential dimension 
of derivative finance.
* * *
The next chapter considers the informatic shattering of humanist 
thought already conceived (and indeed accomplished) by Alan Turing 
by mid-century.9 The emergence of computational machines is at once 
a formalization and a becoming conscious of operations already implicit 
in capital—a formalization of its unconscious processes, and yours, 
that allows for its expansion and intensification, and opens a pathway 
toward the dissolution of subjects and objects by matrixial proliferation. 
Contemporary consciousness is the result of the massive formalization 
through abstraction and relentless codification by means of digitized 
writing machines of those calculative practices of lived cost-benefit 
analysis that are now fed back into the social metabolism (through 
“feeds”). This recursivity between machine and person extends the 
calculus of profit, ramifying new sites of production and presenting a 
whole new set of problems—a set that quite frankly, includes “you.”
Recognizing the extension of digital operations into the core of 
what used to be “the self,” we might then pause a moment on Roberto 
Retamar’s scathing critique of Borges and his right-wing affinities. 
For the most famous Marxist literary critic of Latin America, Borges’ 
pages “are the painful testimony of a class with no way out, diminished 
to saying in the voice of one man, “The world, unfortunately is real; I 
unfortunately am Borges.”10 Retamar’s indictment of Borges’ right-lean-
ing betrayals of Latin American revolutionary becoming might suggest 
that the writer-spy Yu Tsun’s “innumerable contrition and weariness” 
was more than a tad autobiographical. Perhaps in its own way the 
geopolitical garden of forking paths shattered Borges too. Poetic then 
indeed that Retamar closes his groundbreaking essay on Caliban with a 
lucid antithesis to the career of a Borges described as “a colonial and a 
representative of a dying class.”11 Dreaming of a different historical role 
for Ariel, Retamar counter poses against Borges’ role as Latin America’s 
preeminent writer, Che’s word’s offered at the University of Las Villas on 
28 December 1959 and designed to interrupt the codes of capitalist war 
by transforming the very source of the codex:
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I am convinced of the overwhelming necessity of the revolution and 
the infinite justice of the people’s cause—I would hope for those 
reasons that you, today proprietors of the university, will extend it to 
the people. I do not say this as a threat, so as to avoid its being taken 
over by them tomorrow. I say it simply because it would be one more 
among so many beautiful examples in Cuba today: that proprietors of 
the Central University of Las Villas, the students, offer it to the people 
through their revolutionary government. And to the distinguished 
professors, my colleagues, I have to say something similar: become 
black, mulatto, a worker, a peasant; go down among the people, 
respond to the people, that is, to all the necessities of all of Cuba. 
When this is accomplished, no one will be the loser; we all will have 
gained, and Cuba can then continue its march toward the future with 
a more vigorous step, and you will not need to include in your cloister 
this doctor, commandante, bank president, and today professor of 
pedagogy who now takes leave of you.12
Retamar concludes: “That is to say, Che proposed that the ‘European 
university’ as Marti would have said, yield before the ‘American 
university.’ He proposed to Ariel, through his own most luminous and 
sublime example if ever there was one, that he seek from Caliban the 
honor of a place in his rebellious and glorious ranks.”13 Che too saw that 
social difference was historically constituted but he proposed a different 
matrix of relations than did Borges: “become black, mulatto, a worker, a 
peasant.” Open the university to the people and enable Caliban’s code to 
rewrite the world. In other words, don’t be satisfied to be what you have 
read; write otherwise. Interrogate the terms of codifications, the codifi-
cations of class, race, identity; and rewrite them as necessary. Relating the 
narratives of such codification directly to number, in the brilliant book 
Who Counts, a book on genocide in Guatemala and the socio-semiotic 
struggles around numerology including between Western and Mayan 
mathematics, Diane Nelson teaches us something we should never forget: 
Double-entry bookkeeping is also an ethno-mathematics, but with an 
army.14 We will hold fast to this notion of the enthno-mathematics of 
capitalist computation—their narratologies and practical results—in 
subsequent sections.
3
Alan Turing’s Self-Defense:  
On Not Castrating the Machines
I forgot my destiny of one pursued. I felt myself to be for an unknown 
period of time an abstract perceiver of the world.
—Borges
Alan Turing’s dismissal of the provocative question “Can machines 
think?” in “Computing, Machinery and Intelligence,” his masterful 
essay of 1950, decisively reformats the question of consciousness. In 
his essay, Turing dismisses the question of the thinking machine as not 
useful—because, as he demonstrates with startling economy, the terms 
of the question itself are improperly understood. In fact, he manages 
this dismissal while unequivocally answering the question regarding the 
possibility of the existence of such a machine in the affirmative.1 His 
interrogation of the presumed uniqueness of “man,” also has implications 
for the unconscious as that which gives consciousness depth and 
presence, though he does not address the unconscious directly as such 
in the piece. In keeping with Turing but with our own purposes firmly in 
mind, we will want to note the existence of what I call the computational 
unconscious, because it names precisely the haunting of contemporary 
thought by the unthought and largely unthinkable history of computa-
tional praxis that materially underpins current thought, knowledge and 
computation. I will endeavor to clarify this assertion below.
In “Computing, Machinery and Intelligence,” Turing goes so far as 
to posit a version of a vast computational unconscious as a statistically 
likely ontological condition that can be summed up as follows: we do not 
know that we are computers. This radical anti-humanist position staked 
out by Turing is often missed but the implication regarding a generalized 
misperception of the nature of computation is clear. For Turing, the 
notion of intelligence, resting upon the notion of human intelligence 
and thus upon the humanist tradition, is simply a notion of intelligence 
that depends upon the non-perception (ignorance) of the possibility 
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that human behavior is a consequence of the rigorous execution of the 
operations of a rule-set. Turing held that at the very least, the contrary 
notion, that there was not a set of rules governing human behavior, and 
that human behavior was thus not a computational effect, could not be 
proven. As he writes regarding the hypothetical rule set for the laws of 
human behavior, “The only way for finding such laws [of behavior] is 
scientific observation, and we certainly know of no circumstances under 
which we could say, ‘We have searched enough. There are no such laws’.”2
To emphasize the point that we have only really just begun an investi-
gation into the laws of intelligent behavior, Turing adds:
We can demonstrate more forcibly that any such statement would 
be unjustified. For suppose we could be sure of finding such laws if 
they existed. Then given a discrete-state machine it should certainly 
be possible to discover by observation sufficient about it to predict 
its future behavior, and this within a reasonable time, say a thousand 
years. But this does not seem to be the case. I have set up on the 
Manchester computer a small programme using only 1000 units 
of storage, whereby the machine supplied with one sixteen figure 
number replies with another within two seconds. I would defy anyone 
to learn from these replies sufficient about the programme to be able 
to predict any replies to untried values.3
In 1950, in a single act of cryptographic sprezzatura, Turing puts his 
formidable reputation on the line to demonstrate that the best mathe-
maticians of the day cannot reverse engineer a few lines of his code that 
takes one of 10^16 possible inputs and returns one of 10^16 possible 
outputs—no matter how extensive a chart of inputs and outputs they 
might be able to assemble. If that relatively controlled environment 
of “only” 100 million billion input variants along with an equivalent 
number of possible outputs does not yield to empirical scrutiny such 
that the program can be reverse engineered, how much less, the data 
field of human history? Clearly the prior 1000 years has not been enough 
time to crack the code of human behavior (should it exist) by examining 
inputs and outputs, and possibly the next 1000 may not be enough. But 
ignorance is no excuse for the law, as the old anti-Republican joke goes, 
and ignorance of computational process (non-conscious cognition, as 
Kathryn Hayles recently ventured), which the evidence suggests is how 
Turing conceives of Darwin, is no excuse for a law that claims human 
46 . the message is murder
exceptionalism; it in no way guarantees that a program of sorts (a 
rule set) is not churning in the background iterating complexity along 
perfectly rule-bound lines. This insight implies a radical liquidation of 
the humanist tradition along with all of its exceptionalizing essential-
isms by positing a trajectory of procedural emergence. Turing, it seems, 
would be in agreement with McLuhan regarding the misidentification of 
historical agents (the autonomy of subjects, the essences of beings), but 
his insight has even greater ontological depth because of the granularity 
implied by his notion of media.
It is within the domain of a rationale that understands that entities are 
not givens but emerge from the operation of rules, that Turing replaces 
the question “Can machines think?” with “the imitation game.” This game 
involves the question of whether or not an “interrogator” can discern if 
the entity they are typing a conversation with is a human or a machine. 
This shifting of the “nature” of the question of machine intelligence 
is a bold move, involving what Katherine Hayles refers to as a “sleight 
of hand” that, as she notes, already situates the formerly human being 
in a networked “posthuman” condition no matter the outcome of any 
particular instance of what came to be called the Turing Test.4 As humans 
are placed within a circuit of symbolic exchange with machines, the full 
integration of humans with (writing) machines is suddenly a given in a 
way that looks both forward and back in time. Turing’s reframing of the 
question can machines think, is for him necessary in order to answer the 
question, because in his own view we understand neither the meaning 
of the word “machine” nor, perhaps even more dramatically, “think.” But 
for better or worse, we may discern from the above example of Turing’s 
challenge to reverse engineer a rule set, that what is at play here is, from 
the point of view of metaphysics, a bit more than a magic trick. Turing’s 
argument is at once ontological and teleological, if only weakly with 
respect to the latter. How little we understand “machine” and “think” 
indicates that the stakes involved in this understanding may vitiate 
ontological presuppositions that extend to the essence of humanism and 
humanistic thought and that include notions of governance, hierarchy, 
divinity and “man.” The challenging of these presuppositions explains 
why Turing published this essay in the philosophy journal Mind. In 
the guise of a casual inquiry into the nature of computation, the essay 
orchestrates high metaphysical drama; it troubles not only the nature of 
machines but of “man.”
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Among Turing’s examples of human elements, which, in the terms 
of the imitation game are no longer essential verities but rather 
virtualities or virtualizations, there are subtle but significant inclusions 
of gender, race and nation. For example, the imitation game in which an 
interrogator must specify the difference between man and machine is 
based on a game that already implies a form of cross-dressing and gender 
performativity: “The interrogator stays in a room apart from the other 
two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of 
the other two is the man and which is the woman.”5 What is important 
here in the erotics of this tropologic parlor game is first that gender is 
deduced from input and output, in short, from the interplay of codes, and 
furthermore that in making the determination of gender it is possible to 
be “wrong” (while still being subjectively “right”). Human intelligence is 
AI in drag. But eliciting the “wrong” identification is in fact victory for 
the impersonator, making the drag performance at once more real than 
real, and, in the context of the larger argument, the truth of intelligence. 
From this insight, plus a few decades of thought and passionate struggle, 
we glimpse a path to the groundbreaking work of Judith Butler. If gender 
is code all the way down, obviously there is no ontological right and 
wrong—just and always an exchange of information and thus simulation 
and its consequent semiosis.6 And as Butler lucidly demonstrated more 
than twenty years ago, this semiosis includes not just gender but “sex.” It’s 
performance all the way down.
This de-ontologization of gender early in the history of computing did 
not, however, prevent the engineering of the female voice of computation 
within the developmental framework of heteropatriarchy—there are 
many examples from the starship Enterprise computer (“… working”) 
to Siri. As Emma Goss brilliantly puts it, “The ultimate marker of 
artificial intelligence … was based on the idea that a computer could 
perform femininity better than a real woman.”7 Looking at the history of 
the utilization of the female voice in communication and computation 
from early phone operators, to mid-century female programmers to 
Siri, Goss argues that with electronic communication and computation 
there emerged an idea that “women’s intelligence could be electronically 
engineered”8 and that women were “artificially intelligent.”9 She writes, 
“People [who get] fed up with the shortcomings of voice-communicative 
technology, recogniz[e] that their ‘smart’ phones are not very smart at 
all. Rather than blame the engineers for the faulty technology, people 
have come to blame “her,” the voice, the artificially intelligent woman.”10
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Thus we begin to see that the conscious development of machine 
intelligence required a disruption of many of the ontological presup-
positions of hegemonic Western society and also that many age-old 
assumptions reasserted themselves in the making of new technologies. 
Additionally, we find that just as the de-essentialization of gender 
was implicit in Turing’s understanding of machine-think, but did 
not guarantee a progressive politics (at least so long as an essentialist 
metaphysics with regard to one’s own humanity remained), so too 
was the de-essentializing of race and disability. Against the numerous 
“disabilities” presumably inherent in machines that would exclude them 
from being counted as thinking, Turing comments:
The inability to enjoy strawberries and cream may have struck the 
reader as frivolous. Possibly a machine might be made to enjoy this 
delicious dish, but any attempt to make one do so would be idiotic. 
What is important about this disability is that it contributes to some of 
the other disabilities, e.g., the difficulty of the same kind of friendliness 
occurring between man and machine as between white man and white 
man, or between black man and black man.11
Turing’s logic here is indirect but rigorous. Because of prejudice regarding 
perceived disabilities, the friendliness between man and machine cannot 
be like that friendliness between white and white or black and black. The 
unsaid here is the relation to the unformulated combination, the (non-) 
“friendliness” between white and black, a relation which by implication 
is analogous to the prejudicial relation between (so-called man) and 
(so-called) machine that Turing inveighs against. This argument also 
marks the assignation of the category “disability” as a form of prejudice, 
one that is a condition of ignorance.
These anti-essentialist notions tear up the founding of social difference 
on humanist ontology (more or less the same humanism that presided in 
the colonies, over segregation and apartheid, and that everywhere rears 
its ugly head today). Here anyway, Turing’s anti-essentialist notions are 
without doubt a consequence of the critique of metaphysics implied by 
the slow revelation of the programmability of the discrete state machine. 
When Turing is pressed, that is, when he presses himself to provide an 
actual example of a “learning machine,” that is, of a program capable 
of self-modification through interaction with the environment and 
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therefore of intelligent self-transformation, he uses the analogy of a 
human child. But he also says:
The idea of a learning machine may appear paradoxical to some 
readers. How can the rules of operation of the machine change? They 
should describe completely how the machine will react whatever its 
history might be, whatever changes it might undergo. The rules are 
thus quite time-invariant. This is quite true. The explanation of the 
paradox is that the rules that get changed in the learning process 
are of a rather less pretentious kind, claiming only an ephemeral 
validity. The reader may draw a parallel with the Constitution of the 
United States.12
While it is unclear to me whether Turing means to suggest that the 
main body of the constitution is the unchanging portion, while the 
amendments are the examples of machine learning (amendments 
which would include the abolition of slavery and women’s suffrage), or 
that the Constitution in its entirety is the variable in the more abstract 
machine that is the state and society or even the meta-program of 
“human behavior,” the difference hardly matters here: Not only is the 
state founded on a machine that can learn; it can also think. Though 
subject to hardwiring, the program can be modified. Rule sets persist; 
programs can be modified and machines can learn. Currently inscribed 
in that circuit is this category called “man.”
From these examples touching on gender, race and nation, we see 
that already with Turing, the substrate of social and historical existence 
not only tropologically informs Turing’s thought but is also radically 
redefined by computational logic. Where before there were men and 
women, blacks and whites, gods and states, with Turing there are rule 
sets. Rule sets are prior to emergent instantiations and they condition 
them. Turing’s brilliant abstraction and reduction in the “Turing Test” of 
intelligence to communication and of communication to performative 
simulation in “Computing, Machinery and Intelligence” is of a piece 
with the harnessing of language as programmatic medium, in a way that 
retroactively renders the operations of the symbolic as itself a simulation 
that “is” “human” intelligence. Kittler, whatever his flaws, has a point 
when he observes that the machinic typewriter with its transformation 
not only of language but of philosophy and mind is, by separating writing 
from the organic body, the mechanical preconditions for machine-based 
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computation. “Turing merely got rid of the people and typists that 
Remington & Son needed for reading and writing.”13
One cannot disprove the possibility (indeed likelihood) that what 
passes for human intelligence is the computational effect produced by 
the execution of a rule set or even that what we categorize as human 
intelligence was always already machine-mediated. For Turing, the 
ramification of scientific rationality into the natural world provided 
increasing evidence that the universe functions according to rules and 
that human beings were unlikely to be an exception. It is no wonder 
that he felt he had to debunk various objections to the possibility of 
machine thinking, since humans were in some sense understood as 
machines or at least the result of machinic operations. The ripostes and 
put-downs to common objections arising to stave off the horror of this 
radical and profound anti-humanism were craftily indexed in Turing’s 
essay by categories that included “The Theological Objection” and, my 
favorite, “The “Heads in the Sand” Objection.” For, at the end of the day 
(of Humanism), the thinking machines, those “machinic assemblages” 
were us.
As for “The Theological Objection,” which as he renders it reads, 
“Thinking is a function of the immortal soul. God has given an immortal 
soul to every man and woman, but not to any other animal or to 
machines. Hence no animal or machine can think,” Turing writes:
It is admitted that there are certain things He cannot do such as making 
one equal to two, but should we not believe that He has the freedom 
to confer a soul on an elephant if He sees fit? We might expect that 
He would only exercise this power in conjunction with a mutation 
which provided the elephant with an appropriately improved brain 
to minister to the needs of this soul. An argument of exactly similar 
form may be made for the case of machines. It may seem different 
because it is more difficult to “swallow.” But this really only means that 
we think it would be less likely that He would consider the circum-
stances suitable for conferring a soul. The circumstances in question 
are discussed in the rest of this paper.14
Turing’s razor sharp understanding that the implications that compu-
tational intelligence implies an attack on theology, metaphysics and 
the primacy of the human by way of an impeachment of the conceit of 
a Divine Subject leads him to write, “In attempting to construct such 
alan turing’s self-defense . 51
machines we should not be irreverently usurping His power of creating 
souls, any more than we are in the procreation of children; rather we 
are, in either case, instruments of His will providing mansions for the 
souls that He creates.”15 He then drops the ironic tone and gives the 
example of Galileo as a victim of an ignorant theological framework 
that has since (almost?) disappeared. His example of Galileo under 
the attack of the Church serves as a direct analogy with Turing’s own 
critique of what amounts to a secular theology of anthropocentrism, 
and very unfortunately, was also a tragic predictor of his own fate. 
Galileo faced the Church inquisition for challenging the theology that 
placed Earth at the center of the universe along with the implications 
for power and governance therein, while Turing himself challenges the 
secular theology that places an unbearably narrow and willfully ignorant 
definition of humanity at the center of intelligence and that has built 
Western “civilization.” And persecuted he was. It took England until 
2009 to apologize for it’s own normative (why not say “humanistic”) 
inquisition against Turing’s homosexuality, one that forced him, in 1952, 
to accept “chemical castration” and likely drove him to suicide. Such was 
the automated thinking endemic to the program of the humanist state. 
Yet heads remain in the sand.
Turing’s description of the “Heads in the Sand” objection reads simply: 
“The consequences of machine thinking would be too dreadful. Let us 
hope and believe they cannot do so.”16 Turing comments:
This argument is seldom expressed quite so openly … But it affects 
most of us who think about it at all. We like to believe that Man is in 
some subtle way superior to the rest of creation. It is best if he can be 
shown to be necessarily superior, for then there is no danger of him 
losing his commanding position.17
He adds, “I do not think that this argument is sufficiently substantial to 
require refutation. Consolation would be more appropriate: perhaps this 
should be sought in the transmigration of souls”18
My sense of this gloss and its shade, at once scathing and hilarious, 
is that, like the pseudo-theological remark above about intelligent 
machines “providing mansions for the souls that He creates”19 it is 
more than half serious. With Turing we find the sublation of humanist 
ontologies by a theory of emergence. As the metaphysical artifacts of a 
particular moment of emergence become outmoded, they will find new 
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basis in computation and will be revealed as heuristic conceits and/or 
disappear. From the perspective of computation, all machine states are 
iterations of the crunching of a program—whatever it might be. The 
soul is not what we thought it was, but those who still need such an 
interface as a skeuomorph might find it in transubstantiation. That is, 
in the artificial intelligence of machines grasped through the framework 
of the soul, particularly as there is increasingly less and less evidence 
with which to mark a firm boundary between bodies and machines. The 
soul will require some redefinition beyond the hegemonic framework 
for there to be progress. And as the black radical tradition might remind 
us, the notion that soul is not exclusively the province of those with legal 
claims to humanity, has done significant work.
Turing’s brilliance partially entailed the application of mathematical 
thinking to that symbolic system known as “language.” But one must 
understand that the re-conceptualization and subsequent machinic 
reduction of representation and particularly of linguistic messages leading 
to the instrumentalization of representation had long been taking place. 
The communicative relation as metaphysically constitutional was posited 
(by for example Nietzsche who disallowed the distinction between the 
doer and the deed) and increasingly presupposed. From the emergence 
of print as an economic exploit forward, the denaturing of “natural” 
language into code was a long time coming. From Sassure’s “arbitrary 
nature of the sign,” which severed signifier from signified, to what came 
to be called the critique of the metaphysics of presence in post-structural-
ism, this denaturing at first felt like the ancillary dismantling of one more 
pillar of tradition in the general liquidation of tradition by capitalism 
(or by science or modernity, as it might have been said) before coming 
to be seen as the complete subsumption of the history of the human 
species (and with that the subsumption of history and of the species) by 
computation, Nietzsche with his typewriter collapsed the philosophical 
distinction between being and act and became, above all else, a writer—a 
“general without an army,” as has been said, “determined to emphasize 
maximum influence on the future.” Jacques Derrida brought home the 
idea that in the signifying chain, no one is home. There’s no body there 
in language, just the referent under erasure. Hélène Cixous showed that 
all Western philosophical binaries rested on gender binaries, and were 
not indices of truth but rather indices of power—the power of hetero-
patriarchy manifest in phallogocentrism and the metaphysics thereof. 
Thus, in another case of the medium is the message, the very operation 
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of language in the enforcing of sexual difference exceeded it’s denotative 
meaning, imposing the paradigm of the gender binary everywhere. 
William Pietz’s essay, “The Phonograph in Africa” brilliantly recounts 
the colonial resignification of recordings of native speech for purposes 
of further colonization by which an imperial overcode resignified and 
thus denatured a “natural language” by treating it as a pass code. Those 
(natives) still foolish enough to believe in essences and presence (or at 
least in the merely discursive realities of suddenly provincial customs 
and gods) were hoodwinked with phonographic recordings of tribal 
leaders’ voices commanding people to offer hospitality to colonizers. 
This marked an emerging and increasingly self-conscious tradition, 
or rather military-political strategy, dedicated to the resignification 
of existing codes that was capitalized on by Hitler, Mao and Voice of 
America, and is again being redeployed in a new Amerikkkan synthesis. 
Ontology was mobilized as politics, and, as Allen Feldman keenly 
observes, metaphysics in its reconfiguration becomes a medium of war. 
Barthes’ “Myth Today,” Adorno and Horkheimer’s “Culture Industry,” 
Deleuze and Guattari’s “overcode”, Kittler’s work, Nietzsche’s Geneaology 
of Morals, Butler, Cisoux, Sylvia Wynter, and the subsequent would-be 
wholesale deconstruction of the humanist project, testify to the trend 
of the repurposing of representation for sets of interests that are not 
representable within the natural(ized) domain of the represented. 
Rational-representational systems were mobilized at a higher level 
than was available to those who were most interpellated by them, one 
that exceeded the discernment of most of their practitioners. POTUS’s 
irrational universe provides an ample demonstration that the inevitably 
historical rationales of his psychopathology has a structural and systemic 
fit organized beyond the horizon of liberal perception—and undoubtedly 
his own. Then as now, across the board, the medium was the message, 
which for McLuhan meant precisely that even though a new order was 
transmitted by changes in mediation, that message, the one regarding 
the changes imposed by a new media form, was not being consciously 
received. Today, with the overcoding of every communicative act by 
financialized computation we may perhaps receive the message of “our” 
media: it is capital, the political economy of murder by installments. The 
totalitarian necro-political global regime becomes the hidden content of 
every message. Communication itself brings it home.
Meanwhile one finds multiple efforts at constructing a physics of 
metaphysics in answer to the shifted properties of the ontological 
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ground re-iterated and thus transcoded, transformed and re-ordained 
by computation. Regis Debray examines the technical mediation of 
images and signs by logical-material systems that render the metaphysics 
of prior media regimes skeuomorphic, mere theatrical simulations 
that facilitate the capture of those subjects (themselves both signifiers 
in all senses of the word and skeuomorphs) who, to make their way, 
still require an orientation in imaginary universes by ideologies now 
structurally superseded. The materiality of communication again shows 
the material-practical basis of the subject in ideology. But as we are 
also aware the intensification of through-put vis-à-vis screens places 
the subject in crisis. The various forms of subjective dissolution and 
implosion are also the message.
Allen Feldman’s Archives of the Insensible understands the contem-
porary deployment of metaphysics (the constitution and deconstitution 
of juridical entities) as a means and modality of war. Guantanamo, for 
example, is in the business of producing terrorists. We have the inten-
tional engineering of subjects: the terrorist and the sovereign subject 
by the carceral machine—the terrorist is retroactively engineered and 
the sovereign is proactively engineered. Where with Turing and the 
development of computers, subjectivity was decoded and simulated 
(that is revealed as a simulation), subjectivity is, with the integration of 
computers and their calculi into the web of life, encoded and simulated 
(that is projected as an actionable fact), as a driver of economy and of 
war. In a general sense we observe that from government sponsored 
nationalism, to character identification in Hollywood films, to the idea 
of the computer desktop or file, computational interfaces disbursed 
throughout the socius utilize retrograde modes of subjectification (ori-
entation, suture, interface) as well as advanced techniques of assemblage 
and blurring to perform socio-economic functions whose larger conse-
quences structurally exceed the understanding of the subjects posited, 
interpellated, fragmented, dis-/re-/al-located … and above all—above all 
(?)—functionalized in the informatic matrix that instantiates them.
However, it must be immediately added that the functionalizing of 
what Althusser calls “concrete individuals” and in another, not unrelated 
context, Hortense Spillers calls “the flesh” via forms of codification whose 
invisible processes are shrouded in obscurity and (most often) received/
discerned/interpreted and ”understood” only through dependence upon 
various metaphysical presuppositions that no longer (fully) obtain (e.g. 
readers of The New York Times who think they are merely informing 
alan turing’s self-defense . 55
themselves when they read on a platform dedicated to neo-liberal class 
war), in no way means that all bodies, despite being subjectively and 
objectively instantiated today by computational modes, are instantiated 
equally. Patriarchy, racism, heteronormativity, neo-imperialism, political 
economy, borders, forced migration and the generalization of war amply 
testify to the intensive material and algorithmic production of social 
difference. Neither should radical overdetermination by social-media 
imply any naturalization to the hierarchies imposed, acted upon, 
produced and reproduced by existing codes and consequently essen-
tialized (or, when convenient, de-essentialized) through computational 
social process. Just, as Marx taught us, there is not an atom of matter in 
exchange-value, there is not an atom of nature in computation nor an 
atom of truth in the metaphysics thereof. Here we arrive at the concept of 
the fold and the paradox of undecidability: There is exactly no “nature,” 
available in the computational construct; one could say that “nature” 
is always already a simulation—given up to us by the very means that 
foreclose its being. (There are times when this reflection is not relevant, 
and even uncalled for, but such an immersion in an ontology completely 
isolable from computation is no longer fully, if even at all, possible 
for “us.”) What appears at the horizon of this knowledge during this 
time, signified by the concept of its very operation (as subjectivity, as 
computation, as mathematical proof) is the question of a beyond at 
once necessary and under erasure. Computation is not just a difference 
engine, but an engine of differánce. Simulation = Nature.
At its metaphysical best, when, for example the nature that is not 
simulated but is simulation itself appears to glimmer at the horizon of 
codification (as the computational multiverse), it comes to occupy the 
same status as History in Fredric Jameson’s The Political Unconscious, 
or the Real in Lacan, or the innumerable in Borges. Jameson’s reading 
of Althusser in The Political Unconscious argues that History is both 
non-narrative and non-subjective, saying it is, rather, an absent structure: 
“History is not a text, not a narrative, master or otherwise, but that as an 
absent cause, it is inaccessible to us except in textual form, and that our 
approach to it and to the Real itself necessarily passes through its prior 
textualization, its narrativization in the political unconscious.”20 History, 
as distinct from narrative history, is thus posited as the event horizon of 
knowledge, such that any instantiation is always already a symbolic act in 
a cosmos where the Real remains unsymbolizable. The Real haunts sym-
bolization, even though symbolization cannot transcend itself to render 
56 . the message is murder
the Real. Like the Real, History may be troped, but not identified—there 
is no unmediated access. The dream work of the political unconscious 
and its representational systems gives it form; the forms are always 
ideological. In our own moment we observe that it is only the movement 
of the process of symbolization emergent from the trace through its 
archive that by means of its own churn gives rise to the computational 
model. Concisely put, the reality of simulation is also a simulation.
With computational simulation, generalizing itself, for example in 
the work of Max Tegmark, to cosmic proportions in which the universe 
is itself a super computer (numbers all the way down, with traditional 
physical entities such as atoms and quarks, phenomenonal forms of 
data visualization), there is ultimately nothing but numeric operations 
underpinning ALL. In this totalizing projection of the computational 
universe extending to all possible knowing we have the retroactive 
dissolution of metaphysics and the foreclosure not only of Being, but 
of Nature, History and the Real—all of which must be written with 
scare quotes to signify that they are not just placeholders for something 
beyond the horizon of discernment, but that they are indeed empty—
former iterations of the impossible, now outmoded, themselves only 
computational simulations. The hollowing out of prior ontologies, first 
conceptually and then practically by means of machine operations creates 
a tremendous crisis of values—in the socio-ethical and the economic. 
What computational procedures and results will be valued and how? 
Derivatives, synthetic finance and social media provide answers—no 
doubt woefully inadequate ones. How to value a person, people, peoples? 
What forms or formulations might provide an adequate account? The 
unpleasant question of our time seems not to be Ezra Pound’s “Jefferson 
and/or Mussolini?” or even “Neo-liberalism and/or #45?” but rather, “the 
slaughter bench of history and/or the slaughter bench of information? 
Better I think to see the rise of computation not as introducing a crisis 
of value but as a response to a crisis within the domain of value and 
valuation—a revolutionizing of the productive forces whose measure 
has not yet been taken. Here the injunction would be to finally come to 




Another Method for the Letters1
Where there is no speech there is no truth or falsehood.
—Thomas Hobbes
That order [the sociopolitical order of the New World], with its human 
sequence written in blood, represents, for its African and its indigenous 
peoples a scene of actual mutilation, dismemberment and exile.
—Hortense Spillers
The problem for an unexpected
Soon we will have occasion to delve further into the relationship between 
history and information, between capital and computation—and thus 
also between the unsymbolizable and the innumerable—by which I 
mean to spend a few more words on the parallel mirrors of an infinite 
regress where the real and the virtual become indistinguishable and thus, 
for the abstract (and perhaps it must at least be admitted, psychotic) 
mind, one. We must come to better understand the emergent interface 
between statistics (stochastics) and poesis — for it is along these fractal 
lines that we encounter what used to be called “politics.” We will see that 
it is necessity itself that must fight the odds and that necessity demands 
a re-evaluation of the rise of computation—one that historicizes and 
socializes the anti-social and anti-historical entity called information. 
We do this by dismantling the supposed objectivity and universality of 
forms of mediation.
First, however, we review the achievements of Claude E. Shannon, 
whose 1948 paper, “A Mathematical Theory of Communication,” is 
the landmark essay regarding the conversion of natural language to 
number—a conversion that weighs the odds of any message whatever. 
Shannon’s “translation” of linguistic symbols into mathematical ones is 
no ordinary translation. Rather, it signifies the wholesale conversion, 
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that is, the numerological transduction, of the very process of textual-
ization. The reconfiguration of textualization advances a prior period 
of textualization that was, at least until the rise of visual culture, itself 
the main process through which history has been understood. Indeed, 
philosophically, linear writing becomes understood as the precondition 
of “history,” an analogue of as well as a program for linear time and 
temporal development. Not content with the denotative contents there 
inscribed, Lacanian Marxism, as we briefly saw in the last chapter, found 
History in the ellipses and gaps, recorded in the only way it can be—ideo-
logically and in absentia. Nearly all surviving history and experience was 
rendered or refracted in those “ideologemes” of linguistic form passing 
through what Friedrich Kittler aptly calls “the bottleneck of the signifier.”2 
Included here were not just histories but novels, poems, critical theory, 
indeed all writing—the empire of signs in total. Shannon’s mathematical 
theory of communication would result in the translation, which is to say 
conversion, of the repository of textuality that inaugurated history and 
implied History into an ocean, nay, a cosmos, of ones and zeros—with 
nary a quark left unturned.
The paper regards the written word and seeks “a general theory of 
communication”3 that is content indifferent with respect to the message. 
The theory needs to account for the possibility of sending any message 
whatever. Noting, among other factors, “the savings possible due to the 
statistical structure of the original message,” Shannon writes, “the . . . 
semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering 
problem. The significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected 
from a set of possible messages. The system must be designed to operate 
for each possible selection, not just the one which will actually be 
chosen since this is unknown at the time of design” (italics added).4 
Furthermore, “We wish to consider certain general problems involving 
communication systems. To do this it is first necessary to represent the 
various elements involved as mathematical entities, suitably idealized 
from their physical counterparts.”5
Let us attend carefully here: “The actual message is one selected from 
a set of possible messages. The system must be designed . . . for each 
possible selection, not just the one which will actually be chosen since 
this is unknown at the time of design.” The advantage of statistics will 
emerge from the fact that some messages are more likely than others. A 
particular novel, then, is the one selected from a set of possible novels—
not all writers are yet aware of this fact. Even the text before you was 
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selected from a set of possible texts. And Psycho was selected from a 
set of possible images—as we shall demonstrate, a not entirely random 
thought. On the one hand, we are dealing with a question involving 
any message whatever, in short, any possible combination of symbols 
that might be found, say, as in Jorge Luis Borges’s “Library of Babel,” 
the library that most closely approximates quantum multiverses in that 
this infinite library contains all possible books. Pondering this infinite 
library, the lone narrator poignantly remarks, “If an eternal traveler 
were to cross it in any direction, after centuries he would see that the 
same volumes were repeated in the same disorder (which, thus repeated, 
would be an order: the Order). My solitude is gladdened by this elegant 
hope.”6 On the other hand (I will limit myself to two here)—and this is 
the key insight in Shannon’s paper—unlike as in the library of Babel, all 
messages are not equiprobable. If they were, there could be no useful 
mathematical theory of communication, because the organization of 
signs would be entirely random. Shannon’s insight builds on the fact that 
such random occurring is not, in fact, the case: some messages are statis-
tically more likely than others, and there are concrete ways to delimit the 
random factor by studying the frequency and sequence of the occurrence 
of letters in natural language. To get a sense of how Shannon proceeds 
from Gutenbergian homogeneous segmentation to create statistical 
models, I quote at length:
We can also approximate to a natural language by means of a series of 
simple artificial languages. The zero-order approximation is obtained 
by choosing all letters with the same probability and independently. 
The first-order approximation is obtained by choosing successive 
letters independently but each letter having the same probability that 
it has in the natural language. Thus, in the first-order approximation 
to English, E is chosen with probability .12 (its frequency in normal 
English) and W with probability .02, but there is no influence between 
adjacent letters and no tendency to form the preferred diagrams such 
as TH, ED, etc. In the second-order approximation, diagram structure 
is introduced. After a letter is chosen, the next one is chosen in 
accordance with the frequencies with which the various letters follow 
the first one. This requires a table of diagram frequencies pi(j). In the 
third-order approximation, trigram structure is introduced. Each 
letter is chosen with probabilities which depend on the preceding 
two letters.7
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3. THE SERIES OF APPROXIMATIONS TO ENGLISH
To give a visual idea of how this series of processes approaches a 
language, typical sequences in the approximations to English have 
been constructed and are given below. In all cases we have assumed a 
27-symbol “alphabet,” the 26 letters and a space.
1. Zero-order approximation (symbols independent and equiprobable).
XFOML RXKHRJFFJUJ ZLPWCFWKCYJ FFJEYVKCQSGHYD 
QPAAMKBZAACIBZLHJQD.
2. First-order approximation (symbols independent but with frequen-
cies of English text).
OCRO HLI RGWR NMIELWIS EU LL NBNESEBYA TH EEI 
ALHENHTTPA OOBTTVA NAH BRL.
3. Second-order approximation (diagram structure as in English).
ON IE ANTSOUTINYS ARE T INCTORE ST BE S DEAMY ACHIN 
D ILONASIVE TUCOOWE AT TEASONARE FUSO TIZIN ANDY 
TOBE SEACE CTISBE.
4. Third-order approximation (trigram structure as in English).
IN NO IST LAT WHEY CRATICT FROURE BIRS GROCID 
PONDENOME OF DEMONSTURES OF THE REPTAGIN IS 
REGOACTIONA OF CRE.
5. First-order word approximation. Rather than continue with 
tetragram, · · · , n-gram structure it is easier and better to jump at this 
point to word units. Here words are chosen independently but with 
their appropriate frequencies.
REPRESENTING AND SPEEDILY IS AN GOOD APT OR COME 
CAN DIFFERENT NATURAL HERE HE THE A IN CAME THE 
TOOF TO EXPERT GRAY COME TO FURNISHES THE LINE 
MESSAGE HAD BE THESE.
6. Second-order word approximation. The word transition probabili-
ties are correct but no further structure is included.
THE HEAD AND IN FRONTAL ATTACK ON AN ENGLISH 
WRITER THAT THE CHARACTER OF THIS POINT IS 
THEREFORE ANOTHER METHOD FOR THE LETTERS THAT 
THE TIME OF WHO EVER TOLD THE PROBLEM FOR AN 
UNEXPECTED.8
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In brief, items 2—6 in capital letters are samples of signs randomly 
generated by means of probability tables (or an equivalent method; see 
below), with probabilities weighted as described; item 1 is a string of 
letters generated completely at random. It is well known today that as 
a result of habituated literacy, the brain “knows” how to fill in the gaps 
in a message that might be generated by dropped or out-of-sequence 
lettering, and when scanning the lines above we can literally feel 
that capacity being activated even if it does not fully realize what we 
ordinarily think of as an intelligible message. As we shall see, Shannon 
understands literacy to imply unconscious statistical knowledge about 
the operations of language. If we recall from Jacques Lacan that the 
unconscious is structured like a language,9 here we begin to understand 
something new about how a language is structured. It would appear that 
there are rule sets, otherwise known as laws. And these laws (laws that 
ultimately conform to the law of the Father) are the laws of probability. 
Shannon’s examples are the pre-Oedipal stammerings of the computa-
tional unconscious.
Normal behavior (organized by laws, the law) delimits the kind of 
things that actually get said (through repression). Desire—though 
perhaps no more random than life itself in that it emerges out of 
randomness but then follows its own logic, its drives—is polymorphous 
and must therefore be managed by its chances at a successful (or 
is it profitable?) outcome, which is to say managed by what could be 
grasped as an algorithm first formulated and once known as the 
“reality principle.”10 Likewise, the realities of normal English (what it is 
permissible to say) will structure the likelihood of the occurrence of any 
message whatever through statistical modeling. As we shall see, it is on 
the basis of such research and experimentation that Shannon’s machinic 
utterances resemble real language. The reality principle is another name 
for an algorithm of psychic repression, and translating forward from 
this earlier paradigm implies that so too is the statistical ordination 
of language. Not just anything can burble forth—we cannot have our 
computers speaking in tongues.
The mathematical theory of communication is content indifferent, 
but what does content indifference communicate? Here, with Shannon’s 
phrase in item 6, “THE HEAD AND IN FRONTAL ATTACK ON 
AN ENGLISH WRITER THAT THE CHARACTER OF THIS 
POINT IS THEREFORE ANOTHER METHOD FOR THE LETTERS 
THAT THE TIME OF WHO EVER TOLD THE PROBLEM FOR 
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AN UNEXPECTED,” constructed by means of second-order word 
approximation, we have the heretofore unavailed of opportunity to 
usefully confront the following imperative that was a staple of literary 
criticism for the decades spanning the early 1970s to the late 1990s: 
psychoanalyze this! It is understood now (or should be) that psycho-
analysis was an analogue technology straining to make itself adequate 
to a set of mathematical vectors grounded in the capitalized logistics 
of the bourgeois family that included the calculus of sexual difference, 
of inheritance, property, and pleasure as well as that of class and the 
disavowal of race and, as important, particularly when history gets 
to Lacan, that of the image. One could say that psychoanalysis was 
derived from the prolegomena of the emergent information economy’s 
restructuring of interiority and allowed the analyst to take a derivative 
of ambient information at any point in the garden of forking paths.11 
This derivative was of course the discourse of the modern subject, 
the discursive modality of risk management that produced modern 
subjectivity through the repressive hypothesis and later via the phar-
macological industrialization of self-help and ultimately by the neurotic 
abjection imposed by the full financialization of daily life.12 Psycho-
analysis then was an analogue approach to incipient digitization, a way 
of narrating ambient unconscious forces. Although things are no longer 
organized at the highest levels in accord with its paradigm of the subject, 
which accords with a fantasy of subjective sovereignty—think not “the 
ego” but rather algorithmic governance—we might want to explore what 
goes on, that is, to think the logistics of informatics for the/a subject, as 
if it still mattered, because to some people it does.
PSYCHO: “pure cinema” as meditation on castration  
and paradigm of codification
“WHO EVER TOLD THE PROBLEM FOR AN UNEXPECTED?” 
Well, let’s just say, “THE HEAD AND IN FRONTAL ATTACK ON 
AN ENGLISH WRITER [SUCH] THAT THE CHARACTER OF 
THIS POINT IS THEREFORE ANOTHER METHOD FOR THE 
LETTERS.”
Shannon’s procedural generation of signs in accord with statistical rules 
applied to Markoff states provides a kind of cipher for what may as well 
be inscribed as an ur-text of the computational unconscious—these 
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signs are as good as any. Put it this way (stay with me here—remember, 
this text is selected): just as it is possible to read Norman Bates as Alfred 
Hitchcock’s conscious creation, designed precisely to decode and then 
encode the effect of a newly mobilized gaze on the law of the father in 
order to create what was referred to as “pure cinema” (we will do this 
momentarily), we might engage Shannon’s symbolic creations in his 
paper and “do a reading.” Hitchcock, also looking for a general theory, 
for “pure cinema,” set out to register the preconditions, symptoms, and 
consequences of an algorithm called psychosis (a freewheeling variant of 
the reality principle in which a gender-troubled masculine-identifying 
subject is at pains to impose reality in his own terms because the larger, 
collective reality is just too much to deal with and must therefore be 
radically denied). Psychosis results in the improper translation and thus 
the short-circuiting (vis-à-vis the cut) of the rules imposed not just by 
propriety, civilization, and patriarchy, but by signification and the law. 
Indeed it sacrifices these rules outwardly in order to preserve them 
inwardly, endeavoring to constitute itself as sovereign in impossible 
circumstances. In Psycho, Norman’s psychosis is shown to be the result 
of Norman’s mother cutting the normative dispensation of the signifier 
scripted by the law of the father—she gets rid of her husband, Norman’s 
father, and after an unusually intense bond with young Norman 
(ordinarily precluded by oedipalization), takes another lover, therefore 
depriving Norman of, in short order, the nuclear family, the name of 
the father and access to the mother. In brief, unrestrained female desire 
blocks Norman’s ascension to full masculinity and a woman will have to 
pay—that’s the story. The story is thus one of failed oedipalization and an 
inability to attain to the symbolic order, which subsequently, in what was 
to become the formula for classic horror, causes further cutting.
As we all know, the fatal cuts slice Marion (Marrying?) Crane. She 
becomes in the taxonomy of the film yet another bird to be stuffed, at 
least as far as Norman, castrated by his mother and held in the “half-light 
of the imaginary,” is concerned. Like what Laura Mulvey said of cinema 
itself, Norman will cut the woman to the measure of desire. Marion 
who herself cut the law of the father and stole forty thousand dollars to 
support her own illicit pleasure with lover Sam (himself laboring under 
alimony payments, and unable to afford to marry Marion and make 
things legit) has in her flight from the law aroused Norman, and, after 
checking in to the Bates Motel, takes a shower. Called upon to be man 
but cut off from an ability to “properly” constitute his masculinity by an 
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overbearing mother, Norman makes a few cuts of his own. Psychosis 
thus results at once from the cut in normative behavior organized under 
patriarchy but is also an intensification. In this tale it results from the 
provocation by and subsequent liquidation of female agency (“sexuality”). 
The deviation of the psychotic’s desires from the code of patriarchy, and 
their re-conversation into that same code, otherwise known as “the law,” 
is here expressed in the sequence woman = crane = bird = stuffed. If 
normativity can’t answer and control female sexuality, psychosis will 
provide other methods. Norman’s removal of the copy of the painting 
Susanna and the Elders to reveal the peephole through which he may 
gaze at and thus objectify Marion, concisely suggests not just an image 
for the cinema, but that the (white Western) male gaze has long engaged 
in quasi-psychotic sadistic objectification: Norman literally reveals what 
lies beneath the Western tradition and looks right through it.
But with new media come new opportunities. The light from the 
peephole evokes the light cone of the cinema and the affordances offered 
the voyeur. Like cinema, and in an homage to the quagmire of castration, 
the desire that is his gaze executes with the cut. Hitchcock’s own 
algorithmic program in Psycho, otherwise known as the plot, but I mean 
more than mere narrative here, iterates a main character: NORMAN 
BATES—written in capital letters here to denote that it is the output 
of an algorithm of psychoanlysis as operative in the newly mechanized 
(cinemated) visual sphere. NORMAN BATES is a name that, as the 
eloquent Saul Bass-designed credits slicing through the signifiers in the 
titles of “PSYCHO” might indicate, bears the mark of the psychopatho-
logical cutting of the signifier—a visual editing of a phrase that can be 
reverse engineered to its proper form of signification. The slashing of the 
signifier “psycho” in the same set of titles might indicate that, under the 
force of the cut, “Psycho” removes “path.” Following the path of Psycho 
the signifying chain NORMAN BATES can be restored to an “original 
state” when signification functions normally, that is in accord with the 
everyday operations of the law of the father, and is thus organized not 
according to a short-circuiting of law by mobilized (female) desire (a 
castrating mother and a sexually modern Marion Crane)—but by 
warding off such a brazen cut, and living peaceably in accord with the 
law as it purports to operate in the reality of pre-cinema. This reverse 
engineering of psychopathology—Norman’s psychopathology, cannily 
attributed to the rest of us by his exemplary role as cinematic voyeur 
who, to preserve his own fragile homeostasis, to ward off castration, has 
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a tendency to over objectify (desubjectify) women—clearly allows the 
audience to grasp from the coded message that is NORMAN BATES 
a sort of corollary to the law of the father and its necessary legacy 
repression of desire up until modern, cinematic capitalism.
NORMAN BATES is an algorithmic encryption of the law placed under 
duress by cine-mediated scopophilia and the mobilization of desire 
beyond the traditional capacities of the symbolic order to contain it; 
the code is the result of an old law caught in the press of modernity 
and new media. Norman is the result of a linguistic short circuit 
(hence his stutter), a cutting of the symbolic order (as ordered by the 
name of the Father). Even the situation of the backwater Bates Motel 
produces a persistent ressentiment regarding the irrelevance imposed 
upon its location by the new modern highway that cut off Norman’s 
access to power. What then would Norman’s name be if, in accord with 
longstanding patriarchal custom, castration were “properly” reserved 
for women alone? Reverse engineering law-breaking Norman would 
be an act of decoding (interpretation) that reveals Hitchcock’s under-
standing of the law itself—its flailing operations in a cinemated world. 
Let us then interpolate the proper letters back into NORMAN BATES, 
who, as victim of some unfortunate cuts (for him and for his victims 
yes, but fortunate in all financial senses for the history of cinema), is 
probably no more than two standard deviations from the norm by which 
the patriarchal regulation of desire by the ordinary signification process 
is imposed. Let us sound our own unconscious and restore the path to 
psycho. A moment’s thought reveals the following elisions or cuts: THE 
MAL MASTUR, an abridgement that, when properly recombined, solves 
the puzzle and reveals the fuller text of the everyday law of patriarchy: 
NORMAN BATES without the castrating (cinematic) cut imposed by 
female sexuality and its imperative for the reorganization of male desire 
fills the lacunae in the code and gives us our result: THE NORMAL 
MAN MASTURBATES. Unappealing as it may be (to some), such is the 
corollary and consequence of the law of the father, the situation imposed 
by the otherwise unacceptable terms of female sexuality and the cinematic 
obscene. When all goes smoothly in patriarchy, the “normal” pathway to 
taking the woman as object suffices—that’s everyday objectification. But 
when a modern (cinematic) woman, pursues her newly mobilized desire 
and breaks the bounds of the law by trying to cut out her own version of 
THE MAL MASTUR (dreamwork for the bad master, the name of the 
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father, of course) in pursuit of her own satisfaction, the result is a new 
plot: a procedure that also sends a message: NORMAN BATES!13
In a classic case of psychoanalysis blaming the victim, female desire, in 
revolt against capitalist heteropatriarchy (the law of the father and the big 
other), produces the male psychopath (and makes for good-profitable 
cinema in its day). Its disruptive consequences can themselves be 
decoded, that is, reversed engineered, to reveal the law of the father. 
The code is broken and re-inscribed. Norman Bates is the logical 
consequence of the increasing power of female desire organized around 
the objectification of women, or here, the axiom that in heteropatriarchy, 
to ward off castration and still comply with the law, the normal man 
masturbates. Without going so far as to speculate on what a world might 
look like rid of normal men, we can say that precisely this is the project 
of Psycho—to use psychoanalysis to decode the consequences of the 
unmoored mobilized gaze of cinema on the Oedipus complex and thus 
to encode “pure cinema.” This project, with a different inflection, would 
shortly thereafter be taken up by “second wave” feminist film theory 
as it attempted to decodify the male gaze, derive the psychologistics of 
gender oppression from the analogue (and re-enforcing) screen image, 
cut to the measure of desire—and thus to requisites of “the patriarchal 
unconscious”.
We note in passing that this image, cut to the measure of desire, was 
itself subject to box-office digitization. Mother rids herself of Norman’s 
father, and Marion rebels against all that is personified in money, but 
the male gaze must impose its continuity and seek its compensation. 
In Psycho the more acceptable, sober regard belongs to psychoanalysis 
itself and even more emphatically to money. After her murder, Marion 
is apprehended from the point of view of money in the shot-counter 
shot sequence immediately following the annihilation of her gaze. Her 
agential lifeblood flows from her cut-up body into the dark abyss of the 
bathtub drain and, in an astonishingly eloquent cut, that itself marks 
the literal liquidation of female subjectivity, the camera gaze follows the 
bloody swirl down into the void and emerges out of her now dead eye. 
The counter shot to this shot of Marion’s annihilated gaze and total objec-
tification is the money on the bed. Indeed, Hitchcock’s own heuristic, 
albeit bound by whiteness, would seem to be that the cinema, as a new 
order of codification (and here we get closer to what I meant by viewing 
plot as algorithm), restores the law of the father that it itself interrupts 
through the mobilization of the gaze and the reorganization of desire 
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by means of the cut, precisely by traversing the psychotic—namely, the 
reality denying domain of the cut that reorganizes both perception and 
the signifying chain. As a break with and a short circuit of the law of 
the linguistic sign, the cinema is an invitation to psychopatholgy. With 
it, the ambient program of psychosis is at once executed and canceled 
by the successful work of art—make that the commercially successful 
work of art. The short-circuiting of the law of the father by the liberation 
of cinema eye and its modernity can be recodified by the cinema, by 
capitalist cinema. The psychotic denial of female agency is decoded, 
re-inscribed, and raised to the level of cultural paradigm.
Hitchcock used the Lacanian algorithm of the symbolic order 
organized in accord with the law (rule set) of the father governing desire 
to concoct his signifying machine. As mentioned and as is well known, 
the (white) woman in jeopardy became a general formula for cinema with 
gender-troubled protagonists but one might also say action films and all 
the rest. This formula is also reversed, particularly in horror, which, with 
its increasingly venerable history, provides gender-troubled antagonists 
and phallic women heroes—what Carol Clover famously called “the final 
girl.” Laurence Rickels’ fine intertitles, “The New Norman in Dressed to 
Kill, Blow Out and Body Double,” followed by “The Feminist Reproach in 
Slumber Party Massacre,” understand the mutability of the code.14 These 
rules (property, marriage, policing, privilege, sovereignty, the regulation 
of sexuality, the phallus)—threatened yet also enforced by the cut—
were the weighted factors that staved off randomness. The stochastics 
of hetero patriarchy overdetermined the film program—also known as 
the plot. Queer becoming happened in the margins and interstices by 
refusing the codifications and re-codifications of normative positions. 
But it was precisely the cutting of the law of the father by new imaginaries 
that led to the cutting of the signifying chain that led to Norman Bates 
and a reassertion of the law of the father as “pure cinema.” The medium 
then, in its pure form, or at least in this “pure” form is itself psychotic.
As a medium, cinema first cuts the law but is then recut in accord 
with the law. Interesting then that Lacan, as Lydia Liu recently argued, 
concocted his theories of the symbolic order and the unconscious from 
the insights of cybernetics and information theory, which he used to 
comprehend Freud.15 It is therefore not entirely imprecise to suggest that 
the fundamentals of Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication 
provide the means for the decodification and recodification not just of 
psychoanalysis but also of Psycho. And indeed many of Hitchcock’s films 
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were thoroughgoing exercises in decoding and recoding of psychologis-
tics in a cinemated world.
ANOTHER METHOD FOR THE LETTERS
So we have, albeit in a limited way, a sense of how dominant cinema 
codes its objects and through that treatment creates a world for its 
subjects. We will return to the cinema as a more general form in a later 
chapter. As for Shannon’s THE PROBLEM FOR AN UNEXPECTED, 
THE FRONTAL ATTACK ON AN ENGLISH WRITER (or is it THE 
FRONTAL ATTACK ON AN ENGLISH WRITER?), ANOTHER 
METHOD FOR THE LETTERS …—these iterations too are the 
result of the operation of an algorithmic machine. But is it the effect 
of the machine operator on their machine (Antonio Gramsci) or of 
the machine on the machine operator? Like NORMAN BATES, it too 
is the result of cutting up of language and the law. Here, however, not 
with the lens and its images, but with statistics and their mathematical 
odds. In moving from the machine age to the digital (DC1 to DC2), 
we should bear in mind the shifting relation between the worker and 
the machine during the move from manufacture to fully industrialized 
capital when Marx observed that the machine as fixed capital became “a 
vast automaton” and the worker became its “conscious organ.” Indeed 
we are looking at the agency of machines, agency that good historical 
materialists will recognize as the agency of fixed capital and thus as the 
agency of dead labor—amortized subjectivity. The subject, organized by 
the machinic cut in the life-world, and then re-vised by the cinematic 
cut in the visual field, will now be reformatted by the statistical cut in 
the signifying chain by means of a mathematical theory of communi-
cation that is purportedly content indifferent. If NORMAN BATES is 
the cinematically encoded output of a message that properly expressed 
reads THE NORMAL MAN MASTURBATES, can we then ask what is 
the unadulterated, that is decoded or “proper” expression of Shannon’s
THE HEAD AND IN FRONTAL ATTACK ON AN ENGLISH 
WRITER THAT THE CHARACTER OF THIS POINT IS 
THEREFORE ANOTHER METHOD FOR THE LETTERS THAT 
THE TIME OF WHO EVER TOLD THE PROBLEM FOR AN 
UNEXPECTED?
shannon/hitchcock . 69
To propose an answer to this, my central question here regarding 
ANOTHER METHOD FOR THE LETTERS, let us look a bit more 
closely at the exact method by which Shannon’s example passages were 
procedurally generated in order to attempt a similar reverse engineering. 
In reference to the passages excerpted above Shannon writes:
The resemblance to ordinary English text increases quite noticeably 
at each of the above steps. Note that these samples have reasonably 
good structure out to about twice the range that is taken into account 
in their construction. Thus in (3) the statistical process insures 
reasonable text for two-letter sequences, but four-letter sequences 
from the sample can usually be fitted into good sentences. In (6) 
sequences of four or more words can easily be placed in sentences 
without unusual or strained constructions. The particular sequence 
of ten words “attack on an English writer that the character of this” 
is not at all unreasonable. It appears then that a sufficiently complex 
stochastic process will give a satisfactory representation of a discrete 
source. The first two samples were constructed by the use of a book of 
random numbers in conjunction with (for example 2) a table of letter 
frequencies. This method might have been continued for (3), (4) and 
(5), since diagram, trigram and word frequency tables are available, 
but a simpler equivalent method was used.
To construct (3) for example, one opens a book at random and 
selects a letter at random on the page. This letter is recorded. The 
book is then opened to another page and one reads until this letter 
is encountered. The succeeding letter is then recorded. Turning to 
another page this second letter is searched for and the succeeding 
letter recorded, etc. A similar process was used for (4), (5) and (6). It 
would be interesting if further approximations could be constructed, 
but the labor involved becomes enormous at the next stage.16
Shannon’s purpose here is to develop statistical rules that will allow 
for maximum economy in the transmission of a message through a 
communications channel by reducing the number of bits required for 
each symbol. In short, the less information required to send a message, 
the more message content that can be sent over a given channel. The 
procedurally generated statements above express the effect of reducing 
the randomness of trying any sign arbitrarily. To properly select it 
from a set of signs in the making of a message, the selection process is 
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structured by the frequency of the occurrence of particular symbols or 
sequence of symbols and thus the likelihood or probability of a term 
occurring following the occurrence of a given sign or sequence of signs—
using standard written English. One can grasp the benefits of such 
a process in the telegraph in which dots and dashes must be decoded 
to restore a message. Obviously the fewer dots and dashes required to 
send a particular message, the more efficient the transmission. Thus 
the mathematics of the likelihood of usage along with the likelihood 
of one alphabetic symbol’s adjacency to another are statistically tabled 
to construct a code that will require, on average, the fewest number of 
bits of information (dots and dashes, ones and zeros) to transmit any 
message whatever.17
The conditions thus formulated, we might return to our method of 
interpolation with regard to Shannon’s example to ask what seems to be 
an absurd question: what is the machine really saying? Can we grasp 
this algorithmic output as a narrative? With cinema we had to grasp the 
narrative as algorithm; with informatics we strain to grasp the algorithm 
as story. Following Lacan’s example of the child confronted at an early 
stage in his development by the as yet unknown language of his parents, 
we can ask of Shannon’s protomachine, why is it telling us this? If we 
allow our unconscious to peruse the output and thus audition the 
machine unconscious, we find that the “POINT” is obviously the mode 
of inscription of a dot or a dash, a one or a zero, a hole punch in a card 
or a tape, that is, the binary action that in executing a program modifies 
the machine’s storage by writing a one or zero, one binary sign at a 
time. Undoubtedly, this is the new head (as opposed to the old human 
one), which is also a FRONTAL ATTACK ON AN ENGLISH WRITER 
[such] THAT THE CHARACTER OF THIS POINT IS THEREFORE 
ANOTHER METHOD FOR THE LETTERS THAT [alters] THE TIME 
OF WHO EVER even those who TOLD THE PROBLEM FOR AN 
UNEXPECTED message including and perhaps especially Africans, 
African slaves, and their descendents, first peoples, minorities, colonials 
and all the Others of the “West.”
Well okay, the interpolative method may have its limits, despite the 
brilliant use of it by scholars like Saidiya Hartman and poets like M. 
NourbeSe Philip, author of the poem ZONG! ZONG! is based on the text 
of the manifest of the slave ship Zong—a ship that, by the way, contains 
an error of transcription in its own name, originally Zorg. The original 
name was copied incorrectly in a port where it was being restored, a name 
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that, irony of ironies, meant “care” in Dutch. Care, recoded as slave ship, 
banking on an insurance payout, notoriously sank its human cargo in the 
ocean and manifested as poem—a poem that through speculation shows 
the true meaning of Dutch care. A slave manifest manifested in poetry as 
lamentation, protest, and counter-history, a bubbling up of unimaginable 
pain through the seals of its encryption. One might listen carefully to 
item number 5 (above), the procedurally generated language with one 
degree less order than the line that steadfastly contains “the time of who 
ever,” and faintly hear the poetry that is at once reprimand and lament: 
REPRESENTING AND SPEEDILY IS AN GOOD APT OR COME CAN 
DIFFERENT NATURAL HERE HE THE A IN CAME THE TOOF TO 
EXPERT GRAY COME TO FURNISHES THE LINE MESSAGE HAD 
BE THESE. “The line message had be these,” says the line, but did they? 
Another irrelevant connection, you might at this point think, really a 
method of no method, working on the thinnest threads of connection in 
the cut-’n’-mix vortex of signification that, despite the poetic resonance 
between the horrific informatic reduction of Africans to cargo in brutally 
measured hulls, the cruel numbers of murderous accounting ledgers, 
and the reduction of living language to content-indifferent numbers 
for instrumental purposes, brings us not one iota closer to decoding a 
text for which there can be no original. The bottleneck of the signifier 
was far too narrow for most of what actually happened. And written 
history, we have been a bit too smugly told, is written by the victors. 
Counter-history can only be glimpsed in the gaps, the ellipses. We must 
sound the algorithms and audit the computational unconscious. No 
doubt procedurally generated language, written by the victors’ machines, 
has eliminated the ellipses and all forms of the unconscious and can 
mean only one thing. It all but closes off the bottleneck to history. In this 
it is like the official version of history but better purged of any remainder, 
stain, or excess, which despite those feints and glimmers, the sounding of 
an unconscious that is no longer there, it can also mean in the light of day 
only one thing (particularly, need the world remind you, as God is dead, 
telos is nothing more, and computation reigns), that is, precisely, really, 
ultimately just what it says—just what it says and no more, which is to 
say, metaphysically speaking, absolutely nothing. Computation as pure 
simulation destroys linear history and eliminates the unconscious by 
operating exclusively on its own symbols. Today, “real-time,” financial-
ized, networked simulation operates on a churn of content indifferent 1s 
and 0s increasingly removed from anything “historical.” The generalized 
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expropriation of language by the full colonization of the life-world 
by computational capital renders all meaning solely the meanings of 
money. The significance of “meaning” is one-dimensional—automated, 
functional and anti-hermeneutic—without content. The linguistic signs 
may simulate qualities, but they are iterated by stochastic methods, that 
is, weighted yet ultimately random events of pure quantification. In brief, 
those words don’t mean a thing.
Or so it may seem in your nihilist cosmology. But let’s not forget 
that in the name of efficiency, of economy, in the name of shipping the 
greatest number of signs in the smallest possible container, the mathema-
ticians decided what was normal. They decided what was normal about 
language. They looked about and comprehended normal men. They told 
themselves some stories and encrypted these stories in their calculations. 
Uncanny then, to find out that the ur-text for Shannon’s experiments 
with word sequence was Dumas Malone’s Jefferson the Virginian (1948), 
the first volume of Malone’s six-volume biography of a man who was 
the author of the Declaration of Independence, the third US president, 
and a slave owner, one Thomas Jefferson.18 “The content of a medium 
is another medium,” says Marshall McLuhan;19 the content of Shannon’s 
code is Malone’s; his world, encoded and recut. Malone was a highly dis-
tinguished historian who served on the faculty at Yale, Columbia, and 
the University of Virginia, who was also director of Harvard University 
Press. He was, in brief, an establisher of the establishment who wrote a 
huge book on an even more established establisher of the establishment. 
His volumes were widely praised for their lucid and graceful writing 
style, for their rigorous and thorough scholarship, and for their attention 
to Jefferson’s evolving constitutional and political thought.20
Jefferson the Virginian is a narrative of “America,” of the new world 
order. But as Hortense Spillers so eloquently schools her readers in her 
dismantling of American grammar, in the quotation that serves as an 
epigraph to this chapter “that order, with its human sequence written in 
blood, represents, for its African and its indigenous peoples a scene of 
actual mutilation, dismemberment and exile.”21 What then is represented 
by the re-inscription of that imposed order by the mathematical theory 
of communication for African and indigenous peoples? Even early on 
some reviewers faulted Malone, believing that he had a tendency to 
adopt Jefferson’s own perspective and thus to be insufficiently critical of 
Jefferson’s occasional political errors, faults, and lapses. Some said that 
he was biased in favor of Jefferson and against his principal adversaries, 
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Alexander Hamilton, Aaron Burr, and John Marshall.22 It was said that 
Malone had not adequately treated Jefferson’s life as a slave owner and 
the paradoxes inherent in his views on liberty and slavery. Malone did 
not examine the facts related to Jefferson’s long-alleged relationship 
with his slave Sally Hemings. Famously, Annette Gordon-Reed, in her 
1996 analysis of the historiography of the controversy, blew Malone’s 
text wide open and showed that he had accepted testimony by Jefferson 
descendants, who said that two Carr nephews were the father(s) of 
Hemings’s children, but had dismissed accounts by former slaves, 
including Sally’s son Madison Hemings, that named Jefferson as father, 
although these accounts were better supported by available facts.23
One could indeed wonder here what differences might have emerged 
and what actual mutilation might have been avoided if Shannon’s 
research on the predictability of standard language had been based 
on a text that included the history/ies of Jefferson’s slave ownership. 
And what if the ur-text for “The Mathematical Theory of Commu-
nication” had included slave narratives and slave speech? What if the 
psychotic discourse of “American Grammar,” as Spillers so deftly names 
the paradigm of unreconstructed American semiotic iteration that in 
its syntagmatic emergence continues to disavow the presence of the 
historical violence of slavery and simultaneously performs the recapit-
ulation of white supremacy in every possible meaning, had not been the 
“normal” language decoded and then recoded according to the same, 
now fully digital law? If Shannon’s order had not been drawn from that 
new world order, would the autocorrect in your iPhone work differently? 
Would the entire universe of statistically transmitted language have been 
more nurturing of black life, more amenable and just plain friendly to 
global blackness? On this latter point, there can be no doubt. As smoking 
gun and as incremental excision of black, Latinx and native life/history, 
Shannon’s foundational moves are both paradigmatic and symptomatic. 
As the textual reference template to generate statistical information 
regarding textual predictors by doing research on subjects given certain 
letters of a text whose subsequent letters had to be guessed, Jefferson the 
Virginian, like so many other default encodings fatally skews the results. 
Racism sediments into the architecture of modern machines.
Regarding the clear success of his method, Shannon stated that “results 
of this order are typical of prediction by a good subject with ordinary 
literary English. Newspaper writing, scientific work and poetry generally 
lead to somewhat poorer scores.”24 We clearly see here how even for 
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Shannon, rhetorical difference and indeed social difference, both in 
terms of the form of the original text and in terms of the “good subject,” 
affect the mathematical outcomes. When these same equations are used 
to produce texts, to (re)generate texts from reduced or encoded texts, the 
texts themselves become inputs into the socius that affect the outputs, 
which is to say that, in the name of efficiency, of economy, and the most 
efficient shipping of signifiers, they tend to reproduce their own semiotic 
architecture at the level of statistics, and these statistics endlessly feed 
back into semiotics, consciousness, and lived experience. Thus #Black-
livesmatter becomes a statistically improbable event. Until now.
Shannon remarked, “anyone speaking a language possesses, implicitly, 
an enormous knowledge of the statistics of the language. Familiarity with 
the words, idioms, clichés and grammar enables him to fill in missing or 
incorrect letters in proofreading, or to complete an unfinished phrase 
in conversation.”25 What goes unremarked about this generalized 
unconscious knowledge is that social differences among speakers imply 
both differences in the types of implicit “knowledge of the statistics of 
the language” and different statistics. These differences, we wager, are not 
content indifferent. Understanding the culture-programming-culture 
loop, Beyoncé’s comparison of herself to Bill Gates in Formation (“I just 
might be a black Bill Gates in the making”) may not be too far off. She 
too has a brilliant program—one that has grasped the potentials of the 
programmable image in a new way. Despite the fact that it is precisely 
sociohistorical and political differences that are disappeared from the 
communications model by the assumption of a norm on which to base 
the content-indifferent model, these differences nonetheless function as 
programs. In place of psychoanalysis or cinematic apparatus, Shannon 
creates a statistical model of implicit linguistic law. But his modeling 
of this unconscious knowledge as universal and content indifferent 
is possible only because of the unconsciousness of his method with 
respect to the new world order—so clearly and differently perceptible 
to decolonization and anti-racist struggle—and thus inscribes the 
computational unconscious through machinic repression. The measure 
of the results, better or poorer scores, are not matters of objectivity but 
value judgments encoded in the conception of the task at hand, in the very 
idea of what is to be shipped. This adoption of one standard over another 
in the handling of cargo obviously has a direct relationship to history, 
authority, hegemony, race, gender, and class. It is a relationship of no less 
consequence than that of the normativity of white heteropatriarchy, the 
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psychosis of which was interrogated in the linguistic domain by feminist 
critiques of phallogocentrism,26 and by theorists of decolonization, 
anti-imperialism, deconstruction, and postcoloniality. These were 
thinkers, in short, who were neither fully overtaken by the informatics 
of linguistic efficiency (only one way of putting a price on time) nor 
seeking a Hollywood ending (reconciliation by means of sublimation) 
to their struggles.
While it might be argued that these questions regarding the social 
and historical character of another method for the letters are matters for 
sociology, history, or aesthetic theory, that is, for the humanities rather 
than for the objective or virtual worlds of mathematics and computation, 
it is worth noticing that it is precisely such a conceit that eliminates 
the social from the now fully e-numerated linguistic in the first place. 
Communication is treated at the outset as if it were content indifferent, 
and then, once a whole system has been built upon that axiom, the fact 
that the system works is taken as proof of concept. But for whom is 
this efficiency when deep in its DNA is its founding ideology of value 
neutrality and the assumption of the right to set standards? “The author 
of an atrocious undertaking ought to imagine he has already accomplished 
it, ought to impose upon himself a future that is as irrevocable as the past,” 
wrote Borges. The structural exclusion of social difference, the weighted 
bias against the non-normative, which is to say the non-hegemonic, 
modes of signification, at once constitutes a baseline, imposes a past and 
a future, and shapes the current mathematical and computational con-
sciousness. In the imposition of normativity we saw that Psycho treats the 
exception that proves the rule, Shannon’s rules admit no exceptions. Such 
normative encodings render a world where what can be recognized as 
plot, as thought, as information by its “conscious organs,” all but excludes 
as idle speculation, irrationality, baseless outrage, bad scholarship, or 
just plain noise, the possibility of interrogating, much less smashing, the 
structural and epistemic limits of the code’s very mode.
5
The Internet of Value, by Karl Marx: 
Information as Cosmically  
Distributed Alienation
I thought of a labyrinth of labyrinths, of one sinuous spreading labyrinth 
that would encompass the past and the future and in some way involve 
the stars.
—Borges
There is a deceptively simple but nonetheless correct equation between 
what has become the media-environment and the unconscious, 
discernable from the evidence that is the global warming of the material 
substrate of our thought and now entering a new stage variously 
christened, the anthropocene, “the capitalocene,” “the white supremacist 
capitalocene,” (Mark Driscoll), plantationocene, chthulucene (Haraway). 
There is also a growing recognition that these hot materialities are indeed 
the return of the repressed of centuries of idealism, alienated science and 
all its attendant if unfathomable colonial violence. However the argument 
of Message, that both “the environment” and “the unconscious” are com-
putational and together currently comprise elements of a single system, 
goes further than just to suggest that these two ostensibly separable 
conceptual entities (the first demonstrably everywhere as indicated by 
“the anthropocene,” and the second, only just proposed in this text as 
“the computational unconscious”) are of a piece. Let us recall through 
the lens of Stanislaw Lem and Andre Tarkovsky (Solaris) that according 
to Marx (arguably the first great figure in software studies) “nature is 
man’s inorganic body”—and the history of the species is also the history 
of the transformation of this inorganic body—its reprogramming. No 
wonder that in the fictional, if allegorical, science of “Solaristics” that 
investigates the uncanny star Solaris, the very appearance of the cosmos 
becomes an expression of the species’ repressed. In an interactive and 
recursive relation, Solaris mysteriously sends emanations of the scientists’ 
unconscious back to their observatory to haunt them.
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Marx’s de-encryption of private property anticipates this insight into 
the historical materiality of the as yet untheorized unconscious that 
would later emanate from the outside when in the 1844 manuscripts he 
cracks the code (codification) of private property to show that private 
property, rather than being a natural form (along with its affective 
dimension, “greed” existing as a natural attribute), is “not the cause but 
the effect of alienated labor.” The long history of alienated labor is the 
antecedent of the universalist generalization of private property that 
comes into being only by separating the workers’ product from the 
worker and giving them less in return and recursively iterating through 
cycles of expansion for centuries without end. The analogy Marx uses 
to discredit the naturalizing mythos of private property as the cause 
of avarice and wage labor is one with theology. “[T]he gods in the 
beginning are not the cause but the effect of man’s intellectual confusion. 
Later this relationship becomes reciprocal.”1 Private property as effect 
is naturalized and soon taken up as an explanatory cause by political 
economists and nearly everyone else and this is the source of intellectual 
confusion, to say the least. As “man” is inscribed in “nature,” “nature” 
is inscribed in “man,” says Marx, in a reciprocity based for him upon a 
confusion of first principals.
Such recursive mistaking of mediation effects for causal agents—
private property, avarice, the subject, the nation—has been a leitmotif 
thus far in Message. We observe that this type of mistake, characteristic of 
idealism, has all too often naturalized murder. With colonialism and the 
forced shattering of indigenous traditions, various “mytho-ontologies” 
have undergone a narrowing and “refinement” through disenchantment 
by dominant science working to exclude nearly all other mythic domains 
of ordination and narration save its own. This science however has fully 
incorporated a transformation of “man”/“nature” by history that has 
for at least seven hundred years been dominated by what we may now 
recognize as the informatics of capitalism—an incorporation that in its 
dynamics and consequences is both unconscious and the unconscious 
that has consequences beyond all calculation. Science separates race from 
colonialism and slavery, gender from heteropatriarchy, homo sapiens 
from the environment and humans from their media. No wonder we 
are zombies in the face of climate change—the somnambulism imposed 
by the spectacle and the separation from embodiment imposed by 
information leaves us with an impoverished idea of the bio-dynamics of 
capitalism and encloses us in a mytho-ontology that presupposes greed 
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and private property but has translated those presuppositions into com-
putational operations.
We could recast history here and say that this appearance of being 
outside the world and the reality of being incapacitated by it, results from 
the automation of planetary life by alienated computation. As Marx puts 
it “It is only to be expected that a living, natural being equipped and 
endowed with objective (i.e., material) essential powers should have 
real natural objects of his essence; as is the fact that his self-alienation 
should lead to the establishing of a real objective world—but a world 
in the form of externality—a world therefore, not belonging to his own 
essential being, and an overpowering world. There is nothing incompre-
hensible or mysterious in this. It would be mysterious, rather, if it were 
otherwise.”2 “Man” emerges mediated through his objects, his external-
ities—a logic that places “man” outside of “nature” and makes clear why 
dialectics is forced into the uncomfortable claim that capital was simul-
taneously the best and the worst thing that ever happened: the liberation 
of the productive forces and all that, capital as the condition of “man.” 
Self-alienation from nature produces both the human and nature—an 
“originary” binary that in truth can only be imposed retroactively as the 
result of alienation. This alienation is, for the early Marx “objective man,” 
and as Sean Cubitt has brilliantly shown, it constitutes the environment 
as an externality of capitalism and colonialism that, in a second moment, 
even when re-deployed by environmentalists for protection and saving, 
continues to presuppose capitalism and colonialism in the very notion 
of “the environment” precisely because the environment is conceived 
as an externality.3 The conditions under which the environment is an 
externality are consequent from colonization—in the longue durée, the 
practical continuation of the severance of man (“man”) from nature 
(“nature”). Thus any invocation of “the environment,” presupposes it as a 
colonial externality. The notion itself, despite the best intentions of some, 
results and persists from the unchecked proliferation of narratives by 
abstractions embedded in the material operations of political economy 
broadly conceived—abstractions that are themselves part of systemic 
colonization of the planet and the mind by capital. These abstractions 
contain within themselves the naturalizing notion of originary 
severance that is private property, the still eminently practical means by 
which people continue to be separated from resources that they might 
otherwise access (and arguably the means by which the categoricality of 
distinct speciation comes into being). The list of what has been severed 
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from access is long but it includes air, water, land, earth, life and nature. 
Dominant self-conceptions and the concept of the environment—to say 
nothing of the actually existing planetary relations—urgently require 
decolonization.
Commenting on the power of concepts to inform consciousness and 
differentiating her Chthulucene from the name of monster in the racist 
imaginary of a story by H.P. Lovecraft, the cyborg known as Donna 
Haraway writes:
“My” Chthulucene, even burdened with its problematic Greek-ish 
tendrils, entangles myriad temporalities and spatialities and myriad 
intra-active entities-in-assemblages—including the more-than-human, 
other-than-human, inhuman, and human-as-humus. Even rendered in 
an American English-language text like this one, Naga, Gaia, Tangaroa, 
Medusa, Spider Woman, and all their kin are some of the many thousand 
names proper to a vein of SF that Lovecraft could not have imagined 
or embraced—namely, the webs of speculative fabulation, speculative 
feminism, science fiction, and scientific fact. It matters which systems 
systematize systems, which stories tell stories, which concepts think 
concepts. Mathematically, visually, and narratively, it matters which 
figures figure figures, which systems systematize systems.4
It matters which systems systematize systems. If I understand her 
correctly, Haraway’s injunction to make kin at the end of her essay 
is a recasting of her notion of the cyborg that understands “we” are 
trans-species, trans-material assemblages and that “our” current essen-
tialisms regarding who “we” relate to and who “we” are, are not only 
profoundly refugee unfriendly (she has in mind refugees: human, animal 
and all types) but are killing the planet. I couldn’t agree more.
* * *
The alienation of “man” from “nature” brought about by the alienation of 
man from his product by wage labor (at once capitalizing and digitizing) 
leads Marx, twenty-odd years after the 1844 manuscripts to the following 
observation regarding the misunderstanding of nature, man and capital: 
“[T]here is not one single atom of its value [capital’s] that does not owe 
its existence to unpaid labor” (Vol. 1, Ch., 24, 405). This means two 
things 1) that all the value of capital is theft and 2) that nothing of the 
environment, no matter, is in and of itself of value to capital. Not only 
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is exchange value content indifferent, it is without material content. 
Value conferred by unpaid labor accretes to capital via the repurposing 
(re-ordering, in-forming) of materials, that is to say, the repurposing 
of raw materials, that is, of matter, for social purposes. Value is not in 
things but in what has been done to things in their working up within 
the socio-historical context. We understand from this deduction that 
capitalist valuation is exclusively, inexorably a socio-historical relation. It 
is a form, an informing of matter. More precisely still, it is socio-historical 
relation indexed by number and organized as early computation.5
Marx says explicitly, “As use values, commodities are, above all, of 
different qualities, but as exchange values they are merely different 
quantities, and consequently do not contain an atom of use value.”6 
Therefore: 1) The only externalities that can be accounted for in capital are 
in fact internalities—that which can be valued: the numerable. Use-values 
can only be represented to capital as exchange-values. Human life itself 
is only visible to capital as labor power, that is, as exchange value (and 
living is visible, only as risk). These exchange-values, though external to 
matter and use, nonetheless index attributes of matter and use by number 
(notionally as value, practically as price); they are actually moments 
in capital’s calculus of value that can be compared to one another via 
management. This management has come to be known in sophisticated 
forms as derivatives, and include the options and contracts of synthetic 
finance, but also prices, methods of bookkeeping, the laws governing 
ownership, and really any structure intent upon the profitable management 
of rights to property. These contracts of ownership linked to exchange 
values are thus internal to capital’s system of valuation, and its system of 
valuation is its system(s) of account, which is to say, of representation. 
This content indifferent system of executable representation (calculation, 
accounting, calculus) permeates discourse and creates ideology. Clearly 
the extension of these representational capacities into the visual domain 
through spectacle, cinema and computation opens up another huge field 
of analysis. Additionally, 2) there is another set of externalities that Sean 
Cubitt (above) has discussed with great acumen and precision regarding 
the environment, as have others, writing in the register of transnational 
feminism such as, Rosalinda Fregoso and Melissa Wright, regarding 
femicide and disposable life, which is of value only in as much as it is of no 
account. These realms of no account are the realms of the innumerable—
the environment itself, the place where waste can be dumped, people can 
be starved, raped, harvested and murdered, oceans and atmospheres 
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polluted, all with impunity, all without being held to account. These exter-
nalities in the form of lands, animals, peoples, ecologies, experiences, 
histories, cultures, genocides, fireflies are included as excluded in capital’s 
conscription of systems of representation. When our very language has 
been conscripted as a means of capitalist production and reproduction, 
when it is expropriated and recoded by content indifferent management, 
the difficulty and perhaps impossibility of making the second externality 
count is effected to the point of exclusion and these outsides become 
accessible only by what might be figured as an anti-racial-capital-
ist, decolonial feminist-queer poetics and politics, where intellection, 
engaged in active self-decolonization endeavors to neither presuppose 
nor conform to programs of capitalist conscription.
Our foray into the immateriality of exchange value—an immateri-
ality precisely resultant from the material organization of production 
and reproduction—along with our sense of exchange-value’s structural 
exclusion of the surround opens the way forward to another key point 
for Message. With respect to the viral onslaught of value as an immaterial 
abstraction that nonetheless works its way through the presumed 
externality that is the environment and nearly all other externalities as 
well, it is today possible to specify value’s relation to information. For it 
is the incipient digitization of the life-world by capital, its development 
of machines of account—machines that had to be made increasingly 
interoperable—that paves the way for the “discovery” of information. 
In reality capital first developed machinic modes of perception and 
cognition that were sensitive to what would be “information” and then 
necessitated its invention through the development of general theories of 
information. Information is a real abstraction.
Information is a real abstraction, the consequence of the historical 
working up of the material world, not the cause but the effect of alienated 
labor. As noted at the outset, the specific history of information as an 
emergent mode of financialization is not properly speaking the subject 
of Message. That history remains to be written! I am only trying to 
indicate the path. Some writers who sense the close proximity between 
information and capitalism are already on it. In his brilliant book, 
Control, Sebastian Franklin writes:
The specific valorizing logic of control can thus be understood 
according to the following proposition: if labor under capital is 
always already digital, then the digitization of practices not formerly 
understood as labor—communication, sociality, identity, formation, 
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attention—forms a necessary precondition for their conceptualization 
as such. In other words, digitization is a precondition for subsumption.7
Digital Culture 1 is the precondition for Digital Culture 2, the com-
modification of the life-world is the precondition of post-Fordism, of 
“immaterial labor,” and of racial computational capital. The exchange 
value of a commodity, the quantity of “the universal form of value” that 
it embodies, is immaterial, but is nonetheless a number. What this means 
is that the value measured in a quantum of money is a number assigned 
to a process. “The value of commodities is the very opposite of the coarse 
materiality of their substance, not an atom of matter enters into its 
composition.”8 We see clearly then that there is no substance to exchange 
value—despite its material mediation it is nothing but the quantitative 
index of a social relation. This social relation, however, is itself material 
and historical—“objective” in Marx’s sense.
This quantity of Value, V, indifferent to any and all materials but 
nonetheless requiring the operations of a biological and material 
substrate that crystallizes a constellation of social relations (originally the 
commodity in Capital, originally wage-labor in the 1844 manuscripts), 
is, in essence, an abstraction—a number assigned to a matrix of social 
relations through the very operation of these relations: exchange value, 
abstract universal labor time, the basic building block of a humanity 
measured by clocks. It depends upon the historical emergence of a set of 
increasingly coordinated practices and interconvertible measurements 
that have become generalized, and universal in the sense that they are 
inexorably transmitted across the planetary situation. This requires what 
in a long ago essay on Dziga Vertov I referred to as the meshing of what 
Ernst Bloch called non-synchronous temporalities, as well as the incipient 
digitization presided over by the world market. The organization of 
the world by means of digitization has been going on for some time. 
Franklin’s Control clearly articulates Charles Babbage’s view of God as a 
grand programmer, his “view of the universe as fundamentally digital,” 
and in a lucid argument about the incipient digitization brought about 
by capitalism he “posits Babbage’s world view as a proxy for capital’s 
optimizing gaze.”9 Given the encroachment of digitality and Marx’s 
clear notion that value is an immaterial number assigned to a matrix of 
social relations, we prick up our ears then when we hear Norbert Weiner 
conclude in his essay “Computing Machines and the Nervous System,” 
that there exists an immaterial domain called “information” present in 
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relation to any given phenomenon: “Information is information, not 
matter or energy. No materialism that does not admit this can survive 
at the present day.”10
The wager then is that not only does “not an atom of matter enter 
into” the composition of information, but that information emerges 
in the foot print of capitalist valuation—it is not “nature” in any naive 
or unmediated sense but rather value achieving a new order of self-
consciousness, self regulation and interoperability. The connection to 
cybernetics is now clearer. Weiner writes:
We have already spoken of the computing machine and consequently 
the brain as a logical machine. It is by no means trivial to consider the 
light cast on logic by such machines, both natural and artificial. Here 
the chief work is that of Turing. We have said before that the machina 
ratiocinatrix is nothing but the calculus rationcinator of Leibnitz with 
an engine in it; and just as modern mathematical logic begins with the 
calculus, so it is inevitable that its present engineering development 
should cast a new light on logic. The science of today is operational; 
that is, it considers every statement as essentially concerned with 
possible experiments or observable processes. According to this, the 
study of logic must reduce to the study of the logical machine, whether 
nervous or mechanical, with all its non-removable limitations and 
imperfections.11
The reference in Weiner is Turing’s 1936 paper, “On Computable 
Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem,” in which 
the machinification of computation was proposed as a universal 
possibility—one that gave rise to what became known as the “universal 
Turing machine.”12 This paper generalized the thinking already present 
in Charles Babbage’s and Lady Lovelace’s steam driven analytic engine, 
effectively showing not only that all mathematical process could be 
machine driven but that it was fundamentally machinic. The abstraction 
that was the calculus of Leibnitz and Newton was thus always already the 
thinking of machines. Marx argued that the organization of machinery 
created a “vast automaton” out of fixed capital in which workers were 
only its “conscious organs” and capitalists did the thinking of capital. So 
too then, the mathematicians—those who so rigorously enumerated the 
calculus of space and time. They did the thinking of machines. Given the 
mesh between industrial history, the machinification of thought and 
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capitalist accumulation, the conjecture that computation is the auto-
poeisis of capital implies that information is its representational medium.
Built on machines, but an immaterial isolate of machines, com-
putational process proposes to be content indifferent and medium 
indifferent—the universal Turing machine implies (in the abstract) that 
one computer is as good as another. Our abiding insistence that this 
indifference to history and specificity is not the case in computation is 
the equivalent to an insistence that there is or must be a persistent form 
(persistent forms) of non-capitalist valuation. If there is not a single 
atom of matter in exchange-value, then neither is there a single atom 
of matter in information or computation. Weiner says as much. What 
then of the rest, of the body and the flesh—of what matter is matter? 
Regarding the immense edifice of computation from the standpoint of 
life not (not yet? not completely?) taken up as labor by capital, that is, 
from the standpoint of what Neferti Tadiar calls “remaindered life,” the 
machine as The World Computer, is at once basis and externality.13 It is 
violently alienated intelligence as condition of possibility.
In addition to splicing machines and brains into the same circuit, 
informatics can therefore be understood as the “subjectivity” of the 
objective situation of “man,”—non-conscious thinking (at least so far as 
humans have been concerned), emerging in a world grown increasingly 
complex and abstract: in a word, “operational.” The machina ratiocinatrix 
speeds up (motorizes) the calculus in a capitalized world, “essentially 
concerned with possible experiments or observable processes,” because, 
dependent upon innovation capital must stave off the falling rate 
of profit. But just because machine-mediated logical operations are 
non-conscious in a human sense in no way implies that they are not self-
conscious in a machinic sense. They are self-reflexive in the same manner 
that, as Turing pointed out in his essay published in Mind, computation 
works on its own operations and store of information. They are also not 
without vectors of intention, for what else is logical problem solving but 
an algorithmic approach to representations of life—a program. As Turing 
emphasized, humans are often surprised by the outcome of programs 
they themselves set in motion. The human mind does not and cannot 
immediately grasp the logical implications (outputs) of a program and 
its inputs. Today, actually existing computers outpace the narrowly 
biological mind’s capacity in this respect by orders of magnitude—in 
algo trading, but everywhere else as well. This machine-thinking, that 
outpaces life, is precisely the thinking of sedimented, dead labor.
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Of course, machine-thinking is today nothing if not cybernetic. The 
machine operator who once worked on “their” machine now works in 
the machine. Machine thinking has re-sculpted perception and mind 
for seamless interface and near total capture. The amortized conscious-
ness of sedimented historical sensual labor, expropriated by capital, 
welds itself to current thinking and by enveloping, enclosing, ramifying 
and programming it, organizes it in ways that are at once extremely 
subtle, broad-spectrum sensual, and nearly impossible to disarticulate 
from any possible form of awareness. That’s why the kids are all sick: 
“augmented” reality. But we must wager that “we” retain the capacity to 
note the spectral character of life as well as the encroachment of what 
Achille Mbembe understands as necropolitics in which death and power 
over death is the vernacular of power. When death is the medium of 
expression, how might the living signal our aspiration?
For Marx, the information that is the exchange value of a commodity 
has a legible dimension/approximation (its price), and a dimension 
that relies on social relations that are fundamentally unconscious. “The 
commodity is exchange-value but has its price.”14 Price is not one with 
value, but is, rather “notional.” This means to say that when the commodity 
realizes its price in a sale, the relations and ratios informing the sale are 
gleaned from background information processing and abstraction, some 
of which is pre-conscious or unconscious. Seizing upon these same 
relations with machinic computation posits that they might be given 
symbolic form in a register that departs from the market—one that is 
representationally adequate to the market but not, in the first instance, 
the market. We may position the history of information theory as the 
effort to formalize these relations in executable form while eschewing the 
dialectical call for understanding an abstraction, a machine or an abstract 
machine in relation to its social embedding. Dialectics surfaces the 
repressed of information, namely noise. “Information” was and remains 
a way of treating the social as an externality—as noise. This tension 
between the formalizations of political-economy via the principles and 
practices of exchange value (and now financialized computation) with 
dialectical critique precisely describes Marx’s struggle with representa-
tion (darstellung): how to represent capital in a way that at once follows 
the movements of production and the capitalist market and comprehends 
it such that the hegemony of that market might be transcended.
Dialectics endeavors to outpace the market and outthink computation. 
But we need to be aware that the insights of dialectics are hardly immune 
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from market digitization. Take for example the insight, “Money does 
not effect the actual circulation of commodities in space and time. It 
merely realizes their price in a way that transfers the title of ownership 
to the commodities to the purchaser, to the person who has offered the 
means of exchange. What is circulated by money is not commodities, 
but the titles of ownership to them.”15 Almost 150 years later, we can 
clearly grasp from Marx’s statement about the social dimension of 
exchange, what is becoming an axiom of crypto-currencies: monetary 
circulation is a matter of informatics and contracts. The traffic in rights 
to ownership mediated by money are antecedents to forms such as the 
bitcoin blockchain and Ethereum’s programmable blockchain and “smart 
contracts” developing in the twenty-first century. The current thinking 
on crypto refers to this immanent restructuring of finance by computa-
tional money-forms as “the internet of value.” The visionaries here are 
not imagining crypto as a mere replacement of “fiat money.” Building 
on the practices of post-Fordist economy and cognitive capitalism, it is 
clear that money executes a transfer of rights by means of quantifica-
tion and more or less understood that social process will be ever more 
intimately wedded to financialization and encrypted as money in real 
time. A new computational layer of communication and datavisualiza-
tion that formally binds financialization to representation (of intention, 
identity, visibility, aesthetics, etc.) is in the works: “the internet of value.” 
A century and a half ago Marx’s dialectical method resolved aspects of 
property relations that are now being self-consciously utilized in the 
build out of crypto-currencies. However, none of these currencies are 
post-capitalist—at least not yet.
The degree to which the inner dynamism of the commodity form can 
be elaborated is testified to in the writings of Marx and beyond—it is 
elaborated even in communist revolutions. However, one thing is clear: 
this “thing” called value is constituted by both a social relation and a 
civil contract; it is thus, also, a tacit collective agreement that there are 
pre-individual and trans-individual forces at work in the market. Theses 
organizational forces, manifest in and through wage labor, alienation 
and private property (a causal chain, if one recalls the exposition in the 
1844 manuscripts, that becomes recursive) and the logistics thereof, 
are the precondition of the exchange of equivalents in the market. The 
market as information machine, as itself a computer, an understanding 
already achieved by Hayek in 1945, was less a discovery of informatics, 
than a pre-condition for the emergence of informatics. Dissolving here 
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(a la 2001) from the primeval bone toss of Marx’s dialectical analysis 
of industrial capital to the orbiting space stations of Google, Facebook 
and bitcoin, one could say that the becoming economically conscious 
of the fine lattice-work of informatic relations and the understanding 
of them as simultaneous means of production and communication is in 
fact the significance if not the meaning of the internet—at least from the 
standpoint of capital. As I said of cinema in the CMP, the dominant mode 
of representation has become the dominant mode of production. Taken 
as a whole, the internet is the nonconscious cognition of “man,”—the 
cognitive process of the market in the largest sense, that then processes 
its conscious organs.16
As a kind of aside, my own view of the nonconscious status of AI, 
is one of extreme skepticism. Let’s pull our heads out of the sand, shall 
we? Just as machines operate at orders of magnitude faster than human 
brains (beneath or beyond the level of human discernment) so too does 
the daibolical intelligence of the market. Marx clearly understands these 
market relations (their intelligence) as forcibly imposed.
“[T]he totality of the process appears as an objective relationship arising 
spontaneously; a relationship which results from the interaction of 
conscious individuals, but which is neither part of their consciousness 
nor, as a whole subsumed under them. Their own collisions give rise 
to an alien social power standing above them. Because circulation is a 
totality of the social process, it is also the first form in which not only 
the social relation appears as something independent of individuals, 
as, say, in a coin or an exchange value, but the whole of the social 
movement itself.”17
In brief, this analysis of circulation, its elision of conscious relations, and 
its imposition of market conditions on human existence accounts for and 
historicizes both Adam Smith’s invisible hand in which the pursuit of 
individual interests serve the general interest and Hobbes’ naturalization 
of the war of each against all and brings us into the present. By drawing 
an arc that spans from Hobbes’ Leviathan and Smith’s invisible hand to 
Google’s invisible mind, we may grasp that Marx’s analysis of the social 
totality is indeed a proto-theory of both AI and of the unconscious: the 
commodity form is a symptom (a fetish) requiring the depth hermeneutic 
of the dialectic. For us it also provides the basis for a theory of the com-
putational unconscious and a means of historicizing information as the 
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product of alienated labor. The unconscious is structured like a language, 
a computer language. This computer language is in us more than “us.”
Thus one sees through Marx’s analysis of monetary circulation, the 
instantiation of the individual:
“Money … as the individuality of general wealth, itself emerging from 
circulation and merely representing the general, as mere social result, 
implies no individual relation at all to its owner, its possession is not 
the development of any one of the essential aspects of his individual-
ity, but rather possession of something devoid of individuality …”18
The subjective dimension is given as follows:
“Money is therefore not only an object of the quest for enrichment, it 
is the object of it … Avarice is possible without money, but the quest of 
enrichment is itself the product of a definite social development, not 
a natural in contrast to an historical development. This explains the 
lamentations of the ancients about money as a source of all evil. The 
quest for pleasure in its general from and avarice are two particular 
forms of greed for money. The abstract quest for pleasure implies an 
object that can embody the possibility of all pleasures.”19
Marx continues, “The greed for money or quest for enrichment is 
necessarily the downfall of the ancient communities … ” It is itself the 
community and cannot tolerate any other standing above it.20 “Where 
money is not itself the community it must dissolve the community.”21 
Given this notion, or at least intimation of a communal totality—here 
viral, cannibalistic and alienating, “the false community of the spectacle” 
as Debord would say or “the communism of capital” as Virno has it—there 
is the strong suspicion on the part of economists and entrepreneurs (but 
also among some revolutionaries) that some (non-humanist) episteme 
(Althusserian science?) ought to be adequate to these relations; this 
episteme is generally known as social, or political, or economic science, 
but has become computer science. Leaving aside for now the question of 
the singularity, in which the sedimented and alienated consciousness of 
capitalism as computational power becomes irrevocably self-conscious 
(I just suggested that for all practical purposes, it has) and which by 
definition would outpace our thought, we should be able to grasp clearly 
that any version of Marxist social science (at least) needs to become 
the internet of value, by karl marx . 89
Marxist computer science; Marxist critique of political economy needs 
to become Marxist critique of the digital/attention economy of racial 
computational capital. Thus we require a Marxist theory of information. 
I hasten to underscore here—and this is the point of making this 
argument for a Marxist theory of information only one chapter in the 
larger work that is Message—that the Marxism I have in mind registers 
capitalism as racial capitalism, and understands it as axiomatic that the 
difference made by information is always social difference.
The imperial masters of social, now computer science (not the 
mere academics relegated to our pay silos and Twitter “feeds,” but the 
practitioner-entrepreneurs), feed their avarice, their abstract quest for 
pleasure in general and the object that in Marx’s phrase “can embody the 
possibility of all pleasures,” by decoding the social/computational logic 
of the community—of any phenomenon whatever—formalizing it, and 
developing a proprietary relation to that formalization. They call “their” 
insights nifty things like “Google” and “Facebook” and “Apple” and help 
to devour prior social orders by moistening them with information and 
re-organizing communication. Progress is bound less to their genius and 
more to their proprietary rights. Can we reengineer these relations?
The control of communication, as Weiner noted, is the very strategy 
of the “Lords of Things As They Are.” This current control of communi-
cation has meant the instantiation and control of information, a control 
that in turn means a control of the market, and of social production 
and reproduction. The decoding and recoding of social practices in 
a proprietary vein is the precise logic of the start-up, as well as that 
of speculative markets, particularly that of the markets for celebrity, 
“tech” and art. Why? “The abstract quest for pleasure implies an object 
that can embody the possibility of all pleasures.” Content indifferent 
information is the contemporary analogue for content indifferent 
pleasure. The greater the accumulation of information, the greater the 
quantity of abstract pleasure. Without diminishing the brilliance of the 
achievements manifest in these corporate platforms, which do indeed 
harness collective aspirations and abstract an eon of collective praxis, we 
can also see what drives them. They embody the same logic of abstraction 
that drives many of the rest of us to abjection, sleeplessness, psychosis, 
insanity, precarity, outrage, breakdown, migration, starvation and/or 
death, in the unequal distribution of dispossession. Within the dialectics 
of avarice they offer the lure of increased sociality, and in return they 
strip-mine our libidos, our neuronal powers, our cognitive capacities, 
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our language, our imagination and our time. In the twenty-first century it 
is paradigmatically social-media, the grim reaper, which extracts content 
indifferent value from the myriad qualities of social life to provide an 
elite coterie of vested owners with what can embody the possibility of all 
pleasure, namely, money and the informatic control of rights.
Within the space of the social, information, in contrast to what we 
better understand as the community of exchange values, does not, at 
least until now, appear as social; it has been expressed as a property 
of things—“neither matter nor energy” and there with or without an 
observer (according to its observers, anyway). It is what communicates 
even between non-sentient things that otherwise do not communicate. 
It is, as Benjamin critically observed, the antithesis of narrative and the 
annihilator of experience. We search information in pursuit of life and 
in flight from death, doing what we can to avoid the crashing of the 
wave. And while we would be solipsistic and even foolish to imagine that 
after our own deaths, nothing means anything, it is perhaps slightly less 
egocentric to wonder, “What of the cosmos beyond the life-span of our 
visible generations, or even of ‘our species’?” In as much as we believe in 
the immortality of information, is there really any question we can pose 
that is not also in some way about our own place in the universe, that 
does not posit our own critical consciousness even after it has logically 
disintegrated? While there is within this reader-writer an impulse to say 
yes, it’s not all about “us” and better if it isn’t, I must confess that I/it is not 
sure—I/it is perhaps unable to escape the originary ethnocentrism of the 
sign and its extension into informatics. However, I also recognize that not 
caring about those in the future is analogous to not caring about those 
in the present or the past; we may be removed from them in a narrow 
way, but there are many many tendrils that link our fates together in the 
web of time. It only matters if it matters. If information binds us together 
in a negative way, what about the historical emergence that is the con-
solidation of the net communal will of what has been? What about the 
echo and persistence of all the endurance, survival, communication and 
aspiration that built the apprehension of the indifferent infinity called 
information? However bound by autopoetic limitations the answers 
to such a question about cosmic meaning may be, when regarding the 
relation of information to community our responses do not need to fall 
back into an identitarian framework, nor, in recognizing the alienation 
of so much intelligence, do they need to fantasize a return to origins. 
However, we may and indeed must ask, if death has developed such an 
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articulate, infinite and immaterial infrastructure, wherefore life? If there 
is so much death in our information, in our images, in our streets, in our 
borderlands, and in our persons, what of the living that are marooned at 
the edge of space and time?
Can we say (in agreement with Brian Rotman’s groundbreak-
ing work on mathematics as sign system in Signifying Nothing) that 
information, likewise, elides the subject (I, God, totality) even as it 
smuggles in its ghost. This degree zero of information we should call 
the myth of non-presence (the presence of anti-presence that ushers 
in presence under erasure), a deep conviction, or rather a theology of 
the irrelevance and non-existence of what used to be called the human 
species, a world-view ceaselessly dedicated to the absence of concrete 
human agents, but no less ethnocentric for all that.22 Information, 
“the difference that makes a difference” as Bateson said, derives from 
the Latin nominative and the Latin verb informare (to inform) which 
means to give form or to form an idea of. “To give form, therefore I am.” 
As an expression of maroonage we can re-write this grammatological 
formulation as “Information, therefore I am.” The post-structuralist 
rewriting of Descartes, in which “think, therefore I am,” expresses that 
the subject is an artifact of grammatical function, a phantom presence 
generated only after the fact of, that is, in the very movement of sign 
function, of the symbolic, of the signifying chain, expresses that the 
subject of information as presence is therefore also a myth, an artifact 
that merely suggests metaphysical presence, rather than a pre-existing 
agent. I is a predicate rather than a subject who is always already absent—
this famously, was “the myth of presence.” The spectral I of information, 
the informatic dividual, megalomaniacal and abject, is indeed the spirit 
of contemporary capitalism. Secular religion, an ascetic ideal. Knowing 
all devouring information encompasses the cosmos, therefore I am. 
And yet, in accord with an idea I develop elsewhere as the politics of the 
utterance, the strategic voicing of this spirit, this immaterial cybernetic 
consciousness so firmly grounded in and dependent upon the totality 
of the material array, matters profoundly. Does it hew toward all that 
appears, that is, to the spectacle and data-visualization? Or, might this 
spirit, Turing’s trans-substantiation, also be a specter, the product of so 
much disavowed violence that may yet devise strategies to hew toward 
all that is disavowed, disappeared, invisibilized, haunting and forgotten, 
as these unremembered violences are nonetheless part of this history of 
its moment of emergence and therefore part of what it is?
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The perception of information qua information, the analytical 
instantiation of the category itself, clearly has its origins in history and 
in sociality. Today there is almost no escape from the legacy of that 
perception: we are all part of the history of technology and all haunted 
by presence. Such is consciousness. Our emergence as an affordance of 
fixed capital is bound up with planetary materiality and information. 
Dominant history has it that the category of information arises and 
is formalized as an intervention in the merely social by punchcards, 
quantum physics, cybernetics and communication theory. Indeed, as 
ostensibly autonomous realms, the cumulative result of these emergent 
disciplines was a mythic generalization of the logistics of inscription of 
information as the fundamental cosmic modality. Thus information is 
now at the foundation of any event whatever—indeed any and every 
event without exception at least in the multiverse of computational 
physics. Here we have wagered, a bit more precisely, that information 
arises in the footprint of the value form and that value as an immaterial 
number assigned to a social relation was indeed the precursor to the 
conceptual matrix that became information. Information: a way for 
value to get more value. No doubt this work of analysis can and will 
be done better and more thoroughly, but we have established that the 
cybernetic social totality of the computational multiverse has capitalism 
in its DNA. (Literally of course, since the discovery of the role of DNA 
was itself premised on an informatic model).
Information as “the difference that makes a difference” was in fact 
informatics' very own concept of differánce. A deferral of meaning that 
found dramatic expression in many domains, for example, Shrodinger’s 
cat, who was alive and dead until one had a look. The fact of information 
has been generalized as a universal principle, visible everywhere one 
looks and, what’s more, everywhere one does not look, but could. We 
thus concur with critical race theory’s critique of dominant discourses 
of post-humanism in our analysis of information: it places the sovereign 
subject of colonial humanism (white, male) under erasure while leaving 
it operative. Technology as “white mythology” says Joel Dinerstein, 
Posthumanism as having afro-futurist, anti-racist, decolonizing roots 
in the rejection of the racist category of the human says Alexander 
Weheliye. Information as the further deracination of exchange value 
(itself dehistoricized and naturalized in everyday experience), and as the 
temporary suspension of price from propriety, serves as in an interum 
calculus that has value inputs and outputs at each end. It casts its 
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net(work), its informatic reticulum, into speculative domains that have 
financialized protocols operationalized before and after. The endless flux 
of the cosmic informatic churn, presents an endless array of virtual sub-
jectivities, any of which might become vested. NSF grants and medical 
research are the most obvious examples of this process, and all research, 
as Flusser says, aspires to be photographed, which for us, is another way 
of saying that it unfolds in a capitalist milieu bent upon the bio-mediated 
extraction of information.
As we shall see in greater detail in the final chapter, the general 
formula for capital, M-C-M ' becomes M-I-M ', where I is information. 
As simple circulation, it returns a value equivalent, but as capital, the 
very informationalization of money and life also assumes a machinery 
of value extraction: Facebook, bitcoin, the NSA, Tech. This shift in the 
general formula of capital, in which surplus value is extracted by means 
of the human-mediated production of information, is the key to any 
understanding of post-Fordism and begins to forecast what’s beyond. 
In a nutshell, information as a universal property of things means that 
the entire universe is posited as an interoperable site of financialization. 
The machines that measure information and the informatic results they 
procure/produce are inscribed with ever increasing granularity between 
M and M '.
Thus information as a presumably value-neutral category represents 
the cosmic naturalization of digital market relations. Under such 
conditions, we may be sure that any super-intelligent machine we 
make, (along the lines say, of any of those discussed in Nick Bostrom’s 
Super-Intelligence) will be the algorithmic embodiment of our history—
of objectified humanity savaged under racial capitalism—and not the 
objective (as in ahistorical and value-neutural) embodiment of some 
deracinated universal Absolute Intelligence—which is to say that it is 
likely to be totalitarian with respect to any and all inferior races, the 
so-called human race included. Shanon’s words now sound almost 
as chilling as they were prescient: “I can visualize a time in the future 
when we will be to robots as dogs are to humans … I’m rooting for the 
machines!”
Situating the emergence of information theory and practice in the 
history of capitalism (and keeping in mind the fate of Pavlov’s dogs), it 
is thus legitimate and indeed historically and politically necessary for us 
to ask: Is it Information that transcends Value, making Value just one 
instance of Information (ambient in markets); such that a category or 
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superset that contains value as a subset led to the discovery of many 
other subsets of seemingly immaterial variables that index more general 
relations; or, does Value transcend Information, the latter of which as a 
category appears to be even more autonomous and therefore abstract 
than Value but, in actual practice, only operates/appears within the 
domain of Value (and markets), and thus not only in the domain of 
sociality per se but of Capital? Is informatic process the very means by 
which racial capitalism continues to expand its Imperium? No amount 
of “OOO” is going to answer that one, I’m afraid. What we need is a 
critique of Digital Ideology that re-subjectifies and historicizes the 
ostensibly non-subjective and ahistorical, a critique that, once having 
out-informed information, is not content to rest there, but is committed 
to develop new methods, idioms, and practices capable of recognizing 
the instrumentality of processes of digital occlusion and exclusion, and 
to actively refuse non-existence by demanding new methods of account. 
This critique must understand its own embodiment, its own emergence 
from within the framework of racial capitalism even as it writes in the 
name of an outside.23
Otherwise, the world will go on as it does, intensifying its violence, its 
environmental destruction, its genocide and radical dispossessions. To 
be clear, this murderous future is the path we are currently on since the 
planetary communication system—its integrated system of accounts—
kills people(s) in its everyday operations. Racial Capitalism is another 
name for intergalactic information processing as we know it. Computa-
tional Capital as communication system, a militarizing apparatus and a 
distributed factory, crunches numbers and many of these numbers are 
people. We, the substrates of computational capital … The devaluation of 
the 2 billion dispossessed and living on two dollars a day, as accomplished 
by advertising, nationalism, imperialism, militarization, “aid,” borders, 
internet, educational systems and art, is part of the general, world-wide 
devaluation of the working day with regard to the fixed capital embodied 
in machines and their information. The historical devaluation of those 
in the Global South is thus far only intensified and exacerbated as the 
processor extends its range and resolution.
Information is alienation distributed. It paints the cosmos with 
sedimented dead labor. To speak in the vernacular, it is the inhuman 
perceived by the inhuman in a matrix that encompasses what used to 
be human. It is an “object” that exists everywhere for a “subject” that 
exists nowhere. As the communication of the stolen sedimented dead 
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labor that is capital accumulation, it is an abstraction meaningful to an 
abstract machine—all of which transpires with absolute indifference 
relative to the use-values afforded, including the use-value known as 
“you.” Your own particular value, based upon your production price and 
the value that your virtuosic activity gives to the computer that is capital, 
is calculated as a multiple of removes from absolute dispossession. Even 
if your multiple happens to go up (even if you are worth 50 or 500 times 
the lowest common denominator of “human” life), the general value 
of humans (or is it humans?) approaches zero while the extraction of 
productive activity still remains essential. Because capital depends upon 
labor, and laborers are increasingly devalued in relation to the cosmic 
expansion of fixed capital as information, we see increasingly intensive 
exploitation on increasingly massive and increasingly granular scales. 
The falling rate of profit brought about the decrease in the relation of the 
value of labor power as compared to fixed capital is compensated for by 
the extension of the working day to every and evermore waking hours, and 
the proliferation of metrics of extraction to linguistic, psychic, neuronal 
and metabolic levels. Likes, movements, heartbeats, pheromones and 
prison time are all value-productive for someone as every attack surface 
of the body and cerebellum is exploited. The devaluation of life on Earth 
is the mirror image of the cosmic distribution of information.
Computation is the reticulated extension of financialization. We 
are back to Tarkovsky’s Solaris, in which the history of suffering is the 
very medium through which one apprehends the cosmos. Thus we 
have an image of the world media system and thus we may grasp the 
emergence and most general function of informatics in computational 
capital. Despite what the ideologues will tell you, neither your soul 
nor ambient information have escaped capitalist valuation. The very 
fact of information and its metrics, both the data and the infrastruc-
ture that records, measures and posits it, is the result of alienated labor: 
sedimented dead labor, theft. Yet some think it is just information that 
wants to be free.
Does the “notional” assignation of price really begin to extend itself 
into the subatomic and the universal? Already, the cost-benefit analysis 
called the atom bomb seemed to say yes. So too does the large space 
telescope, the Higgs-Bozon particle colliders, and all the seemingly 
autonomous science undertaken without a serious regard for global 
inequality. John von Neuman, who Philip Mirowski credits with having 
invented both the A-bomb and modern computing in 1943, may have 
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been remarking on the relation between the specific and the general case 
when he said, “I am thinking about something more important than 
bombs. I am thinking about computers.”24
And then of course, there is the oh-so-familiar computer-mediated 
financialization of everyday life. Interface, get paid. Move up the value 
chain on Instagram or at your institute, get paid. Garner those attention 
metrics, get paid. In the context of my overall argument regarding com-
putational capital, our re-placing of the “universality” of information 
by and indeed within the domain of exchange value cosmically posited 
brings the entire armature of information back to McLuhan’s chicken: 
Information, an egg’s idea to get more eggs.
In conclusion, information is but game theory for eggs. Well, at least 
we have posed the question: “Was information value’s idea to get more 
value?” There may not be a definitive answer, but new pathways for 
thought and praxis open when the logic gate selected is “Yes.”25
PART II




Camera Obscura After All:  
The Racist Writing with Light
Taking a chapter from Jacqueline Goldsby’s brilliant and disturbing 
book, A Spectacular Secret: Lynching in American Life and Literature, 
entitled “Through a Different Lens: Lynching Photography at the Turn 
of the Nineteenth Century” as a starting point, I would like to pursue a 
point made by Goldsby about the role of these atrocious photographs of 
racist murder in what, with Paul Virilio, one might call “the logistics of 
perception”—so I’ll start there.1
Goldsby cites Jonathan Crary’s Techniques of the Observer to remind 
us that “the optical devices used in the nineteenth century were 
not invented in cultural vacuums,” but were, rather, “[p]remised on 
‘conceptual structures’ that reflect ‘points of intersections where phil-
osophical, scientific, and aesthetic discourses overlap with mechanical 
techniques, institutional requirements, and socio-economic forces.’ 
[P]hotographic equipment also presupposes an ideal viewer—an 
observing subject—whose cultural privileges can be inferred from (and, 
consequently conferred by) the ways in which a camera makes the world 
visible to human perception.”2
At this point in The Message is Murder we are quite familiar with the 
notion of both the machine and machinic operations as culturo-historical 
forms. We are also increasingly aware of the dire consequences of 
the uncritical operation of seemingly neutral technologies such as 
computation and cinema (informatics and optics) because they 
themselves are racial formations. Ideas operating “in the silence of 
technologies” are without a doubt ideological in the sense that they are 
divorced from their material conditions of production and dissemina-
tion as Regis Debray taught us, but technologies operating in the silence 
of social difference are solely techno-logical only in the sense that their 
emergence as a social formation that sediments those social relations 
into an apparatus is suppressed. Here we explore the extent to which 
photography might be grasped as a racial formation.
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Building on Crary’s insight, Goldsby says, “Thus, when considering 
lynching photographs and their social effects, we must approach them as 
artifacts that are more than transparent, self-evident documents of these 
events of racial murder. Indeed lynching photographs encode more than 
the deadly operations of white racism. The images also inscribe how 
practices of racial violence were used to cultivate the experience and 
meaning of sight itself.”3
The point I want to emphasize here, that what is encoded in the 
basic structure of the photographic apparatus feeds back into the social 
to re-organize and reproduce it, resonates with a possible research 
project that I will only be able to sketch the outlines of here: With 
respect to practices of looking, there is a deep-seated dialectic, if you 
will, between racism and photography. Here we will only explore the 
most extreme form of this dialectic, leaving the many interventions by 
the black radical tradition and others who contested the racialization 
of and by photography for another occasion. Goldsby is, for very good 
reasons, more interested in analyzing the social dimensions, violences, 
and occlusions transmitted and enabled by the specific photographs 
and platforms she presents—and in seeing the whole heinous genre of 
lynching photography as a significant part of the making of American 
modernity—than she is interested in making general points about 
“photography itself.” However, in the context of the study that is Message 
we may understand from her juxtaposition of her own claims with some 
of Crary’s that any general points one might make about American 
modernity and hence about photography are inadmissible without 
a consideration of racial formations. I take this implication as a key 
starting point for the evaluation and understanding of the social and 
historical emergence of a media platform. If the making of whiteness and 
blackness is mediated by the dynamics of photography, then the reverse 
is also true: the making of photography is mediated by the dynamics of 
whiteness and blackness. Photography does not evolve in a vacuum; it 
is, to borrow from Stephen Heath, a dispositif, the social and technical as 
photography.4 Thus we may expect to find that “race relations”—that is 
to say, forms of racism—may be not only at the heart of “the meaning of 
sight” but inscribed in the technological platforms that enable sight and, 
therefore, in “photography itself.”
Some questions: To what extent is “photography itself ” a racial 
formation? What social dynamics have been subsumed in the reification 
that occurs under the sign of—and, indeed, in the form of the apparatus 
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that is—the camera? How might one rethink Martin Jay’s scopic regimes 
of modernity in terms of racial formation?5 Or similarly, if Deleuze and 
Parnet are correct in asserting that a machine is historical and social, i.e., 
abstract, before it is technical, what kinds of statements can be made about 
photography that draw from and contribute to the work of a critical race 
media theory?6 If Stephen Heath could consider the cinematic apparatus 
as a dispositif—that is, “the social and the technical as cinema”—then 
can we return to the question of photography and the archive using 
the incredible momentum of the intellectual ferment of decoloniza-
tion, black, minoritarian, queer, of-color, subaltern, Marxist, feminist, 
Global South scholarship to rethink the ontology of photography and 
other media platforms? Did photography abstract racial and capitalist 
encodings in a manner consonant with what we have seen thus far with 
informatics and with the cinema? And if so, what does this prejudice of 
technology teach us about the organization of appearance, semiosis, and 
the terrain of communication? What is the message of these media?
Although there is no mention of cameras or photography in Harriet 
Jacobs’ harrowing Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl: Written by Herself, 
within the narrative a mechanism appears that I would hypothesize 
shares some aspects of the abstract machine that necessarily precedes the 
instantiation of the concrete machines of photography. I am speaking, 
of course, of Jacobs’s prison, the crippling attic crawl space above her 
grandmother’s house where mid-way through her account Jacobs hid 
from her slave-masters—immobilized and unable to stand—during the 
seven-year period from 1835 to 1842. Confined, as it were, in camera, 
by the conjunction of vectors of colonialism, political economy, racism, 
slavery and the law that granted to whites the legal right to hold black 
people as chattel, Jacobs, while under inconceivable physical duress, 
watched her own children grow up through a peephole she drilled in 
a shingle. In this social and technical construction, she observes her 
children through a camera obscura, unable to touch them, speak to 
them, or even let them know that she is alive as they face all the travails 
of growing up black under white supremacy. She lives the life of the 
negative.
Through social means, Jacobs is converted into a recording device, 
hidden from view and forced to observe the world through a pinhole 
in a shingle. And yet she chooses this form of social and near physical 
death—imprisonment—over her option on the other side of the pinhole: 
visibility, being seen and, thus, slavery. Reducing Jacobs as closely as 
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possible to a pure observer on one side of the aperture, and to a pure 
object on the other; this horrifying assemblage—this being in camera—
requires the deprivation of one’s rights to one’s body, a deprivation that 
itself relies on the development of a particular scopic regime that offers 
two disparate pathways to social death. On one side, invisible observer; 
on the other side, abject object. This scopic regime is not incidental but is 
a matter of life and death; it has the power to produce metaphysical ideas 
about the human and nature, order and entitlement; it becomes, in short, 
a foundation of U.S. “civilization.” In this racist spectrometry, persons are 
measured by the biochemical, light-absorbing properties of their skin—
let us call it with Lacan (but with a different set of inflections a kind of 
“photo-graphing.”7 A regime of subjectification and objectification and a 
metrics of domination.
This everyday photo-graphing endemic to slavery in the United States 
and to racial formation itself—this constant inscription and re-inscription 
of black and white and color dramatized by Jacobs in camera—points 
toward an essence of photography somewhat different than that put 
forth by Roland Barthes in Camera Lucida, a text that often still passes 
(notwithstanding the writings of Chela Sandoval and Fred Moten) as a 
definitive statement on the ontology of the photograph today.8
To cut to the chase (itself a suspect narrative formula), in Camera 
Lucida Barthes sets out to determine “the essence of photography … 
at any cost” [italics mine] and determines finally that a photograph’s 
noeme, its unique quality, is precisely its chemically mediated indexical 
transmission of a moment of Reality—what he calls the photograph’s 
“that has been” aspect. This, for Barthes, is the distinctive feature of 
photography itself.
But we must ask: what about the costs of this determination? For 
Barthes, the personal cost is twofold. First, there is the cost in pain. 
With Camera Lucida Barthes writes a book of mourning for the loss of 
his beloved mother, the person with whom he was most closely, indeed 
intensely bonded. The photograph, and here a very specific photograph, 
is a way back to her. Indeed for Barthes the Winter Garden photograph 
of his mother (which is not reproduced in the text) provides a way to 
activate (but also register the loss of) a pre-verbal, para-psychoanalytic, 
extra-semiotic bond of unspeakable import. And then, beyond the 
pain of loss there is, in the rejection of semiotic and psychoanalytic 
explanations for the nature of his desire for and love of his mother, the 
cost to Barthes’s extraordinary intellectual career; for the book is a kind 
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of recantation, an admission that the domain of semiotics, which he 
spent the better part of his life elaborating, is not adequate for the deepest 
questions of love, of life, and of mediation. As he concludes, the indexical 
character of the photograph—its relation to reality, both in the instance 
of the photograph and as opened by the particular feature he identifies 
as the punctum—“the prick of the Real”—delimits and indeed exceeds 
the terrain of semiotics. Photography contains within it a relation that 
exceeds meaning of any kind. However there is, in the determination 
of the essence of photography yet another cost, and for the rest of us 
perhaps, it turns out to be the most important one.
* * *
In Camera Lucida, Barthes provides a detailed description of his own 
experience of being photographed, during which he feels himself 
physically transform. “Now once I feel myself observed by the lens, 
everything changes: I constitute myself in the process of posing, I instan-
taneously make another body for myself, I transform myself in advance 
into an image.”9 And then, “I don’t know how to work upon my skin from 
within.”10 His account of becoming an object before the lens, of being 
separated from the world by the play of sociotechnical dynamics on his 
skin, precisely echoes—albeit in apparent ignorance—Frantz Fanon’s 
description in “The Fact of Blackness” of coming under the white gaze 
while in France: a description that read in its entirety, suggests the 
colonial roots of existentialism and existentialist visuality. Here is just a 
brief excerpt:
And then the occasion arose when I had to meet the white man’s eyes. 
An unfamiliar weight burdened me. The real world challenged my 
claims. In the white world the man of color encounters difficulties in 
the development of his bodily schema […] On that day, completely 
dislocated, unable to be abroad with the other, the white man, who 
unmercifully imprisoned me, I took myself far off from my own 
presence, far indeed, and made myself an object. What else could it 
be for me but an amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage that spattered 
my whole body with black blood.11
What, then, is the relationship between photography and modern 
racism? What Nicole Fleetwood has subsequently called “the Fanonian 
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moment,” in Troubling Vision, what she reminds us, Henry Louis Gates 
calls “a Rorschach blot with legs,” is an experience of the visible field 
that no matter how it is inflected, testifies to its ambient striation 
by the violence of racialization. Thus it seems to me that something 
deeply hidden, repressed, or unthought inheres in the dispositif that is 
photographic technology. A thoroughgoing analysis of this dispositif 
would necessarily show connections between photography, racism, and 
political economy—three vectors of objectification—and ultimately 
should intersect with legal, psychoanalytic, imperialist, and sex-gender 
systems. After all, Barthes describes being photographed as if it were a 
process of proprietary alienation: “[T]he disturbance is ultimately one of 
ownership,” he says, and, “I invariably suffer from a sensation of inau-
thenticity. I am neither subject nor object but a subject who feels he is 
becoming an object: I then experience a microversion of death […]: I 
am truly becoming a specter.”12 Barthes also likens the captured light of 
the photograph to “a carnal medium, a skin I share with anyone who has 
been photographed.”13
Well, yes and no. Is aphanisis, the fading of the subject under the gaze 
of the other a question of psychology or of racialization? Of death or 
social death? Is the abjection of objectification that comes from sharing 
the skin of the other a matter of the gaze, or racism, or both? Here we 
hypothesize that the processes of racist and colonial visuality have been 
translated into the photographic apparatus, and what transpires under 
a racializing gaze designed to draw profit from othering, for turning 
subject into object, can in principle be turned on anyone, even Barthes. 
But in spite of Barthes’ uneasiness one still feels that the blood that 
spatters his body is mostly black.
The large-scale archival project that these hunches regarding racial-
ization and photography imply would be to establish that the parallel 
thus far limned between the mortification of the flesh before the lens 
and the mortification of the flesh under a white gaze—supported by, and 
indeed developing as a technology of the historical-economic violence 
of slavery and colonialism—are not merely analogous but are mutually 
constituting. White psychology and white visuality rests atop black dis-
possession. The camera itself would be studied as a machine for the 
generation of what Saidiya Hartman calls scenes of subjection—forms 
of domination that go undetected.14 A study proving that photography 
is itself a racial formation—following say, Goldsby, and in a different 
way, Ariella Azoulay and Vilem Flusser, for example—would want to 
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show that usage, form, and technical development went along a kind of 
simultaneous and mutually imbricated trajectory that was fully embedded 
in racial and racializing social practices. The machine as a racial 
formation is also a machine of racialization. These procedures would 
include the institutionalization of photography in various disciplines, 
the elaboration of a racial imaginary by photographic and other means 
as well as a critique of assumptions about the ontology of photography. 
Vicente Rafeal’s work on census photography in the colonial Philippines 
as a technology of racialization comes to mind here, as does the work 
of Malek Alloula, Jane Gaines, and bell hooks.15 Each of the three latter 
writers explores the imbrication of photography in regimes of racist 
violence. Rafael’s astute analysis of the encoding of an American racist 
imaginary on the Philippine populous by means of photography and 
the census shows how photography was used to impose a teleological 
narrative regarding “progressive” waves of racializing colonization 
that took Filipinos up the racial hierarchy (from Malays to Spainiards, 
to White Americans). Given the racializing role of the census, we see 
that Sebastian Franklin’s research on Herman Hollerith, the inventor 
of the punchcard and enabler of first the broad based, searchable data 
collection of the national census (and later IBM’s infrastructural support 
of the Holocaust), turns up something arresting. “Hollerith utilizes an 
extended analogy between data collection, on the one hand, and inter-
pretation, the objective conditions of society, and photography on the 
other, noting that ‘the enumeration of a census corresponds with the 
exposure of the plate in photography while the compilation of a census 
corresponds with the development of the photographic plate’.”16 The 
census and the photograph were media of racialization. The image was 
data visualization.
Goldsby’s suggestions that the images produced by cameras also 
structure the meaning of sight allows us to see that the development and 
iterations of photographic knowledge—as well as the incorporation of 
that knowledge into the further development and use of the apparatus—
are marked by practices of racial violence that feedback and feed forward 
through lived experience and technics. As a modest foray into what is a 
potentially vast undertaking, we can show here that these parallel and 
seemingly autonomous regimes of racial formation, on the one hand, and 
photographic visibility on the other, are mutually constitutive in Barthes’ 
work. If such a counter reading of Camera Lucida turns out to be correct, 
then the “essence of photography,” precisely defined by Barthes as “that 
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has been,”—and acted upon in similar ways by entire populations—has 
for many decades meant the practical disavowal of racism by its benefi-
ciaries. While such an account does not exhaust photographic practices, 
we will show that the essence of photography lies elsewhere, which is 
another way of saying that the referent of “that” in “that has been” is not 
what it seems. Photography does not simply index a past; it is profoundly 
embroiled in the past—all of it.
In Camera Lucida, Barthes makes a case for the meta-semiotic 
“madness” of the photograph and rhetorically generates a meaningful—
that is, semiotic—context for the dramatic eruption of the Real itself. 
Within a carefully weighted semantic field he stages the emergence of 
“the essence of photography” as the indexical “that has been.” He also 
develops the extremely influential theories of “the studium,” or the 
various photographic genres along with their necessarily all-too-familiar 
(and for Barthes, ultimately uninteresting) avenues of meaning, and of 
the aforementioned notion “the punctum,” which is rendered as “the 
prick of the Real,” “the wound,” “the puncture” all of which endeavor 
to figure a rupture of and a limit to the merely semiotic by the Real. 
The punctum is activated, in Barthes’ view, only by certain photographs, 
most are subsumed in the studium and the semiotic.
What is crucial here is that for Barthes to produce this reality effect—that 
is, for him to produce these programs of photographic apprehension—
the majority of the images he uses to do this work in Camera Lucida 
are photographs of slaves, racialized bodies and differently abled bodies. 
This striking fact is somehow most often overlooked, and students at 
art schools everywhere proceed as if they were learning simply about 
a technology and not about a mode of sociality. Indeed, careful textual 
analysis of Camera Lucida shows that slavery, race and, ethnicity became 
the privileged tropes—the discursive apparatus—with which to figure 
“the essence of photography,” for Barthes, “at any cost.” Slavery and race 
become the rhetorical figures, the discursive, and arguably material 
media for the derivation of the supposedly ontological character of a 
visual technology. Indeed one might say that by making racialized others 
the stepping stones leading to the essence of a technology, Barthes 
subsumes and finally disappears the historical realities of race, ethnicity, 
and slavery (Jews, blacks, Latin Americans, Eastern Europeans) in 
order to make the ahistorical, that is, technical and indeed chemical 
reality of photography appear. At the very least, we can show that in the 
presumed illumination of Camera Lucida, racialization is something like 
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the unconscious of the essence of photography. Indeed the troping and 
subsequent disappearing of racial difference for “purely” epistemological 
purposes may well be the most “universal” gesture here—the essence, if 
you will, of a whole tradition’s way of knowing by signifying on the other: 
Humanism.
For Barthes, the unique quality of the photograph, its that-has-been-
ness, along with the ability of the punctum to puncture the merely 
meaningful and disrupt the normative function of the sign, imbues the 
photograph with a radical potential for semiotic instability. However 
Barthes does less with the instability unleashed (instantiated) by the 
photograph than we might hope. For example, he writes that, “since 
every photograph is contingent (and thereby outside of meaning) 
photography cannot signify (aim at generality) except by assuming a 
mask.”17 He then regards the (is it haunting?) Richard Avedon portrait 
entitled William Casby, Born a Slave, and all-too-summarily concludes 
his observations with the thought that “the essence of slavery is here laid 
bare: the mask is the meaning, insofar as it is absolutely pure.”18
Barthes’ inclusion and cursory treatment of the Avedon photo do 
more than give slavery short shrift, they make slavery appear only to 
make it disappear again. Slavery rises up only to fall back and make way 
for an understanding of photography: “Society, it seems, mistrusts pure 
meaning […] Hence the photograph whose meaning is too impressive is 
quickly deflected; we consume it aesthetically, not politically.”19 Ironically, 
to lay bare the essence of slavery, the photograph and therefore Barthes 
must be in “mask” mode—that is, on the side of meaning and of society, 
of semiotics. This “essence of slavery” is neither named nor described. 
Rather, its meaning conveniently dispensed with, the photograph opens 
the way for further (aesthetic) remarks on the inherent characteristics of 
the photographic medium. One suddenly suspects that the trajectory of 
the text—a striving to represent the essence of photography by replacing 
obscure projections with a lucid Real accomplished by signifying through 
racialized representations—is precisely a way of not talking about slavery 
and is, in fact, a displacement, a method of disappearing the history and 
with it, the logistics of perception that really produced the image of 
William Casby and perhaps in certain respects, all photographic images. 
It being understood, of course, that a political meaning of this sort, 
that suggests that photography itself is made with black blood, and that 
abominably slavery itself is the medium of photographic representation, 
would subsequently vitiate ostensibly non-partisan knowledge, to say 
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nothing of value-neutral aesthetic inquiry, forever. But Barthes treats the 
Casby photograph as a studium, which allows him to proceed with the 
analysis of the essence of photography in his famous degree-zero prose.
50 pages later, at exactly the climactic moment in Camera Lucida 
when Barthes discovers photography’s essence, slavery comes up again:
I remember keeping for a long time a photograph I had cut out of a 
magazine—lost subsequently like everything too carefully put away—
which showed a slave market: the slavemaster, in a hat, standing, the 
slaves, in loincloths, sitting. I repeat: a photograph, not a drawing or 
engraving; for my horror and my fascination as a child came from 
this: that there was a certainty that such a thing had existed: not a 
question of exactitude, but of reality: the historian was no longer the 
mediator, slavery was given without mediation, the fact was established 
without method.20
One is reminded here of Regis Debray’s statement echoed above: “A 
fortiori, ideology could be defined as the play of ideas in the silence 
of technologies.”21 Here, the silent technologies that establish Barthes’ 
certitude “without method” (an ostensibly non-ideological knowing 
that for Louis Althusser would mark the pinnacle of ideology—and 
hence of semiotic function) would include all of the recording machines 
and disciplinary technologies involved in the mediation of people by 
graphing their skin as image or sign, converting subjects into objects 
and persons into commodities that together constitute and constellate as 
photography. In Camera Lucida, slavery itself—in fact the slave market—
composes photography’s primal scene, its degree zero, and is arguably 
identified as paradigmatic of the essence of photography, but unchar-
acteristically, in perhaps too quick abandonment of his own brilliant 
work in semiotics, Barthes reads an (the?) image of slavery—actually, 
ironically, and uncannily, an absent image of slavery—in purely phenom-
enological terms.
Whether in the semiotic or evidentiary mode, slavery appears in 
Camera Lucida as supplementary to the photograph—a coincident 
incident that explains photography by being disappeared. In the first 
instance, the Casby photo, slavery appears as an essence that is visibly 
communicated, but aestheticized and thus of no more interest (since 
Barthes meaningfully pursues the photograph as an event beyond 
meaning). In the second evidentiary example, an absent image of a 
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slave market appears as the cynosure of photography itself—within 
the framework of the essay, slavery and its absence exist, as it were, 
principally to establish the that-has-been-ness of the photograph. Thus 
the disappearance of method in Barthes’ establishing for himself the 
facts of slavery has, in fact, the opposite function in Camera Lucida: the 
discursive disappearance of slavery establishes the facts of photography; 
that is the method. It is only via the epistemic disappearance of slavery—
and of all the historical-economic vectors that made both slavery 
and photography possible—that by means of Inception-like layers of 
self-deception, Barthes’ phenomenological account of photography as 
merely a technical medium with a unique property (“that has been”) is 
possible. Had he been able to refuse techno-fetishism, Barthes might 
have kept his punctum but more accurately have gleaned the essence 
of photography: “slavery has been.” And the slave market has been. 
Photo-graphing as a medium of racializing objectification and subjecti-
fication has been—and it still is. One must steadfastly keep the histories 
of racial formation and political economy outside of the photographic 
frame to have evidence without method because otherwise, one might 
see that the evidence is the method: the historical and technical separation 
of subjects from their skin explicitly places racialization and photography 
on a continuum.
The imprisonment, social death and annihilation of subjects by 
the logistics of the gaze are fundamental to that relation we name 
photography. This photo-graphing of the skin, we must insist, is an 
ineluctable part of what Flusser identifies as the camera’s program. To 
produce photography as a stand-alone platform, slavery must be at once 
present and disavowed. Which is to say that slavery is one of the methods 
by and through which photography came to be what it is, or at least what 
it appears to be—an autonomous platform. From this it is crystal clear 
that colonialism, and slavery, and the institutionalization and normaliza-
tion of the practices on which these depended and depend, are part of the 
conditions by which bodies are first liquidated of subjectivity and reduced 
to images and signs for others to read. Whether in the slave ship Brookes 
where people were so cruelly reduced to numbers or in the maquiladoras 
where, as Lourdes Portillo shows, young women are photographed as 
targets for rape and femicide, the inscription of body as sign and its 
treatment as profitably captured cargo merge. Indeed this lifting off, 
or abstraction, of what will become racial and gendered characteristics 
from bodies is part of their de-coding and encoding as information—
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it becomes, as we saw in the first chapter, a condition of possibility for 
Borges “Garden of Forking Paths.” These modes of abstraction and 
alienation are part of the economic and racializing prehistory that gives 
rise to the society of the spectacle and its de-realization of the world. 
Social photo-graphing provides the abstract machine for technical 
photo-graphing; chattel slavery haunts the photographic image. The 
social relation opens the space for the chemical one and for what Flusser 
calls, in his description of photography, the thinking in numbers that 
is accomplished by the apparatus. Before the encoding of abstraction, 
society becomes abstract in practice. To fail to address this primordial 
disappearing—both the alienation of the skin and the alienation of the 
right to one’s look, consequent upon the social abstractions endemic to 
racism and persistently emerging in Barthes’ text as an eternal return 
of the repressed—would be to embrace the essence of the dominant 
discourse about photography, which as it stands unconsciously recapit-
ulates, extends, and naturalizes violent forms of corporeal inscription, 
racial objectification, and social death as the very media of speculation.
Time constraints force me to note only in passing that such 
photo-graphy disappears bodies to make subjects appear (the viewer), 
and disappears subjects to make bodies appear (the viewed). We have 
seen a similar logic at work in informatics, computation and cinema. The 
disappearance of the subjectivity of the slave-object becomes the means 
by which the subjectivity of the slave-master manifests. Likewise the 
slave’s body appears as the means of world making and of slave-master 
subjectivity through the radical and violent disappearing of the slave’s 
subjectivity. Leaving Hegel aside, we can content ourselves here by 
clearly stating that materially and psychologically, the objectification and 
incorporation of the slave is a condition of possibility for the subjectivity 
of the slave-master. And the disappearance of slavery is the condition 
of possibility for Barthes’ philosophy of photography—that is, for “the 
essence of photography” as many still understand it. The photograph, as 
Barthes says, is a momento mori, but of whose death?
Goldsby writes, “The secretion of lynching photographs was an 
explicit exercise of racial domination. If ‘reckless eyeballing’—looking at 
white women in a sexual way—could get black men killed by white lynch 
mobs, knowledge that photographs of these murders were circulating 
thoughout the pulbic domain no doubt terrorized black communities … 
Indeed the secretion of lynching photographs codified what was emerging 
as the civil right to look at and interpret the world in ways that perfected 
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racism’s hierarchies of privilege.”22 The death of blacks underpins white 
subjectivity and dominant visuality. As Harriet Jacobs’ example shows 
a century earlier, to an extreme that was all too common, the slave as 
a subject had to disappear from view in a white-supremacist scopic 
regime in order to retain subjectivity and even life. What is remarkable 
in Jacob’s case is that she was able to occupy this regime in a fugitive and 
clandestine way that allowed her to preserve and ultimately constitute 
her subjectivity in public discourse—albeit at a tremendous price. It 
would not be incorrect to assert that under this scopic regime, Jacobs’ 
superhuman perseverance—which allowed her to live long enough to 
achieve literacy, write her life story, and re-appropriate both her body 
and her gaze—is one of the punctums in the history of photography. 
Her presence constitutes a wound, a prick of the Real, an eruption of 
unspeakable black suffering that the dominant discourses on the origins, 
meaning, and significance of photography have preferred not to detect, 
to simply pass over in silence. It is as if her life and the innumerable lives 
that had to bear the pain of white supremacist inscription had nothing 
to do with the history of images and of image making, of semiotics and 
code. With Jacob’s a subject otherwise erased by slavery’s photo-graphic 
regime talks back.
Without doubt, the camera obscura from which Harriet Jacobs 
miraculously emerges is an iteration of a visual-political system that 
extends in one way or another through the history of modern racism 
and colonialism, a visual-political system marked by gender as well 
as by race. Much ink has been devoted to the formal differences 
evident in the ways in which persons of various races and genders are 
photographed; and it has recently been brought to our attention that film 
stocks themselves were chemically biased towards rendering whiteness 
legible in acceptable and valorizing ways. There can be no doubt too 
that gender dynamics underpinned the formation and, indeed, the form 
of photography (whether black and white, or “colored”) in a manner 
that was similar to, overlapping with, but distinguishable (at least at a 
certain level of analysis) from race. Furthermore, these social vectors—
vectors that are fundamentally linked to agency and oppression vis-à-vis 
objectification—are inseparable from the cultural meanings and, indeed, 
the mysteries of the photograph. During her life, Jacobs is objectified as a 
black and as a woman: in addition to her enslavement, the slave-master’s 
lust and the slave-mistress’s jealousy were what produced the particular 
circumstances of her incarceration in camera. And as Jacobs lucidly 
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expresses (and Hortense Spillers brilliantly elaborates), the roles of 
masculinity and femininity associated with whiteness, down to its 
very psychology were dependent upon the subjugation of slaves, and 
the brutal theft of material and sexual pleasures. What subsequently 
is allowed to appear and what is disappeared in photographs—what 
constitutes photography’s “program,” as Flusser again might say—has 
everything to do with the dynamics of agency and desire in this regime. 
Indeed, though it would take us too far afield, one could imagine that 
Barthes extraordinary love for his mother also presupposed a set of 
racial, financial and colonial relations. The fact that such regimes are 
contested (by their victims if no one else) also places the use, meaning, 
interpretation, significance, and epistemology of photography on an 
inexorably political terrain. What would it mean, really, to think of 
slavery as a form of photography or conversely, of photography as a form 
of slavery? The question itself calls for a far-reaching decolonization of 
visuality and visual technologies, and of the information that informs 
the photographic apparatus. And again, what would it mean to think 
of photography as a vector of feminization and commodification, both 
of which are inseparable from racism in the modern era—from racial 
capitalism that is also sex/gender capitalism? And what are the long-term 
epistemological and political implications of a certain knowledge of this 
triple objectification that recognizes that these photographic racializing 
and engendering structures of encoding and expropriation are the 
conditions of possibility for the now ineluctably historical illusion of 
transcendent, unmarked, objective (photographic) perspectives which, 
despite their anachronistic ontologies, persist in rendering truths 
ostensibly “without method?” The recent (and in my view utterly 
contemptible) emergence of “object oriented ontology” is merely the 
tip of the iceberg here; everywhere we confront deracinated mediation, 
data visualization and computation that are at once the means of social 
connection and the disavowed operation of a globally distributed system 
of apartheid. Biometrics, signature strikes, profiling of all sorts have 
become the affordances of an informatic world that takes much of its 
organizational template from photography and the history of visuality—
even Hollereith confirms this. For those of us who concern ourselves 
with media and politics as if life depended on these (which it does), 
understanding the historicity of technological formations, cameras, 
film stocks, information systems, and the myriad other apparatuses of 
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visualization in terms of race, gender, and commodification calls out 
contemporary media theory’s fetishistic technological determinism. 
To refer to “photography”—or for that matter, “computers” or “the 
internet”—as if they were standalone media could be dismissed outright 
as a kind of platform fetishism bent on the disavowal of the immanent 
and absolute relevance of race, gender, and political economy to any and 
all technological questioning.
Although we might use Gwendolyn Audrey Foster’s idea of a 
“plantocary of images” or Hortense Spiller’s still unrivaled instantiation 
of “the flesh” as wedges of further inquiry, marking a starting point for 
reckoning the ontological being and un-representable experience of 
captured bodies always already overcoded by violent categories (and 
hence ideologies and moreover practices) of racialization and gendering; 
my purpose in this brief intervention on photography has only been 
to “stain the waters clear”—that is, to make the invisible visible in the 
seemingly transparent window that is the photograph, endeavoring as I 
have to indelibly mark photography itself as a racial formation.23 In this 
view Flusser’s account of the photograph as a “triple abstraction,” (from 
the pre-writing pictograph, to the hieroglyph and linear writing, to the 
materialization of linearly written (numeric) thought in the apparatus) 
persuasive as it may be, remains woefully incomplete, as it is derived 
purely from mediatic shifts and devoid of geopolitical concreteness 
attendant to colonization and social differentiation.24 Indeed, the history 
of visuality, including photography, cinema and computation, needs to 
be entirely rewritten in terms that understand the intersecting roles of 
racialization, feminization, and commodification. More than that, their 
convergent operating systems need to be decolonized—disrupted in 
their function in the broadest possible sense and reprogrammed.
To be sure, no amount of looking—even knowledgably—at Avedon’s 
photo of William Casby, Born a Slave could redeem any aspect of the 
violent injustice, unspeakable brutality and astonishing suffering of the 
past, or its extension into the present. Recognizing that contemporary 
visuality, semiotics and computation is bound up with racism and 
slavery—genetically, so to speak—and that so much of what is seen is 
actually a seeing through slavery and coloniality and that so much of 
knowing is a knowing through slavery and coloniality (that is, by means 
of slavery and coloniality; slavery and coloniality as method) does not 
amount to reparations. Still, the abiding thought that modern scopic, 
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discursive and computational regimes are inexorably entangled in lived 
racism, past and present, and that there is no photographic image, and 
possibly no post-photographic thought, that is untouched by racism 
powerfully shifts the terrain for the understanding and use of images, 
archives and machines. May it also enable visions and practices that will 
help to one day make racism a “that has been” that is no more.
7
Pathologistics of Attention
In the end mass media culture has, bottom line, no other content than 
violence.
—Laurence Rickels
What white people have to do, is try and find out in their own hearts 
why it was necessary to have a nigger in the first place, because I’m not 
a nigger, I’m a man, but if you think I’m a nigger, it means you need it.
—James Baldwin
Their history [drones’] is that of an eye turned into a weapon.
—Grégoire Chamayou
As it turns out in the mise en scène of computational capital, our 
nonexistent democracies increasingly rely on automation, and more 
particularly the automation of psychopathology and psychosis, in order 
to sustain the ir-reality necessary to their function. This, to be sure, 
suggests that psycho-logistics, falls under the domain of an overarching 
functionalization of the living by algorithmic governance and pattern 
recognition in the society organized at the level of meta-data. The 
shattering of traditional life forms and the imposition of new forms of life 
(and of statistically distributed death) by placing the bios in information 
brings broad-spectrum crisis, at least from the standpoint of prior con-
stitutions. In this chapter, we will attend to the immanent organization of 
the (white, white-identifying) psyche in and by cinematic technologies 
that are to be understood as emergent interfaces with the data-sphere of 
computational capital.
Psychopathology, in the modern sense, while an overly general term, 
most often results from some dissociation of sensibility, or in other words 
(a necessity, it seems), some slippage of the signifier from the signified. 
Psychopatholgy was, as Lukacs scandalously wrote in his valorization of 
Thomas Mann over Joyce and Kafka, symptomatic of the bourgeois flight 
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from reality and from an awareness of the objective conditions that over-
determine subjective existence.1 While this thoroughly modern slippage 
of language from the Real is intuited by linguistics and latched upon as 
an inexorable feature of language by post-structuralism, a historiciza-
tion of these emerging insights into the becoming ontological failure of 
language to image Being would understand post-structuralism as itself an 
inflection point in which this generalized slippage intensifies. While the 
paradigms of reality and truth are irrevocably lost to philosophy in the 
mid-twentieth-century West (and seemingly to the world at large with 
the U.S. Presidential election of 2016), one sees, retroactively, that the 
gradual intensification and awareness of this slippage from the referent 
was the condition not only of post-structuralism and postmodernism, 
but of psychoanalysis and modern linguistics en toto. Naturally, this view 
of arbitrary signifiers slipping off of no longer fully presentable signifieds 
in accord with new organizational principles (drives, fetishes, desires, 
in psychoanalysis, syntagmatic, paradigmatic functions on the arbitrary 
nature of the sign in linguistics) could be stretched back into historical 
time to explain the need for hermeneutical analysis (Marxism, psycho-
analysis) as well as the opening of the space (gap) that will give rise to and 
be ramified by poetry, modern literature, abstract painting, and visual 
culture. Lukacs was right about one thing at least: High Modernism was 
symptomatic. It could also be extended forward in a recognition that the 
scrambling of signification was indeed an effect of an instrumentalization 
of signs (and then images by higher order programs in a media-ecology 
of capital) that is only now being understood as such. In this chapter, 
however, I will be interested less in the formal characteristics of linguistic 
and identificatory dysfunction with regard to a paradigm of representable 
truth, and more in pursuit of what I take to be the increasing automation 
of this dissociation of sensibility, that is, of what in the older language of 
the ideological paradigm was in extreme cases diagnosed psychopathol-
ogy—while noting that such automation when considered socially tends 
to completely exceed its psychic dimensions and extensively develop the 
patho-logical dimensions at a new scale. Even if the normalization of 
aspects of psychopathology make it no longer recognizeable as such, we 
may still sense the pathological at another scale: that of the planetary 
condition which few would deny is both sick and obscene.
The automation of what I will refer to here as the pathologistics of 
attention can also be pursued from the standpoint of the experience 
of today’s large-scale psychological afflictions including burn-out, 
pathologistics of attention . 117
depression, autism, OCD, ADD, sociopathology and the like—all of 
which, like schizophrenia, must be understood as at once forms of 
genuine suffering and historically specific incarnations. However, I 
will not dwell on the psychoanalytic aspects of the generalization of 
“mental illness” in the twenty-first century as a fundamental condition 
of possibility for the perpetuation of “our times,” (though that is, as Eva 
Ilouz brilliantly demonstrates, indeed the case) and more on the infra-
structure of the logistics of attention that organize and functionalize 
psychopathologies. As a mediological analysis would take into account, 
these logistics are not only internal to subjects but are also distributed 
throughout the mediatic and material forms of the socius itself. Thus, 
we shall turn to the “support, apparatus [and] procedure” of modes of 
transmission of meaning and the organization of attention—in short, to 
screens and, more particularly, cinema.2
An exploration of the pathologistics of attention through a consider-
ation of cinematic programming seems justified in as much as cinema’s 
identificatory structures were, and in legacy forms remain, fundamental 
processes for the encoding, dissemination, and activation of visual and 
mental processes. In short we take the subject as always already cyborg 
while recognizing histories of its emergence and implosion by means 
of a series of distributed software upgrades discernible in the form of 
paradigmatic cinematic tropes and conventions.
The investigation proposes the following hypotheses:
1. Films are programs of visualization and hence for discourse.
2. Iconic films abstract and mobilize paradigmatic programs. These 
programs provide infrastructure for the organization of attention.
3. Psychological aspects of these programs are functional and legible 
in the interface of the screen, but the logistics are distributed in 
the organization of bodies, apparatuses and social relations—in 
materiality and more precisely in historical materiality.
4. Apparatuses automate aspects of formerly human decision and 
intelligence. They are programs that have been formalized and 
sedimented into machinery.
5. Sovereignty is increasingly moving into the material, the machine-
mediated, which is to say, the computational environment: platform 
sovereignty.3
6. Convergence, ordinarily thought to mean the convergence of various 
media platforms into the digital medium known as the computer, is 
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to be understood as the convergence of linguistic function, scopic 
and auditory function and financialization with and as computation. 
These platforms consolidate a matrix of operations. This convergence 
is a powerful tendency, perhaps not a fait accompli.
These proposals extend from the argument made in The Cinematic Mode 
of Production that cinema “brings the Industrial Revolution to the eye.” 
Aspects of Industrialization, “the factory code,” the assembly line, routin-
ization, were built into the cinema, and then later developed in feedback 
loops with the cinema and computation. McLuhan’s “homogenous 
segmentation” attributed to Gutenberg, what Steigler generalizes and 
calls grammatization, works for frames and bits—and on bodies. Life 
processes are broken down and reassembled in discrete units with ever 
more granularity. By studying a non-random selection of films made at 
various moments along the evolutionary path taken by cinema, films 
that not incidentally all have a thematic relation to money at their 
narrative and libidinal cores, we may sketch with some precision the 
implication of Karl Marx’s idea that “industry is the open book of man’s 
essential powers, the exposure to the senses of human psychology” for 
contemporary psychology.4 Film, abstracted and submitted to analysis, 
shows us the machinic and indeed automated organization of spectator-
ship and it’s psychological interpellations. However, in this case, different 
in important respects from that of Marx and his fragment on machines, 
our “open book” is not the assembly line (chaine de montage) but cinema 
and cinematic montage conceived as a key transitional phase between 
industrialization and the social factory of digital culture (post-Fordism). 
We will be sketching, dialectically as it were, the (re-)organization of the 
psyche itself as well as the modes of attention that correspond to said 
organization in the advance of computational capital.
It is increasingly non-controversial that machine-mediated modes of 
attention are regimes of capture; the attention-machine as fixed capital 
absorbs sensual labor. Thus we may observe that montage, deep focus, 
and the cut, as theorized during the history of cinema and the heyday of 
film theory, all correspond to neurological and psychological processes 
as well as to specific forms of attention prototyped then instituted. We 
may also observe paradigmatic cinematic forms were “destined,” more 
or less, to be utilized in capital’s emerging regimes of production and 
monetization collectively termed attention economy or cognitive 
capitalism. This is particularly obvious from the standpoint of the 
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present conjuncture in the U.S., where as in Nazi Germany, “adolescene 
[is] streamlined … and advanced to the position of superego” and a white 
supremacist government is (still) in power.5 Thus, we begin a kind of 
archaeology of forms of attention—neuro-, psycho-, photo-, cinematico-, 
informatico-, and capital-logical—that have both paved the way to and 
achieved a culmination of sorts in the capture of the cognitive-linguistic 
commons by life-destroying modalities for the organization of attention 
in racial capitalism.
There are connections to be investigated between the organization of 
perception by machinery, the strip-mining of attention by images and 
James Baldwin’s observation that American heroes of the John Wayne 
type never had to grow up. Because of the widespread influence of 
say the first person shooter, a perspective and relation that has effects 
resounding through the entire fabric of the socius, the modalities of 
cinematic implantation and cybernetic visualization include not just the 
ordinarily acknowledged media platforms but in our own times, student 
debt, blood computing, drone warfare, and the every second of every day 
function of representation floating on the surface of an ocean of unrep-
resented—and in the current conjuncture unrepresentable—suffering of 
more than two billion people living on less than two dollars per day and the 
history of the world that got “us” here. Platforms though programmatic 
are not autonomous but embedded; formal shifts index changes in the 
sites and modes of the production process and of sovereignty. If this 
correspondence does not occur in exactly the same way for all viewers, 
then it occurs within statistically predictable parameters in which real 
deviation requires the reclaimed and purposefully redirected sensibilities 
of a critical movement such as feminism, anti-racism or decolonization 
in feminist film theory, third cinema, postcolonial film theory and the 
like—bell hooks’ oppositional gaze. One thinks of figures like James 
Baldwin, bell hooks, Solanas and Gettino, and in cinema a long and 
powerful tradition of modification and refusal of programmatic norms 
(Maya Deren, Trin T. Minh-ha, Sadie Benning, Djibril Mambety, etc.). 
It is our urgent challenge to connect the function of apparatuses whose 
logistics both organized dominant (dominated and dominating) psychic 
formation and have also been abstracted and encoded in the operation 
of digital machines, with the expansion of mass immiseration, and the 
relative unrepresentability of planetary crisis in such a way that would 
demand revolution (and new foms of revolution) instead of various 
types of conformity and machinic enslavement.
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This study of the pathologistics of attention is therefore necessarily also 
about the scrambling of the symbolic order; the increasing bankruptcy 
of sign-function; the de-structuring and restructuring of the grammar of 
semiotics and the grammatization of social relations such that they can 
be broken apart and reassembled according to new protocols of value 
extraction; it is about the proletarianization of the senses that occurs from 
the dissociation of the senses from prior social instantiations of mind and 
body; the expropriation of the cognitive-linguistic; the installation of the 
regime of cognitive capitalism over and on top of, or adjacent to, the 
persistence of spectacular, industrial, and feudal regimes; the mining of 
attention as an amalgamating means of command-control-production; 
the current and ostensibly indomitable reign of short-term thinking; the 
life-sucking character of financialization; the acid corrosiveness of the 
Wall Street nanosecond; the ever-advancing seizure of the commons; 
the rise and rise of white nationalism and the effect of all these projects 
in relation to mentality, warfare, global dispossession, and planetary 
collapse. The very organization of appearance as data-visualization under 
the contemporary forms of inequality presses perception and knowledge 
into functioning as technologies of for-profit murder through the active 
cancellation and “dismediation”6 of the other. This intensive production 
of the other by the pathologistics of datavisualization is a fundamental 
productive strategy of a computational capitalism that remains racial 
capitalism. The other is slated to labor as surface of inscription.
So, in addition to the breakdown and reformatting of language 
function and the redistribution and/or liquidation of meaning, this 
essay unavoidably focuses on the psychopathology and the logistics of 
perception of contemporary, that is, postmodern, fascism, otherwise to be 
thought of as the totalitarianism of computational finance capitalism—a 
formation that is, like the psyche itself, at once without us and within us. 
In what follows we will have occasion to remark upon the solicitation of 
identification and the fractalization of fascist structures of personality 
such that they may compensate in “the imaginary” for collective dis-
empowerment while preserving property relations in “the real.” We have 
the dialectic between the historical expropriation first of labor and then 
of attention, on the one side, and the short-circuiting of the body and 
then of thought on the other side. The historico-technical, and indeed 
affective, ramification of this gap between the liberative potentials of 
globalized life and the sovereign planetary interdiction against justice is 
the definitive means and necessary condition for the production of this, 
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our present time—the time of computational capital—in as much as it is 
verifiably present at all.7
A first cut: gesture, or the fragments of machines
Charlie Chaplin’s film Modern Times (1936), near silent but made nine 
years after the official end of the silent era and recently re-historicized 
in Owen Hatherly’s illuminating Chaplin Machine, juxtaposes the two 
major filmic modes of the first half of the twentieth century: montage 
and deep focus. The unforgettable assembly-line sequence: with the 
Tramp struggling to keep pace with the work speed up, desperately using 
wrenches to tighten first bolts and then, neurologically reprogrammed 
by assembly-line repetition, to tighten blouse buttons; the auto-feeder: 
allowing the workers to continue tightening bolts while a machine pushes 
food into their mouths; and the culminating fall: into the machine itself 
all show the radical imposition of the standardization and routinization 
process on the body by the machinery of industrial capital. The body 
and the neurological system are being remade by industrial capitalism to 
compose what Hatherley reminds us, Benjamin in his notes for a review 
of The Circus (1928) called “the Chaplin-machine.” “He greets people 
by taking off his bowler, and it looks like the lid rising from the kettle 
when the lid boils over … ‘the mask of non-involvement turns him into 
a fairground marionette.’ Benjamin implies something deeper here, that 
this is a ‘mask’ of sanguine inhumanitiy, under which something more 
poignant is at work.”8 Hatherley quotes again from Benjamin on Chaplin:
He dissects the expressive movements of human beings into a series 
of minute innervations. Each single movement he makes is composed 
of a series of staccato bits of movement. Whether it is his walk, the 
way he handles his cane, or the way he raises his hat—always the same 
jerky sequence of tiny movements applies the law of the cinematic 
image sequence to human motorial functions. Now, what is it about 
such behavior that is distinctly comic?9
The disciplinary aspect of the assembly line, in both its corporeal and 
temporal dimensions, is translated to the cinema and underscored by 
physical comedy: Chaplin shows it in the Tramp’s at times involuntary 
rebellion against the machine’s strict routinization of his gestures as well 
as through his total incorporation of machinic function. The Tramp’s 
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inadequacy to the disciplinary regime of industrial production—he is at 
once overtaken by it and inadequate to it—leads him at the beginning of 
Modern Times to a series of nervous ticks, short circuits, and conflicts 
with his fellow workers. Chaplin’s ability to be both his character and 
himself, by means of the “mask” of machinification, allows for the 
narrative register to be in continual tension with Chaplin’s directorial 
analysis. Whatever befalls the Tramp, as well as his brilliant subversions, 
are there to be experienced viscerally, but also to be accounted for and 
analyzed since the machinic structuring of his everyday is abstracted in 
the representation that is the film such that the film becomes industry’s 
meta-cognitive account of itself—a reading of “the open book of man’s 
essential powers, the exposure to the senses of human psychology.” As the 
film progresses, the Tramp finally falls into the mechanism itself, passing 
through its system of gears. Only upon his real subsumption, if you will, 
does the Tramp thoroughly become one of the machine’s products. At 
this point in the narrative he has a complete nervous breakdown: before 
being carried away in an ambulance he defiantly oils people with big 
black squirts in the face as if serving machines.
Importantly, this nervous breakdown does not lead the Tramp to the 
psychoanalyst’s couch but instead to a hospital and then, through a series 
of employment mishaps, to jail—a place, incidentally, that with its warm 
dry bed and three meals a day he finds infinitely more congenial than the 
outside world of the industrial city. I stress this not only because the price 
of neurological failure for the working machine-man is prison or the street 
but also because the film’s coming break from montage for the utilization 
of deep focus at certain key points does not employ this important latter 
technique to psychoanalytic ends, as in, Citizen Kane (1941), a film we will 
explore momentarily. This non-psychologizing response is a matter of 
class of history and of politics. Rather than psychology in Modern Times, 
it is the physical comedy and the power of the body that are given as the 
heroic response to the fragmentation of space and time by the machine. 
It is relevant that Hatherley deftly documents not only Chaplin’s stake in 
Marxism, but the Soviet avant-garde’s investment in acrobatics, circus 
and Chaplin. Chaplin’s brilliance is in large part due to his corporeal 
abilities to reclaim a body that would otherwise be robbed of its gestural 
capacities and effectively shattered by the machine organizing life in 
the fragmentary mode of montage. Importantly, this bodily mastery 
manifest in Chaplin also reunifies space and time. As writer, director, 
and star, Chaplin’s superlative control of the four dimensions (for that, 
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in brief, is, or at least was, cinema) is both an analysis of industrial 
production and a form of vengeance against industrial capitalism. With 
Chaplin, the cinema abstracts and recasts a paradigmatic experience of 
machinic industrialization, using its own industrial methods to create 
pleasure and critique.
Of the two or three scenes that utilize deep focus, I want to talk 
about the skating scene. The extraordinary tension that a viewer may 
experience while a blindfolded Chaplin skates backwards with infinite 
and graceful abandon as if oblivious to a three-story drop opened by 
the broken balustrade just behind him creates a kind of poetry of the 
body in which the human animal, slated, as indicated by the film’s 
opening scene to become a programmable sheep by the industrial-
ized temporality of the machine age, is shown to be capable of a near 
supernatural freedom of expressive movement—a form of joy. Not once 
but many times, Chaplin skates in speedy backwards arcs, with one leg 
in the air, seemingly unaware that he is less than an inch from the edge 
of what could only be a bone-breaking fall. This movement in the round, 
in a temporally continuous three-dimensional space (rather than a space 
constructed through shot-countershot or montage fragments), is narra-
tologically inspired by love: the Tramp and the Waif are an impoverished 
couple battling the dehumanization of the industrial city. It is also 
inspired by their momentary if illicit enjoyment of the luxurious spoils 
of a bourgeois department store. We see a relation to love and to luxury 
that despite its bourgeois aspirations is not diminished—because within 
the confines of history and class narrated here such a life of luxury is at 
once the best that can be imagined and an unrealizeable dream.10
Taking advantage of cinema Chaplin uses industrial modes of 
production to organize body, space, time, and attention counter to 
that self-same industry’s Taylorist reconditioning of modern man’s 
neurological function. This is a political redeployment of technologies 
of automation that posits the cinema and visual process as a mode of 
critical abstraction capable of exercising leverage over the abstraction of 
the body by capitalized machines. In becoming the content of cinema, 
the medium of the assembly line is interrogated through the revelation of 
its message. The decoding of “the message” of assembly-line capitalism—
that it is nothing short of the wholesale theft of gesture and life by the 
routinization of neuronal process—makes this a counter-cinema. 
“Collective laughter,” as Benjamin observed, is [a] pre-emptive and 
healing outbreak of mass psychosis. The countless grotesque events 
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consumed in films are a graphic indication of the dangers threatening 
mankind from the repressions implicit in civilization.”11 Unfortunately, it 
appears that Adorno and Horkheimer’s sense of cinema as a conditioning 
mechanism designed to generalize psychosis (“fun is a medicinal bath”) 
prevailed as the cultural dominant of film laughter and film therapy.
A second cut: castration, or the fetish is a penis but not just any penis
This space-time of realism—which Andre Bazin in What Is Cinema? 
described as a decal or a transfer of reality to celluloid and saw as 
best represented by deep focus—is perhaps today better thought of as 
the realism befitting a certain Euro-American transnational era in a 
particular media-ecology. Real space-time continuity was thought to 
index real relations. With Chaplin the realism provided by deep focus 
is far more physiological than psychological.12 How different it is in 
a film such as Citizen Kane, where the journey through a discontinu-
ous set of continuous space-times, what Deleuze calls “sheets of past,” 
is entered into as if one were to enter directly into different moments 
of Charles Foster Kane’s snow globe—one of his many fetish objects 
whose formation had to be investigated. The narrative sheets, each of 
a particular time, together constitute a set of behaviors and events that 
are to be read symptomatically and that, like the fetish objects in the 
film provide access to Kane’s unconscious.13 The multiple entries into 
spaces via shots passing through windows and skylights emphasize 
and thematize this effect even as they build out a notion of the rich 
and complex fabric of biography and history composed by events and 
unconscious motiviations. Narrative space becomes itself an extension 
of the psyche—an expression of unconscious forces.
This spatialization of the unconscious, developed even further, albeit 
in different directions by Hitchcock and Antonioni, at once discovers 
what Benjamin referred to as an “unconscious optics” and posits first 
space and then later the optical field itself as a means to accomplish two 
distinct but not unrelated aspirations. At the first level, the space is there 
to be read as a matrix of unconscious forces working on the subject of 
the film: this is a poetics of space and space as text—as a hermeneutic 
for the analysis of the unconscious. At the next level, Inception-like, the 
space not only tells us about the figure in it, but programs the figure for 
certain actions. We see this programming, for example, in Zabriske Point 
when a character drives past a billboard advertising hourly flights by 
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showing an image of a watch and then unconsciously checks his watch 
as he passes by. All of these spatial dynamics, already present in panoptic 
designs and then greatly elaborated not only in fascist architecture but 
in the candy fascism of shopping malls and much urban planning, have 
here a second register in as much as these are transcoded and mobilized 
by the image. They become part of the dynamic semiosis of the optical 
field, and as already stated, thus become both the legible text of the 
unconscious and means by which to program the unconscious. We are 
in the realm of the unconscious optics posited by Walter Benjamin. If 
for Benjamin and Welles these serve as sites of analysis for the default 
practices of hegemony—whether or not elaborated as concepts or later 
as algorithms, they also serve as means of programming.
With Citizen Kane, there, in these sheets of space-time, sealed off by 
the closure imposed by Kane’s death and the mystery of the gaps among 
the fragmentary accounts of who he was, everything is pregnant with 
meaning, and, as has been observed, the audience plays the role of 
detective or psychoanalyst while watching the film—and not just this 
film. In Kane, we embark on a search for an explanation of the inner 
workings of a public and indeed cultic personality, one first introduced 
to us, it must be underscored, through a montage sequence. This 
sequence of the newsreel at the opening of the film is in contrast with 
all the rest emphatically not a deep focus sequence of movement and 
duration. The film within the film, which Deleuze says is about money, 
is indeed, but in a way that may expand our notion of money since it is 
here embodied by Kane. The newsreel serves multiple purposes here, 
to inform us about Kane in using the efficient manner of prevalent and 
popular genre of the time, but also as a metaphor for how we moderns 
know. It is not just a representation of Kane, or a representation of Kane 
as a media mogul and financial titan. It is also a representation of the 
newsreel as medium and furthermore of montage itself. The newsreel 
is at once psychologically affective (it piques our curiosity) but is also 
psychologically opaque (it does not answer our questions) and calls for 
another mode of cinematic function as a mode of analysis. Montage and 
the cut become the commercial way of understanding a commercialized 
world; Citizen Kane will want to find another way to know this world. 
Notably then the montage representation Kane the citizen, the media 
mogul, the recluse, the man whom later, in a deep focus sequence we 
will see accused by disillusioned paramour Susan—for whom he built 
an opera house—of “never giving [her] nothing, but only trying to buy 
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[her] love,” has a public identity built through mechanical reproduction’s 
financially calculated montage effects. Even in the newsreel sequence 
Kane appears through the montage effects of yet another financialized 
media: the newspaper ballistics that daily sensationalize the famous 
Kane’s endeavors and shock the modern public into continuously 
recalibrated modes of recognition. It is also noteworthy, in light of the 
implicit assertion here that newsprint and publicity running on the 
program of a sensationalist newspaper function as a form of expanded 
cinema, that Bazin, a great proponent of deep-focus cinema, found 
montage overly programmatic, saying that montage foreclosed thought. 
Bazin, for the record, also accused montage of representing things that 
do not exist—a point on which he was no doubt correct with respect to 
the pro-filmic world. Despite the fact that for Eisenstein the instantia-
tion of a concept or the creation of a conditioned reflex, that is, of a new 
order of reality via the montage of attractions, was a good thing, or at 
least a very useful one inasmuch as it both expressed the modal power 
of cinema and could engineer new perceptions (adequate to the times) 
and thereby be utilized by the revolutionary avant-garde both to foment 
revolution and create revolutionary sensibilities, the programmatic and 
behaviorist aspects of montage were correctly intuited by Bazin to be 
on a continuum with the shredding and reprogramming of space-time 
that was characteristic not only of the cinema-machine but also of indus-
trialization more generally. Newspapers, newsreels, the fragmentation 
and re-assemblage of life was a sort of ballistic assault in the spectator, 
“a tractor plowing over the audiences psyche” as Eisenstein said. Deep 
focus, on the other hand, allows for ambiguity, according to Bazin, and 
in Citizen Kane the deep-focus suspension of the determinate meaning 
of the image is in fact used to interrogate a montage sequence. Deep 
focus interrogates the world sutured by montage and subjugated to the 
exigencies of the message. The film investigates the newsreel.
For whatever reason, there is one part of the newsreel montage that 
opens Citizen Kane that I have always likened to that of the stone lion 
sequence on the Odessa steps in Battleship Potemkin (1925), those 
paradigmatic splices offered just after Potemkin fires on the czarist 
troops. In Potemkin we get sleeping lion statue, waking lion statue, 
and fully roused on all fours lion statue, an extraordinarily dynamic 
presentation of the objectified masses rising up—the stones come alive. 
In the newsreel in Citizen Kane we have the three telegraphic vocal 
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accounts of Kane given a press interviews: “He’s a communist,” “he’s a 
fascist,” and, in his own words, “I’m an American.” Here also we have the 
masses represented iconically, each time by the figure of Kane in relation 
to a social system. Is this sequence, these representations of the masses, 
objectified in the figure of Kane come to life as thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis. Yet this synthesis of the mass movements (communism) and 
mass culture (fascism) in the figure of Citizen Kane as iconic American 
is precisely the mystery that the film seeks to investigate.
So, let’s say that the film sets out to contemplate a world in fragments, 
that is, it seeks a depth hermeneutic adequate to a world of appearances 
that suddenly are felt to be mere symptoms of a deeper mediological and 
financial problematic. In short, Wells seeks a psychoanalytic explanation 
for a mass media produced cultic figure—one who as himself a product 
of industrial society appeared to be sympathetic to the masses and to 
workers’ struggle but who was a Cesarist in Gramsci’s sense, that is, a 
charismatic leader who opportunistically conscripted the libidinal 
investments of mass-based struggles for liberation to build his own 
image in accordance with the laws of private property and profit.14
On his deathbed Kane loses his grip on his snow globe. It shatters on 
the floor as if releasing his dying word: “rosebud.” The film proceeds as if 
rudimentary communist sympathies and blatant fascism when channeled 
through a capitalist media empire somehow culminate in “an American,” 
and in Kane’s case in “an American citizen,” and as if this “progression,” 
for lack of a better term, could be understood upon a proper exploration 
of the question whose answer is “rosebud.” This investigation will require 
the spatio-temporality of deep focus and the long take. As we know—
because Wells told his lawyers to tell the press so—Citizen Kane is not 
about William Randolph Hearst (or Rupert Murdoch, Bill Gates, Mark 
Zuckerberg, Silvio Berlusconi, or POTUS) but is based on “dollar book 
Freud.” Of course like psychoanalysis, a dollar was worth a lot more in 
1941, and we certainly should not miss the proximity of psychoanalysis 
and money in Wells’s riposte.
“Rosebud,” the fast darkening name on little Charlie’s childhood sled, 
is revealed to us in the final scene in the Xanadu warehouse of Kane’s 
massive material accumulation, as the lost plaything burns with his 
other unsalable junk in a vast incinerator. Rosebud is fetish number one 
among a series of fetishes that are reconfigured in the frozen world of the 
snow globe and analogously in Kane’s fetishistic acquisition of “the great 
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treasures of Europe,” bought, crated, and stored in his palatial Xanadu—
never to be seen again.
Freud, unsurprisingly perhaps, tells us that the fetish is the penis, 
but reminds us that it is not just any penis; it is, quite specifically, the 
mother’s penis, often associated with the last object seen before the 
fateful revelation of the mother’s lack. Freud tells us that the fetishes 
for feet, velvet, and fur originate from the moment just before the male 
child looks up the mother’s skirt.15 The fetish is a way to simultane-
ously know and not know; it preserves a last instance of the plenitude of 
childhood (a last glance at feet or pubic hair) while becoming a stand-in 
for the now-castrated mother’s penis. Thus, the fetish disavows the 
threat of castration that traumatizes the male child when he sees that 
the penis he believed to be there can disappear. This little excursion 
into “dollar-book Freud” is clarifying since Rosebud was indeed the last 
thing the young Charlie Kane enjoyed before witnessing his mother’s 
(symbolic) castration. The mother, domineering in relation to Kane’s 
shady and very likely abusive father, is both protective of Charlie and in 
charge of family decisions. But as the story has it, Kane’s relation to his 
mother is supervened by an inheritance that in a single stroke makes 
him one of the richest people in the world and severs his connection 
to his mother. Called over from the plenitude of childhood sledding by 
his mother and the man who will turn out to be his new guardian, little 
Charlie is informed that he will no longer live at home. Charlie’s new 
guardian is a bank-appointed custodian of his new fortune. The agency 
of this fortune—in short, the alienated power of money expressed 
as the will of the banks—separates Kane from his mother, in spite of 
his childhood protests to the contrary. The rest of his life, we are to 
understand, which tellingly includes his hatred for his guardians at the 
bank, will be an effort to recapture the plenitude of the maternal bond—
the time of the maternal phallus. However, cut off from the mother 
who transferred her loving protection to the bank, the medium for the 
solicitation of love is forevermore capital, and for Kane, who seeks to 
make his capital expressive of his own desires, this expression takes the 
form of the newspaper: mass media itself will be the financial medium 
for the solicitation of universal love. But in order to not be castrated 
as his mother was (her agency was vanquished by the phallic power of 
the banks), he must prove himself to be more than money, to operate 
in excess of the explicit logic of money. This time, thinks Kane, money 
must create love, not destroy it. Ultimately, this quest turns out to be 
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impossible and Kane’s epic struggle ends in failure. All the fetishes in 
the world could neither ward off the death of love among his monetarily 
controlled intimates, nor the final castration that is mortality itself—a 
fact that were Kane not such a hideous figure might have been tragic. 
Kane’s sympathy for the workers’ movements, expressed via the very 
means that would require overthrow for such sympathy to be authentic 
(bank capital and capitalist media), becomes only his self-aggrandizing 
populism—a way of buying love on a mass scale. Money, newspapers 
and readers become the media for the working out of Kane’s psychic 
trauma, a life-long struggle to ward of the castration imposed by the 
banks in the first place. Lacan’s “vel of alienation” which poses the 
question “your money or your life,” but takes your life in either case 
reigns supreme. Charismatically, Kane promotes himself as a great man 
of the people, but in playing the charismatic leader he leads the public 
to what Walter Benjamin would call “a processing of data in the fascist 
sense.”16 Kane’s love for the masses, expressed via financializing media, 
is actually a desire for love from the masses that makes him into an 
authoritarian personality—the “communist” becomes a Fascist, and 
that’s America for you. From now on, for Kane but clearly not just for 
Kane, love, masculinity, mass media, and capitalist exploitation will 
be welded together. This convergence makes each of Kane’s libidinal 
investments within the film nothing more than an exploit. Indeed, the 
love object, from whose perspective Kane might see himself as loveable, 
whether in the form of the masses, the friend, or the lover, requires an 
evisceration of the love object because, in brief, capitalized montage as 
a protocol for the organization of objects cuts them up and abstracts 
them. Its sovereign imposition of meaning is the opposite of dialogue. 
Accordingly, Kane, with his horde of hollow treasures and collection of 
exploits organized by the cutting power of capitalized media, all meant 
to signify a humanity that he does not possess, will die a great man: 
loveless, friendless, empty, and alone.
Freud tells us that all men are great in their dreams. Kane tried to 
live his dreams as a media capitalist and thus became an exemplary 
American: neurotic, megalomaniacal, unloving, and unloved. In this 
he was successful: he replaced his mother’s love, severed it is true by 
the money relation, with what on the surface of a world of montaged 
fragments seemed like the generalized attention of a kind of affection, 
but in deep focus appears as a relation of exploitation and indeed of 
liquidation.
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A third cut: the normal man, or mobilized gazes  
and the short-circuiting of the law of the father
With the development of the assembly line and mass media, we have 
examined all too briefly in this chapter, the loss first of the capacity to 
move and then of the capacity to love. Let us survey the damage that is 
the price of cybernetics and informationalization by returning to Alfred 
Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960), a film about a man trying to overcome both 
of these incapacities. As we have seen, the famed opening of Saul Bass’s 
cut-up credits of Psycho already forecasts the shredding of the symbolic 
order (both syntagmatically and paradigmatically) and thus of the law of 
the father—by cinema. Nonetheless, despite the cuts, the symbols remain 
legible, while also achieving a new order of legibility because of the cuts.
We first glimpse Marion and Sam in a hotel bed during time stolen 
from the lunch hour. We glimpse them voyeuristically, it must be 
admitted, as we peer under the curtain and through the window into 
the bed from ten stories in the air. In fact, it is noteworthy that in the 
first fifteen seconds of the film we go from a bird’s-eye view of the 
aptly named city of Phoenix to a momentary perch outside a curtained 
window and then into a sex scene—as the characters, the cinema, 
and the audience seek their quasi-elicit pleasures and their ends. The 
audience too is positioned in a kind of no-place that welds desire to the 
technologically mobilized gaze and, presciently here, turns city space 
into cyber-space. So, with interests thus aligned (we want sex, not psy-
choanalysis, in risqué 1960), we pursue Marion Crane, who, untamed by 
the law, takes flight. After having stolen forty thousand dollars, suddenly 
out of control and haunted, she drives out of town, driven by the gaze 
and the voice of the law—only, as luck would have it, to fall into the trap 
of the stuttering Norman Bates, a man with, as we have already seen, his 
own scopic and linguistic program who also happens to be a taxidermist. 
One could say that film in general was, above all things about the cut, but 
such a statement would never be more true than in the case of Psycho.
Let us agree: Marion, whose gaze, mobilized like that of cinematic 
spectators, finds herself momentarily free to follow her desire but is 
then pursued by the law while on her flight to pleasure. Paradoxically, 
this journey to pleasure is cut short by a new law, that of the cinematic 
cut. This cut is the other side, the dialectical antithesis, if you will, of 
the mobilized gaze—technically speaking, its condition and limit in the 
cinema, socially speaking, a new modality of perception and experience 
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in relation to which the cinema is at once an abstraction and an inten-
sification. Indeed, as observed in our prior discussion of Psycho, it is 
the film as a narrative structure and indeed as algorithm that forces 
Marion to stop at the Bates Motel to be properly cut to the new measure 
of desire by the revenge of the law of the Father. Mobility and the edit: 
the new grammar of desire and deferral for which the old grammar of 
the symbolic order and the law of the father must find adequation. This 
power to fragment and reassemble is at once a condition of possibility 
of, and subjugating grammar for, an emergent order of desire attendant 
to modernity. That modality, as the slasher auteurs who followed in the 
footsteps of Hitchcock during the next half century realized in one way 
or another, is the deeper message, for we find in Psycho an algorithm of 
financial capture—of capitalized vision. The mode of its implantation 
in the spectator extends and yet reconstitutes the pathologistical imple-
mentation of the gendered organization of pleasure.
Kristeva writes, “As correlative to the notion of repression, Freud put 
forward that of denial as a means of figuring out neurosis, that of rejection 
(repudiation) as a means of situating psychosis. The asymmetry of the 
two repressions becomes more marked owing to denial’s bearing on the 
object whereas repudiation affects desire itself (Lacan, in perfect keeping 
with Freud’s thought, interprets that as “repudiation of the Name of the 
Father).”17 Not just a violation of the common heritage that is the human 
body and its thought, not simply the re-composition of space-time, 
the grammar of the cinema is a mode of and for the mobilization and 
reorganization of desire. Marion, the desiring Crane, empowered by 
her new role in the workplace, cuts the law, but she is not the only one. 
There are many new mobilizations afforded by new social and financial 
relations in the mid-century United States. In stealing the money and 
fleeing Phoenix (the bird reborn from the ashes), she cuts out, but she 
is also cut out: out of society and, even more shockingly perhaps, out 
of the film. Indeed, Hitchcock shocked audiences not with the one 
act of cutting against Janet Leigh but with two acts in one: by brutally 
cutting her up as he did in the middle of the film, he thus, against the 
audience’s expectations, cut the film star out of the film halfway through 
the narrative. The second half of the film is the afterlife of both Norman’s 
and the audience’s fetishistic appropriation and indeed consumption of 
the female film star—a sewing up of loose ends with psychoanalysis.
Let us also remember that for Laura Mulvey, at least, visual pleasure 
is generated by a narrative cinema “cut to the measure of [male] desire,” 
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and this is accomplished by the organization of three looks, that of 
the characters, the camera, and the audience. Mulvey describes the 
exigencies bearing on both woman and the image of woman with a 
kind of devastating efficiency. “[T]he function of woman in forming the 
patriarchal unconscious is twofold: she firstly symbolizes the castration 
threat by her real lack of a penis and secondly thereby raises her child into 
the symbolic. Once this has been achieved, her meaning in the process 
is at an end.”18 As if writing about Marion, Mulvey adds that “Women’s 
desire is subjugated to her image as bearer of the bleeding wound; she 
can exist only in relation to it and not transcend it.” The two sentences 
immediately following this description of the structural foreclosure of 
feminine expression almost uncannily describe Norman’s fate at the 
hands of his mother: “She turns her child into the signifier of her own 
desire to possess a penis (the condition, she imagines, of entry into the 
symbolic). Either she must gracefully give way to the world, the name of 
the father and the law, or else struggle to keep her child down with her 
in the half-light of the imaginary.”19 For Norman, as we are to find out, 
has a mother who did not “gracefully give way to the world, the name 
of the Father and the law” and thus he is held down “in the half-light of 
the imaginary.” Accordingly, NORMAN BATES as we saw in a previous 
chapter, is both the discursive symptom and the visible encryption of the 
repudiation of the logic of castration—at once pure film, and what film 
must contain: the film’s message.
Norman’s endeavors to become a man under the unquiet gaze of his 
mother lead him to engage in acts whose reality must increasingly be 
rejected if he is to remain a good boy. One might say that paramount for 
Hitchcock is the diagnosis of modern psychosis as a structural feature of 
modernity that is one with the affordances of cinema and a new order 
of scopic relations; modernity unbinds female agency and threatens 
castration precisely by placing limits on masculinity and the assertion 
of masculine power.
So, Psycho delivers its brand of poetic justice in accord with midcentury 
white American patriarchy. A woman breaks the law for pleasure—cut 
to her punishment. If that punishment is mildly disproportionate, it is 
because somewhere else, another woman, in this case Norman’s mother, 
was seeking her own pleasure in an effort to mean something more than 
castration and nothing else—at least to herself. But the law of the father, 
even if it doesn’t function seamlessly, organizes things such that (its own) 
poetic justice is served and things get sewn up. This is the algorithm that 
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scripts NORMAN BATES. The repudiation of the Name of the Father 
creates NORMAN BATES and its reassertion organizes the fragments 
and the cuts, as it organizes the cinema. It is, in short, an algorithm for 
taxidermy. In the media of patriarchy, one woman’s exercise of agency is 
shot down by another woman’s exercise of agency and Hitchcock stuffs it 
into a film. The angel of this justice, the particular medium that provides 
its deliverance, is first Norman, who as we know is a psycho and, not 
coincidentally, a voyeur. He also happens to be an embodiment of 
cinema: a practicing taxidermist. Cinema (Psycho is, after all, a “classic”) 
is thus the second medium of poetic justice and here, since, Norman’s 
visual practice is exactly analogous to cinema itself. Cinema transcodes 
the psychoanalytic (itself an investigation of the visual field) to make it 
a program of an apparatus that organizes the visual field and Hitchcock 
is its vehicle.
At the risk of repetition, let’s review how this works. On the other 
side of the wall, is Marion in her hotel room, literally in camera. A 
moment earlier in the bunker full of stuffed animals for grown-ups, 
where Norman’s efforts to rescue his failed manhood through taxidermic 
exercise are housed, Marion had questioned the sandwich-bearing 
Norman’s masculinity by implying that he was subservient to his mother, 
adding, “a son is a poor substitute for a lover.”
But now, with Marion’s presence expelled from the den of struggling 
masculinity, she may be beheld in the cinematic gaze (at this moment 
in history the culminating technology of dominant Western visual 
practice); she may, in short, be taken as an object in a way that is at once 
consistent with the rape of Suzanna yet responsive to feminine agency. 
Notably, the viewer’s gaze, directly aligned with Norman’s, puts both in 
the position that Hitchcock stated he wanted for his audience: “aroused 
by pure film.”20
According to Jean-Paul Sartre, if one sees the eye, the gaze disappears; 
however, if one falls under the gaze, the eye disappears. Thus, seeing the 
eye, objectifying the body of the other, is a way of warding off castration 
through the repression and negation of the subjectivity of the Other. 
That is why Jacques Lacan tells us in The Four Fundamnetal Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis that the gaze is also an annihilating gaze. As Mulvey tells 
us, “Desire, born with language, allows the possibility of transcending 
the instinctual and the imaginary, but its point of reference continually 
returns to the traumatic moment of its birth: the castration complex. 
Hence the look, pleasurable in form can be threatening in content, and 
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it is woman as representation/image that crystallizes this paradox.”21 
Cinema, she explains, has developed various strategies of objectifica-
tion and identification to manage the image of woman, to tack back and 
forth between voyeuristic pleasure and reinforcement of the male ego: in 
brief, the sadistic narrative that unmasks the woman and deprives her of 
power and the fetishistic manipulation of her image via the close-up that 
removes her from three-dimensional space cuts up her body and renders 
it two-dimensional and iconic.
In the shower scene, the literal liquidation of Marion’s agency gives 
us a concrete image for the gendered praxis of this gaze as fomented 
and codified by cinema. As the knife cuts, at once analogously to and 
here simultaneously with the way in which the cinema cuts up the image 
of woman, the camera continues by following the blood swirling in the 
water of the bathtub down into the void of the drain, only to leave the 
blackness of the void by exiting the pupil of Marion’s now dead eye. As 
the camera zooms out from Marion’s pupil, we see her final twitches 
before she becomes a corpse. The counter-shot to her annihilated gaze/
her dead eye, as noted previously is suddenly that of the newspaper with 
the money in it, as if all of that psychodrama is now to be grasped from 
the standpoint of money—was a dialogue with money. Through the 
sequence of cuts, her subjective (and threatening) gaze has literally been 
converted into the eye-object. Thus, in abridged form, we have the whole 
film. The shower sequence is the film within the film that gives us the 
fundamental relation of the eye and the gaze in an economy of gendered 
looking circumscribed by capitalist patriarchy. The rest of the material is 
(a brilliant) elaboration.
Traditionally speaking, then, Norman’s attention to Marion is 
not properly economic—his attention to her exceeds somewhat his 
contractual duties as hotel clerk. In this, he is Kane-like, using the 
economic resources at his disposal to work out his psychic need. But, 
as if to emphasize the extra-economic dimension of Norman’s use of 
Marion, the forty thousand dollars that Marion stole is buried under 
the mire in the trunk of the car, still wrapped in newspaper—wrapped 
in the symbolic order of the business world—and despite the fact that 
it structured the action remains well beyond Norman’s grasp. Indeed, 
although aware that it was the new highway that changed the fortunes 
of the Bates Motel and left it in the backwaters of commerce, Norman 
is unaware that it was the money-relation that drove Marion to his lair. 
Norman’s gaze, then, from the point of view of our own times, in which 
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we have come to understand that looking is posited as labor, seems 
atavistic if not exceptional, part of yesterday’s problems and an older 
regime of looking, as it is not directly productive of value. His attention 
is not contributing to the shareholder valuation of Facebook it is simply 
working out his psychological issues. He is not being exploited in his 
look. Indeed, in a certain respect he is looking freely, an illusion that the 
conventions of cinema also supports. He knows neither that capitalist 
patriarchy made him a psycho nor that his gaze is productive of value.
However, if we take seriously, as we must, Sylvia Federici’s critique 
of Marxism and the labor theory of value, for example, then we know 
that women’s work, although unwaged and unrecognized by capitalist 
modes of valuation (monetization), is nonetheless the bedrock of social 
reproduction.22 Woman as unwaged, unvalued, and unrepresented labor 
not only bears the gendered burden of social reproduction, but also here, 
archetypically, is the bearer of the burden of the look. Marion bears the 
burden of the look unto death (though she would have preferred to bear 
it back to the bank) and thereby serves Norman’s desire to reproduce 
himself as a desiring subject, in this case a man. As the exemplary 
spectator, his looking and Marion’s bearing, now algorithmically coded 
in the logistics of a film that will become a new paradigm for cinema 
in general, serves as an architectonics of the male gaze, female objecti-
fication (repudiation) and the narrative that will be organized around 
it. Thus, though atavistic in some respects in as much as this gaze is 
extra-financial in the first instance, recursively, Norman’s gaze is the very 
formula for the financialization of libidinal logistics. Norman objectifies 
Marion for what seem to be his own reasons, but the money was watching 
all along. And cinema harvests his gaze.
In a famous passage about Hollywood narrative cinema that today 
we must make redound to a critique of Marxist poetics as well, Mulvey 
reminds us that with the image of woman, “her visual presence tends 
to work against the development of the story line. This is because the 
narcissistic needs of the male ego are sutured into an identification 
with the male character: his gaze, his control of the narrative and his 
organization of three-dimensional space.”23 This describes Hollywood’s 
male lead but also, we should note, Marx’s figure of capital which revo-
lutionizes the productive forces presumably without women’s domestic 
work. In Psycho, Marion’s act of theft cuts the law of the father and 
inaugurates a narrative that is used to reveal the logistics of the law, 
which is to say, the forces of normalization under patriarchy.
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The law of the father, via a stochastic-cybernetic system of capitalist 
patriarchy—what a moment ago I ironically referred to as poetic justice—
reestablishes itself. Systemically speaking, the homeostasis of capitalist 
patriarchy is reestablished among the cinematically mobilized eyes 
in a no longer traditional world through a kind of Norbert Wienerian 
self-regulating damping effect via the program known as “the plot.” 
And in a restoration of the law (if you remember the end of the film), 
psychoanalysis makes sense of it all. As if to say “The symbolic order is 
dead; long live the symbolic order!” Marion short-circuits the law and 
is herself cut up by a character who would represent patriarchy but has 
himself been short-circuited by it via another figure of modernity, the 
castrating phallic mother. Indeed, we have observed that in restoring 
what was cut out in the repudiation of the Name of the Father (“the 
mal mastur” which recombined gives “the normal man masturbates”) 
the main character is himself reinscribed in the cinematic cutting-up of 
the symbolic order by the very cinematic optics of modernity that both 
threaten and enable his fantasy.
So from 1929–1960 we see three pathways in the cinema, at once 
diagnostic and therapeutic: the corporeal short-circuit with Chaplin, a 
megalomaniacal narscissistic cathexis to mediation with Wells, and a 
psychotic-schizoid taxidermy of the gaze with Hitchcock. As we shall 
see in the next chapter, serious as these maladies of capitalism are, 
they must be understood as specific rather than universal, local and 
particular, rather than global. For, contrary to all fact, they erupt as if in 
an all-white world. It must be said now and said very clearly that despite 
all of its subtlety and nuance, this world is dedicated above all else to 
the preservation of its whiteness. Thus it is a world also dedicated to 
the repression and negation, not just of the white woman, who though 
profoundly diminished in Hollywood remains partially visible, but of 
everything not white constitutionally excluded from the frame. Arguably 
then, whatever is in the frame is also a representation of racial violence. 
Unfortunately, this tendency can be extended to representation more 
generally: images, whatever they may contain, are of racial violence—
they emerge from and signify in a context of ongoing racial violence. 
As we have seen, a similar hypothesis may be applied to language, 
photography and computation. At bottom global semiosis rests heavily 
on the exclusion unto death of hegemony’s others.
8
Prosthetics of Whiteness:  
Drone Psychosis
The violence of whiteness
Well, if in 1960 while psychos roamed, the normal man masturbated, 
what does he do today? What does anyone do? “But by the grace of the 
good object, there go I,” says Laurence Rickels in a clear indication that 
these two trajectories are of a piece. Particularly after half a century 
of cinema, digitization, visual saturation, and visual financialization, 
what are the dominant scripts for power? Citizen Kane or Psycho, Kane 
or Bates? Neurotic megalomania or psychosis? Two still functional 
programs for white subjectivization, and for fractal fascism, for infinite 
dividualization, and for death by representation.
In today’s world in which the entire visual field is posited as a site of 
value extraction, it is no secret that pornography represents 30 percent 
of Internet traffic at minimum.1 If we consider that computer energy 
usage has expanded to account by some measures for almost 10% of total 
energy consumption planet wide, that’s a significant amount of fossil fuel 
devoted to masturbation. Still, if reaching orgasm in order to ward off 
psychosis were the main use of fossil fuels, the world might be a better 
place. However, the effects are somewhat more serious than “mankind” 
on the verge of psychosis caught in an orgiastic and masturbatory 
thrall: unless one begins to understand that this thrall is one with 
necro politics. Structural violence, systematically deployed and titrated 
with highly fungible vectors of racism and sexism, is embedded in the 
techno-visualization of everything that appears with the express goal of 
capturing sensual labor and the consequence of liquidating both subjects 
and the subjectivity of their objects. Bernard Steigler’s notion of the 
stripping of the libido and the proletarianization of the senses by what 
he calls “retentional systems” would be useful here, as would Herbert 
Marcuse’s idea of one-dimensional man, but more to the point perhaps 
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is Arthur Jafa’s sublimely poignant Love is the Message, The Message is 
Death (2016).2
From Kane to Bates, we witness the mediatic functionalization of 
white subjectivity and the virtualization of the object world. Even 
Chaplin’s resistance to machinic desubjectivization takes place in an 
all-white world. The three films, part therapy for and part intensification 
of specific historical pathologistics, provide programmatic compensatory 
means to ward off the radical disempowerment wrought by ambient 
social programs. The result is nothing short of the codification and 
automation of neuronal-psychic function by the cinematic apparatus. 
The programs of subjectification, archetypes analyzed, inscribed and 
mobilized by cinema depend upon the denial of even the existence of 
people of color.
Indeed, the forms of neurological and psychic dysfunction and 
reformation described thus far—people fragmented, castrated, and 
cut up by money and machines and driven to seek subjectivity by 
pathological means—are relatively easy to understand, delimited as they 
are. Not to minimize them, since they violently imposed various regimes 
of the body, psychology, personhood, and desire upon subjects as well 
as upon those who became and suffered as objects or invisible ground 
for said subjects, but we must remark here that they are local manifesta-
tions specific to a white supremacist imaginary, in which human drama 
can be adequately represented in the absence of the non-white world 
reduced, as it almost always was and is, to an invisible supporting role. 
Nonetheless, their mainstream expression and dissemination make them 
valid precursors to the contemporary psychosis of today’s mainstream. 
Yesterday’s white supremacist capitalist patriarchy still configures today’s 
white supremacist capitalist patriarchy in the United States, Europe, and 
beyond, a formation that is symptomatically specific to one class fraction 
but nonetheless potentially deadly to every planetary denizen (if also to 
itself) for all that.
Outing the whiteness (for those who may not have noticed) of the 
examples from the previous chapter should delimit their relevance 
even as it emphasizes their complicity with the hegemony of a racist 
imaginary—a racist reign of images. Along with Frantz Fanon, we must 
recognize the limits of psychopathologizing discourse, which is to say 
the limits of psychoanalysis. For Fanon, no talking cure was going to cure 
the sicknesses of either torture victims or sociopaths; only insurrection 
and revolution could overthrow the forms of egoism, objectification, 
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hatred and desire endemic to colonialism and fascism and only violence 
could overthrow colonial violence to bring about the needed paradigm 
shift.3 So in tracking the white psychopathologies that lead toward the 
dissolution of their hosts, we are witnessing along with the fomenting 
of a subject that is capitalist, patriarchal and white, the implosion, the 
practical deconstruction, of whiteness. It’s sickness, emptiness and 
breakdown. The technical apparatus is there to sustain this crisis and 
render it profitable through the therapeutic structures of the plot.
Two points: one about whiteness and what Anne Anlin Cheng astutely 
calls the “melancholy of race.”4 This will be an additional and indeed 
constitutive pathologistical vector that, in addition to the production 
of the Tramp, the Citizen and the Psycho characterizes the operating 
system of the representational dominant. Then there is a second point 
concerning a generalized liquidation not just of particular human beings, 
but of human being and of being itself.
In The Melancholy of Race, Cheng reminds us that the melancholic is 
both sad and aggressive:
Dominant white identity in America operates melancholically—as 
an elaborate identificatory system based on psychical and social 
consumption-and-denial. This diligent system of melancholic retention 
appears in different guises. Both racist and white liberal discourses 
participate in the dynamic, albeit out of different motivations. The 
racists need to develop elaborate ideologies in order to accommodate 
their actions with official American ideals, while white liberals need 
to keep burying the racial others in order to memorialize them. Those 
who do not see the racial problem or those who call themselves non-
ideological are the most melancholic of all because in today’s political 
climate, as Toni Morrison exclaims in Playing in the Dark, “it requires 
hard work not to see.”5
Although Cheng is interested in “the question that Freud does not ask: 
What is the subjectivity of the melancholic object?”, for the moment 
I want to remark that the canonical cinema of the United States can 
be thought of as a melancholy canon, organized as it is to profitably 
portray white narratives as universal narratives in a society profoundly 
structured by racial inequality—organized, in other words, to not see.6 
bell hooks and many others hence have commented on “the oppositional 
gaze” responding to Hollywood cinema, particularly the oppositional 
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gaze of black spectators watching white films. “We” must learn to better 
recognize how whole systems of visualization and thus the organization of 
attention are structured around a disavowal of racism or of the existence 
of racialized bodies and oftentimes the active annihilation of racialized 
bodies.7 Frank B. Wilderson III, in his tour d’force analysis of Monster’s 
Ball, in which “prison is seen as black, but scened as white suffering,”8 and 
the requirement of black death is “rendered as a romance”9 notes that:
From the two fisted modernism of white film theory’s intervention-
ist agenda to its recent invigoration—or ennui depending on ones 
perspective—… their differences … maintain between them an 
uncanny solidarity in relation to the “estate of slavery.” That solidarity 
is evidenced by the fact that the Slave remains unthought, foreclosed 
by the inspiration of we.10
Though it is impossible (for me at least) to recapitulate Wilderson’s full 
argument here, he persuasively (indeed overwhelmingly) argues this 
and more: “Like the reconstructive (socially transformative) gesture of 
Lacan’s ‘full speech,’ the politics of heteropathic cinema is none other 
than a narrative instance of Whiteness. And the frame, in its internal 
assemblage—what is know as mise en scène—and in its external 
movement—the shot—is none other than a formal instance of Whiteness 
… In point of fact, the ‘composition effects’ of [Stephen] Heath’s cinematic 
frame are not available to the Black unless the Black has been structurally 
adjusted with the frame, made to appear as ‘man,’ ‘woman,’ ‘proletarian,’ 
child,’ ‘gay’ or ‘straight’ and so on. Such a structural adjustment makes 
the Black ‘palatable’ and allows for his or her cinematic ‘conversion 
[from] seen into scene’.”11
As with film and film theory, so too with media studies and 
philosophy—these also float on a sea of blood and endlessly re-enact the 
decimation and disappearance of the slave, the colonized, the native. In 
I Am Not Your Negro, Raoul Peck’s powerful film based on writings and 
lectures of James Baldwin, Baldwin appears on The Dick Cavett Show to 
speak about racism. After he finishes, Yale philosopher Peter Weiss is 
called in as the next guest, to chastise Baldwin who, in his view, dwells 
too much on race. The philosopher then delivers a few thoughts on the 
general existential situation of loneliness and the problem of becoming a 
man. Baldwin deftly eviscerates this position clearly demonstrating the 
primacy of race: “What I was discussing was not that problem really. 
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I was discussing the difficulties, the obstacles, the very real danger 
of death thrown up by the society when a Negro, when a black man 
attempts to become a man.”12 One is given to understand that like Sidney 
Poitier’s jumping off the escape train to remain with his white friend 
(Tony Curtis) who couldn’t catch on in The Defiant Ones (1958), (a scene 
criticized by Baldwin and replayed in Not Your Negro), the gestures of 
most contemporary philosophy are likewise there just to make white 
people feel better.
Cheng, citing Thomas Mann, who says that “What we call mourning 
for our dead is perhaps not so much grief at not being able to call 
them back as it is grief at not being able to want to do so,” shows that 
“it is exclusion, rather than loss, [that] is the real stake of melancholic 
retention.”13 Indeed, melancholia approaches psychosis when the lost/
excluded object rises up to challenge the melancholic, who in truth no 
longer desires (or can abide) its return. Wilderson goes even further 
saying, “But if David Marriot, Frantz Fanon, Hortense Spillers, Orlando 
Patterson, Saidiya Hartman, Ronald Judy and Achille Mbembe are 
correct, then ‘human figures in their actions” [(Heath)] cannot have 
their Humanness guaranteed if those actions are not a priori imbricated 
in the mutilation, the genealogical isolation of the Black.”14
Take, for example, Clint Eastwood’s all too convincing portrayal in 
Dirty Harry (1971) of a sad cop, Harry, whose disillusionment and 
melancholic self-loathing have almost cost him his job on the San 
Francisco Police Department. When one of the rare black characters 
in Hollywood cinema asserts himself, albeit scripted in the most 
stereo typically racist of ways—a black bank robber running from the 
interpellation of a white man who just happens to be a cop—the line 
of sight through the peephole of Psycho, a masculinity machine if there 
ever was one, becomes the sight line down the barrel of Eastwood’s .44 
Magnum. The title of the sequels, Magnum Force (1973) and The Enforcer 
(1976), are telling, because the psycho—with whom the audience is 
supposed to identify—does not simply deny reality (the possibility of 
other ways and practices beyond his ken); he imposes his vision on 
others, if necessary, by making them dead. Eastwood’s persona from 
Dirty Harry forward is that of being too much a man for these muddled, 
liberal, and overly tolerant times—his career turns out to be a “heroic” 
elegy of his racial melancholia, which is to say the melancholia of his 
racism. As one blogger appreciatively writes, “Dirty Harry put a bullet in 
the heart of the flower-power generation,”15 and it’s true: white psychosis 
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overcame the global sixties, and too many Americans identified with a 
killer, a kind of psycho, as therapy for their own racism.
Here we can grasp the virility at the end of Peeping Tom’s camera 
(Peeping Tom, 1960), that Tom uses to film women as he murders them. 
The camera’s bayonet blade extension is a concise image for the virility 
in the extension of Eastwood’s racist gun. The combinatory of psychosis, 
as repressive instrument of subjective agency by regimes of domination 
understood as race and gender is a toxic, violent and in reality, murderous 
algorithm.
Eastwood’s racial melancholia is of a profoundly different order than 
that of African American filmmaker Charles Burnett’s characters in 
his extraordinary Killer of Sheep (1979). This film, which approaches 
Cheng’s interest in the question of the subjectivity of the melancholic 
object, which expresses a desire to return agency to they who are deemed 
inadmissible in the melancholia of a white supremacist community—
and we might add, with Wilderson in mind, a white supremacist 
platform. The film could be read as a kind of black Modern Times 
in which the desultory Watts community in the mid-1970s is also 
metaphorically figured as consisting of sheep (and on occasion killers), 
but here the physical machines hardly work and it is the social machine 
that overdetermines the action. The grammatization of the body and of 
everything else is of a different order than Chaplin’s rendering of the 
machinic interface with the body. Here the interface is ambient and 
existential—to some degree it is unrepresentable except through the trace 
of its consequences. The film is a kind of bearing witness to the lived 
temporality, disempowerment, and affective experiences of racialized 
exclusion and the implacable histories of anti-blackness in the United 
States. It’s neuro- and psycho-pathologies, along with beauty and joy 
hazarded against danger (the kids jumping across the roof gaps, the slow 
dance of the protagonist and his wife) emerge in the context of stultifying 
lack of wealth or opportunity and the relentless weight of apartheid. 
One might find in this film a distinctive composition that creates an 
apperceptive space of black knowing, which in certain real ways is 
outside the economy of visual forms and structures, the “composition” 
proffered at the Hollywood box office (even as it is arguably partially a 
result of this very economy). The incommunicability and persistence of 
the legacies of slavery, racism, and Jim Crow are among subject matters 
and indeed the very contents of this film. The difficulty of generating 
a subject-constituting line of sight, image, a fully resolved perspective 
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or an iconic representation testifies to a nonhegemonic visuality, an 
unrealized subjectification, and the presence of counterhistories that 
mobilize a perceptual mode palpably apart from that which will align 
itself with—and hence be at once repurposed and devoured by—the 
mainstream of white supremacist visuality. Here, in the sense that Nicole 
Fleetwood uses the term in Troubling Vision we have a “non-iconic” 
presentation of blackness, one that through the troubling of hegemonic 
vision through what in both cinematic and existential terms is a kind 
of decomposion and dissolution makes palpable lived experiences 
heretofore unrepresented.16
The annihilating gazes abstracted and informed in Psycho, Dirty 
Harry, Peeping Tom, etc., are a condensation of a specific mode of white 
life’s universal application of a violently imposed sexism and racism to the 
organization of its perception. These “pure gazes” mobilize racism and 
sexism on various platforms to fully render their objects—even as they 
blur the distinction. These dynamics of visualization functioning for the 
presumption of post-Fordist tramps and the profit of today’s entrepre-
neurial Citizen Kanes, and the pleasure of psychos everywhere, are at a 
second level ways of achieving visibility, notoriety, subjectivity and likes. 
Both the objectification and the violating gaze that targets its objects and 
annihilates ground are among the dividends of violence that continue 
to be paid by pathologistics evolved from the legacies of colonialism, of 
slavery, of imperialism and humanism. These patho logistics take forms 
that recapitulate while disavowing their foundations in racial violence 
and capitalist exploitation.
Today, these vectors of for-profit programmatic annihilation 
consolidate to form, among other manifestations, the predatory gaze 
of the drone in a global war to be human. The history of the drone, as 
Chamayou says, “is the history of the eye turned into a weapon.”17 This full 
automation of the gaze represents a kind of third stage of what Bernard 
Stiegler refers to as proletarianization. We have observed the proletari-
anization of gesture, of the senses and perception, and now we are asked 
to confront the proletarianization of critique itself, of reason. The drone 
and its function by means of signature strike, that is, by means of an 
algorithmic decision-making process, effectively cuts “human” decision 
making out of the equation through its own autonomous operation. 
This is by no means a special case, rather it is a clear expression of the 
general case in which visuality and the senses have been supervened 
by computation and data-visualization to the extent that thinking and 
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critique are short-circuited as subroutines subjugated to the programmed 
exigencies of machines.
These pathological programs of visualization, which flourished under 
Barack Obama and show no signs of abatement, continue to function 
in ways that are equally as important as the digital computer. The 
drone, effecting what Allen Feldman calls a liquid archive, couples all 
the capacities of computation for aerodynamic navigation, videography, 
cartography, facial recognition, and weapons deployment to create tech-
nologically enabled psychosis, or what we might call cyberpsychosis.18 The 
drone and its melancholic functionaries—its cybernetically incorporated 
pilots (who will go home to kiss their kids (or have psychotic episodes) in 
Arizona after pulling the trigger on someone else’s family half a universe 
away, along with their entire staff of statisticians, researchers, and 
commanders who serve both machine and country—draw on a panoply 
of mutable, and thus programmable, raced and gendered assumptions, 
as does the press that covers or ignores these exploits and the nation that 
sanctions them. With a signature strike, initiated by pattern recognition 
(as when a wedding party strays from what a surveillance algorithm has 
established as normal movement), the space of critique, of conscious-
ness in its everyday form is further foreclosed. In short, data processing 
can morphologically produce whatever variant of racist/sexist phobic 
rage is required for any operation, it being understood, of course, that 
an operation here means the liquidation of the visualized target (except 
as in the utopian case of Alex Rivera’s Sleep Dealer, where a Chicano 
drone pilot is struck by conscience and ultimately sides with his victims). 
The violent and fully incorporating logistics of the automated gaze of 
the drone are utterly banalized even as they are effectuated through 
quantum distribution in the technical rationality of computers, national 
security, military protocols, and the scoops of networked news that 
together produce the required taxidermic effect on each day’s requisite 
Other. The moaning of the victims of “Predators” and “Reapers”—names 
for two of the most widely utilized drones—are even less audible than 
those of critical theory.
Thus, the drone, as both financial exploit and paradigmatic mode of 
visualization in the era of mediatic finance capital, also represents the 
full automation of not just visuality but also subjectivity. It is the avatar 
of capital, of masculinity, of whiteness. Just as the victim is deconstituted 
and reconstituted as a fungible blur, killers are recruited as users of the 
machine. Though there are many points of entry from pilot to willing or 
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even ignorant citizen, the drone is at once a prosthesis of computation 
and of the dominant form of subjectivity, it is an avatar of the digitized 
neo-liberal and or fascist-populist subject who is constituted through 
murder. This is an accurate statement except for the fact that the 
neo-liberal/fascist-populist subject is no longer really a subject in the 
sense that they are in sovereign possession of agency. Rather, their 
subjectivity (and yours) is an interface for informatic flows structured, 
in the last instance, by market forces of racial capitalism.
Medea Benjamin in Drone Warfare: Killing By Remote Control, shows 
clearly how drone warfare is an effort to emasculate the enemy.19 The 
observation grafts the psychologistics of the drone directly in line 
with the cinematic gaze. She also cites a 2003 Department of Defense 
computer program designed to show the human cost of an attack.” 
“The dead show up as blob-like images, resembling squashed insects, 
which is why the program was called ‘Bugsplat.’ Bugsplat also became 
the “in-house” slang referring to drone deaths.”20 The automation that 
renders targets castrated or as vermin as a means to annihilation and thus 
also as a means to corporate/imperial subjectivity damages, as Benjamin 
points out, not just the thousands or tens of thousands of specific 
targets—whether defined by “personality,” “signature,” or “collateral 
damage”—but millions of Palestinians, Syrians, Somalians, and others 
for whom the fabric of life and time is destroyed. This destruction feeds 
back in the public relations calculus as volatility, and is used to further 
legitimate and financialize the drone vector.
The cybernetics of machines, including industrial machines, 
photographic technologies, cinema, computation and drones has been in 
a feedback loop with the bios for centuries. The technical and logistical 
dimensions have been and remain inseparable from racial capitalism. In 
Control, Franklin says of Kittler’s cold technological determinism:
After all, Kittler, whose technological a priori is in this book [Control] 
deformed into a subjective point of view that is intelligible as a double 
of that attributable to capital itself [a deformation I, as the author of 
Message, am sympathetic with], equates the displacement of the subject 
by the computer with a conflation of targeting and programmability or 
self-steering: ‘bees are projectiles, and humans, cruise missiles,’ Kittler 
writes, because ‘one is given objective data on angles and distances 
by a dance, the other a command of free will.’ What is critical about 
this claim is that its ballistic conceptualization of sociality rests on 
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historical conditions under which ‘[e]lectronics … replaces discourse, 
and programmability replaces free will.’ Sociality, from an epistemic 
position that grounds the control era, can be understood only as 
targeting under the continued impression of free will—a conceptual 
frame underscored by the fact that the terms reticle (gun sight) and 
network share a root in the Latin reticulum, ‘net.’21
Franklin sums up, “Under the control episteme, targeting, the practice 
from which Weiner first developed the concepts of control and 
steering and which, for Kittler, equates to the conflation of free will and 
programmability—becomes the horizon for all possibility.”22 Because 
all systems (computation, financialization, visualization, militarization, 
national borders and migration, racialization, aestheticization, etc.) 
tend toward and are shaped by the logic of financialized digitization, 
subjectivity within these programs relies on the instantiation of targets 
(iconic or blurred as necessary). It is, as an experience, only to be found, 
or at least is primarily found, in the various positions organized by the 
logistics of an annihilating gaze. In this way subjectivity has itself become 
a program for murder; it renders a subject programmed for murder with 
all outsides configured as zones of noisy crisis populated by targets. This 
neo-liberal, cybernetic subjectification through active annihilation of 
the outsider is one real, if unconscious meaning of digital “convergence.” 
Computational capital instantiates its fractal subjects or dividuals as 
cruise missiles and all externalities as targets: the first person shooter 
game become world.
Thus alongside the regular games or risk management, we have war 
games, war porn, food porn, fashion porn, news porn, reality porn, and 
regular porn. In fact, this is the regular fare, a sick tableau of degraded 
crap, and it is all part of the attention economy, where everything we 
look at is emptied of essence and stuffed with psychotic emphasis in an 
effort to help everyone keep reality at bay in the half-light of the digital 
imaginary that is simulation. This all-consuming production by mediated 
sensual labor organized by the dead labor of information is an always on 
expropriation of the libido and the sensual that might otherwise have 
been turned to other uses (love, sensuality, poetry, community, caring, 
erotic forms that redefine a relationship to violence by receding from it). 
The libidinal expropriation and reconfiguration characteristic of what 
is nothing short of fractal fascism in a network of dividualized nodes 
functions at a variety of levels, from the ratification of a particular screen 
prosthetics of whiteness . 147
image thorough to the game, blog, show, channel, platform or interface 
and all of their advertisers, shareholders, banks, militaries, and states. 
We man our dividualizing peepholes as best we can (for who among us 
is really a man, and given the terms, who would want to be?), cutting up 
worlds in accord with an algorithmic function beyond our ken, while the 
bodies pile up to a height equaled only by that of the profits.
The engineering of fractal fascism bundles modes of attention by 
means of computerized systems of content delivery, value extraction and 
metrics of account. Platform “users” become conscious and unconscious 
organs of this vast automaton. We have, in short, the programmatic 
simulation of reality, the virtual mise-en-scène of all looking, without 
the guarantee of any real event beyond that orchestrated by the 
inexorable logic of advertising and value extraction. The logistics and 
indeed pathologistics of these increasingly formalized algorithmic 
processes preserve the basic annihilation-function of the gaze as 
operationalized in relation to race, gender and would-be intersubjec-
tive formations, but adds a new layer of fungibility that allows for the 
targeting of potentially anyone, anytime, anywhere with the proviso that 
the likelihood of a person being targeted is subject to prior encodings of 
their profile, their digitized identity. That our thoughts and perceptions 
are programmed, accumulated, and capitalized in relation to these fun-
damentally weaponized programs for race, gender and financialization, 
testifies to the automation and expropriation of the general intellect by 
racial capitalism. The overwhelming of the intellect by means of the 
algorithmic discrete state machine is the situation, and the irony that it 
was “humans,” who programmed the machines, does nothing to return 
sovereignty in any meaningful form. Racial capitalism achieves further 
autonomy and impunity by means of computational automation. To be 
meaningful, that is to say in radical sense “political,” sovereignty would 
have to diverge from the programmatic leveraged accumulation of value 
and its corollary murder, but few seem capable of offering a new way of 
organizing things—the white sovereignty of what Benjamin Bratton and 
others refer to as “the stack” maintains its stranglehold.23
The general intellect, distributed across media platforms and automated 
in various apparatuses, is not just part of the means of production in the 
industrial sense, that is, in the sense understood by traditional capitalists; 
it is the means of production of sense perception and knowledge. Neither 
is it an ideal or an immaterial formation. It is itself distributed among the 
bodies and machines that constitute the socio-historical domain—the 
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sociality of machines. The general intellect has been rendered as forms 
of sensuality that are themselves sites for value production that include 
modes of subjectivity at once fully automated and fully virtual. They 
are virtual in the sense that the referent that would anchor the subject 
in question—is strictly speaking a non-entity, that is, a computational 
entity, a simulation. Subjectivity is a contingent instantiation, a plug-in 
(and always was), but the mediatic matrix of its materialization, exceeds 
the pre-individual linguistic world detected by Freud, Lacan, structural 
linguistics and poststructuralism, as its local conditions of production 
and reproduction have been overtaken and absorbed computation. The 
unconscious is structured like a language: a computer language, and that 
language is built on racial violence.
Derivations and derivatives of computational racism
In some brilliant pages of Alex Galloway’s book The Interface Effect is the 
following proposition: “The computer however, [which Galloway calls 
a metaphysical medium because it functions through simulation and 
instantiates its own objects] is not of an ontological condition [as cinema 
is purported to be], it is on that condition. It does not facilitate or make 
reference to an arrangement of being, it remediates the very conditions 
of being itself. If I may be so crude, the medium of the computer is 
being.”24 Galloway continues: “If the cinema is, in general, an ontology, 
the computer is, in general, an ethic.”25 The distinction, as Galloway tells 
us, is comparable to that between a language and a calculus: the profilmic 
event as “referent” versus the program that in object-oriented computing 
instantiates the very objects it will then manipulate. As evocative, lucid 
and arresting, as this formulation is in defining the flight from being 
as a metaphysical transformation ushered in by the digital computer, it 
is also partially incorrect, at least in regard to the profilmic if we are 
going to abide by Vilém Flusser’s notion of the photographic apparatus 
as a machine that automates forms of thinking by executing concepts in 
a programmatic fashion.26 For Flusser, “the technical image,” produced 
by the apparatus known as the camera, is the first postindustrial image, 
inasmuch as the camera is already a computer—a programmed apparatus 
whose function is informed by concepts derived from the linearly 
written notations of the sciences of optics and chemistry. An apparatus, 
for Flusser, is something that automates an aspect of intelligence, and it 
no less consists of programs than does a digital computer. What appears 
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in the photograph is not the “thing” but a simulation mediated by 
materially embedded concepts. Thus, Flusser claims, quite convincingly, 
that for nearly two centuries cameras have organized the world for the 
improvement and proliferation of cameras, such that today everything 
exists in relation to the black box that is photography, suggesting that 
this constellation of programs evolves as the photographic apparatus by 
subjugating humans to its functions, much as a Darwinian evolutionary 
vector might transform and then dominate a habitus.
With this in mind, one might say that if, as Galloway says, 
computation is an ethic—the imposition of strict rules upon the 
emergence and trajectories of instantiated entities—then cinema was a 
mode of computation whose ethos was ontological reality—at least for 
a time. This time was that of Bazin with his emphasis on realism and 
deep focus, and, as we saw in a previous chapter, the same was true for 
photography, although with different consequences even in the time of 
Roland Barthes. We already knew that this ontological assumption, the 
translation of the profilmic real onto celluloid, was only truly significant 
for a specific modality of cinema, deep focus, since montage with its 
production of attractions and concepts (rejected by Bazin as a lesser and 
incomplete realization of “total cinema”) already involved a derealiza-
tion of the “profilmic” content of the image. It is useful to say things 
thus not only because it suggests that “ontology” itself is a program 
creating a metaphysical mise en scène necessary for a certain order of 
representation, but because doing so provides a necessary corollary to 
W. J. T. Mitchell’s notion that “there are no visual media.” This corollary 
can be used to show that the computer, despite its invisible binary 
churn, is still fundamentally embroiled in the visual.27 Mitchell argues 
that since even the most “purely visual” media rely on other mediatic 
modes to function—silent cinema, for example, had its musical score 
and intertitles, and abstract expressionism had its critical discourse—
no medium is really visual. The corollary then, indeed anticipated by 
Mitchell himself, is that with regard to media in general, they are all 
visual media—at least today. Presently no mediation escapes some 
relation to visuality, Mitchell tells us, and goes back to Marshall McLuhan 
to emphasize that what is important is the sense ratios. Now that we 
understand computation as the financially driven decodification and 
digital recodification of prior media formations, we must add to the shift 
in sense ratios, the organizational and indeed metaphysical power of 
the program. For visuality is totally overrun with programs. These have 
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been consolidated, abstracted, intensified, digitized, and algorithmically 
redeployed in feedback loops that have their own histories of overlap and 
emergence. Thus, we see that the digital computer is a break in the mode 
of informaticization, the way in which worlds are textualized and then 
treated as information. It must be remembered that, as demonstrated 
previously, nothing is ontologically information, and “information” is 
itself at once a technics and a practical conceptualization of what to do 
with being, and thus a strategy—a program for programming language. 
The camera was a computer and a device for programming the socius. 
Computation, its languages and its effects on language, remains under 
the sway of programs of visualization induced by the co-function and 
indeed convergence of visual media, which, now, emphatically, are all 
of them.
Making this argument regarding the relation of capital, film, 
photography, digitality and computation airtight, and furthermore, the 
argument that these media in their dominant forms at once recapitulate 
and revitalize an originary violence founded on and ongoing in 
racial capitalism, requires a long-term, sustained and multi-faceted 
investigation. Expressed in its most reduced form, the substrate of 
data-visualization is murder, unequally distributed and fractal, but 
murder nonetheless. In White cinema we can already see the waning 
of the real under the informatics of photography in Michelangelo 
Antonioni’s Blow-Up (1966) in which the liquidation of the referent is 
cast as symptomatic of both the photographic universe and the nuclear 
age, and even as far back as Sergei Eisenstein’s films in which the 
montage relation did not represent something extrinsic (profilmic) but 
the creation a new reality. At multiple points we might understand that 
the profilmic real was not real in any of the senses usually intended by 
“realism;” it was material, raw material organized by semiotic retentional 
systems, in which there was not an atom of reality in their visualizations.
This abstraction by means of material organization is even more 
pronounced with computation, which utilizes the rigorous organization 
of matter in the discrete state machine to produce abstraction that 
works on the world. Beyond even Trinh T. Minh-ha’s brilliant critique 
of documentary objectivity (along with her equally brilliant critiques 
of anthropology, first world spectatorship, U.N. humanism, and 
Western post-colonial subjectivity) in which “reality is organized into 
an explanation of itself,” the computer is an apparatus consisting of 
apparatuses, a program consisting of programs—a matrix of automatons 
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and interoperative logistics. For all this, actually existing computing is 
no less keyed into the subject constituting visual and the pathologistical 
vectors I have identified in these chapters. These at once structure the 
parameters of data intelligibility and are introduced into programming 
in ways that have been recursively self-modifying, that is emergent. The 
alienation of “man” from “his” object is not alienation 2.0; it is alienation 
to the “google” (and now to the “alphabet”): programmed, weaponized, 
photographic-discursive-informatic, intelligent apparatuses evolving 
recursively with the socius in an extraordinary materialist complexity that 
runs on scales from the subatomic to the cosmic. “Evolving,” we note, by 
mobilizing the logistics of racialization and sex/gender models to siphon 
off the sensuous activity of human life to the point in which this process 
has presided over a generalized liquidation of being. It being understood, 
of course, that being too, was an artifact of a prior regime—or, at least, it 
looks that way from here. The practical deconstruction of being and the 
de-ontologization of life-forms are directly proportional to the degree of 
distributed computation in a semiotic system. No one bothers with the 
analytic deconstruction of essentialisms any longer because fixed entities 
are deconstructed in practice faster than the speed of theory. Such is the 
world indexed by the post-factual world. If, speaking metaphysically, 
Simulation = Nature, aesthetically the dominant genre is post-factual 
realism, a genre that represents on a slightly elevated abstraction from 
“reality-TV.”
Emergent media, like the species’ enlarging carbon footprint, do not 
cancel what has gone before but instead develop media-ecologically, 
that is, in relation to extant energetics, whether considered from the 
standpoint of thermodynamics, labor, or information. No doubt new 
media are marked by quantitative transformations that precipitate 
qualitative effects; however, we are considering a transformation that 
has taken place over seven centuries or more in the eco-system of racial 
capitalism. The ontological categories and ontology itself have been 
shifting toward a complete liquidation of being—as a category, as an 
experience, or (and here this word ceases to make sense) as a “reality.” 
Reality was the artifact of an earlier media technics. It’s disappearance, 
indeed, is the story of twentieth-century philosophy in the West—one 
that with post-structuralism led to its implosion and philosophy’s rebirth 
as “theory.” (As previously indicated, the effort to maintain the practice 
of Western philosophy past this break is akin to psychosis in the sense 
developed in this chapter.) Taken as a whole the implosion of philosophy 
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and language’s ability to signify being would turn out to be a theory (if 
only elliptically) of the image and information—which is why philosophy, 
crippled by its own incapacity to historicize its situation became theory 
to remain useful, and remained philosophy to offer comfort to white 
people. This historical superiority of theory during the second half of the 
twentieth century however does little for contemporary theory, which 
crippled by its own status as theory, (and even as postcolonial theory) 
presided over by an informatic regime that would render all discourse a 
computational subroutine, realizes next to nothing.
Nonetheless and against the odds, we find it necessary to embrace this 
“next to nothing”28 and insist that race- and gender-based exploitation, 
systemic encampment, rape, enslavement, national wholesaling of 
populations, forced migration, incarceration, military, police action 
and murder continue apace with capitalism’s evolving algorithms—
that inequality and injustice and the murders they distribute are the 
mediological substrate of capitalist simulations. Thus, we can be sure 
that while the pathologistics of capitalism are our common lot, they 
function on a system of differences. These differences that make a 
difference are lived, and contradictorily perhaps, we will claim that 
these lived differences matter in a different way. For otherwise love 
is outmoded and indeed impossible, and there is nothing to noncap-
italist values, except perhaps profound naïveté or extreme cynicism. 
Capitalism, the very image of nonbeing, the very life of nonlife, the 
spitting image of death, would remain our conceptual horizon, however; 
the world that haunts today’s images persists and seeks its insurrec-
tionary ground. And it is calling you through its own rebellion. The 
past, the non-capitalist ontologies, the outsides, the break-away voices, 
the fugitive poetry of objects ran and run other programs that still 
have resources to offer even if there can be no isolation or complete 
return. We do not need to argue for the persistence of alternatives on 
metaphysical ground, even if, as Feldman brilliantly demonstrates in 
Archives of the Insensible, metaphysics have become a medium of war. 
Jameson’s “History is what hurts and requires no theoretical justifica-
tion,” still a zinger after thirty-odd years, provides one script for the 
instantiation of enough ground to stand on in the regime of simulation. 
Spillers’ notion of “the flesh” offers another counter-historic foundation 
that exposes psychology, sociology, normativity, linguistic function and 
epistemology, to rest on an axiomatics of racial domination. And, of 
course, there is the world.
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Paul Virilio, whose inflection of the term “logistics” I have relied upon 
in this volume, would I think agree that there is a crisis and that the 
intensifying rhythm of the pulverization and reformation of subjectivity 
is today endemic to the maintenance of power. In his recent book-length 
interview entitled The Administration of Fear, he speaks of the devel-
opmental sequence of three bombs: the atomic, the informational, 
and the ecological. “The second [bomb] is no longer atomic and not 
yet ecological but informational.”29 This bomb comes from instanta-
neous means of communication and in particular the transmission of 
information. For Virilio, the informational bomb plays a prominent 
role in establishing fear as a global environment because it allows the 
synchronization of emotion on a global scale. Because of the absolute 
speed of electromagnetic waves, the same feeling of terror can be felt in 
all corners of the world at the same time. It is not a localized bomb: it 
explodes each second. The informational bomb creates a “community 
of emotions,” what Virilio only half-ironically calls “a communism of 
affects.” “There is something in the [global] synchronization of emotion 
that surpasses the power of standardization of opinion that was typical 
of the mass media in the second half of the twentieth century.” And a 
little later on he comments that “With the phenomena of instantaneous 
interaction that are now our lot, there has been a veritable reversal, desta-
bilizing the relationship of human interaction, and the time reserved for 
reflection in favor of the conditioned responses produced by emotion.”30
So rather than deep focus and the time of the long take, Virilio sees us in 
the thrall of a new order of montage (already dimly visible in the newsreel 
from Citizen Kane)— the cinematic mode of production, now rendered 
fully ambient and ballistic by computationally cut and mixed datavisual-
ization.31 Far more intensive than Eisenstein’s programmatic montage or 
even the ambient but still cinematic montage of mid-twentieth-century 
mass media, this digital montage is produced by the continued and near 
continuous arrival of information and affect bombs all competing—in 
increasingly self-conscious ways that are feedback loops of the market—
for the capture and expropriation of human attention and neurological 
function. Ours is an increasingly impoverished and militarized society, 
characterized by a total war on the body, on consciousness, and on the 
senses but also on equality, on solidarity, and on democracy. Today’s 
attractions rely on sequence, certainly, but also on frequency, intensity, 
channel, repetition, and spectrum—an infinite scroll. New finan-
cialized avenues of absorption and therapy have emerged as apps, 
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as pharmacology, as the many pornographies. Taken together, these 
attractions generate ideas, affects, panics, crises, and swarms along with 
massive caches of information: a global impulse network evolved (if 
that’s the word) to manage and expropriate a world population (capable 
of knowing itself to be such) by revamping its sensory inputs in a thor-
oughgoing proletarianization that keeps so many on the razor’s edge of 
fear and/or sublime abjection. The cultural ballistics, arguably akin to 
the sensory deprivation and oversaturation of interrogation techniques 
designed by torturers to force the ego into existential crisis, institute an 
establishment of abject fear as a so-called global media environment.
The cut and bundled expropriation of increasing quantities of 
subjectivity that might otherwise have been used for purposes different 
from the capitalist production of dispossession, abjection psychopathol-
ogy and murder is today the condition of and for the intensification of 
the computational capitalist media environment—the obscene fragmen-
tation and, fascistic fractalization induced by capitalized media machines 
capable of creating dividualized nodes through the expropriation of other 
people’s attention and lifetime. The induction of fear and a prevailing if 
not entirely ubiquitous psychosis is at once a result and a strategy, a mise 
en scène and a modus operandi that everywhere instantiates racialized 
and gendered orders, that have a direct relation to the phallic order of the 
white supremacist capitalist value form. The psychotic bent that results 
in murderous eruptions from otherwise impotent subjects is not just a 
result of but a condition of production of the reigning administration, 
one that, it must be admitted, has succeeded in giving us many good 
reasons to be afraid. But the administration in question is also one that, 
as Pussy Riot recently wrote from prison in Russia in 2012, may fear 
nothing more than poetry and thus makes every effort to drive it out.32 
For it may be that the world-making and solidarity-making practice of 
poetics, in all its forms, is what remains to those crisis zones systemically 
configured as extrinsic: zones, peoples, parts of people, fugitives of all 
types, aware of their oppression and refusing to seek liberation through 
the oppression of others. Otherwise, awash in intentional signals, literally 
caught in myriad and all-pervasive gazes in which seeing and being seen 
have become one and the same act, everyone, à la Baudrillard,33 à la 
Borges, is just sending messages that ratify and indeed “improve” the 
dominant codes.
This compression and indeed collapse into the machine is the logical 
outcome of computational capital. Today’s tramp falls into their phone. 
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Threatened with the abjection of invisibility and non-existence, everyone 
is desperate to make words, to make images, to garner attention that will 
testify to their existence in an informatic environment of semio-war. But 
the situation functions as if each and all were suddenly in the position of 
Jorge Luis Borges’s narrator Yu Tsun in “The Garden of Forking Paths,” 
each person a nodal point of multiple inheritances operating under the 
weight of functioning as a sign yet seeking agency in a battle for the 
control of information. Warding off abjection for themselves and for 
their ancestors in an informatic war, they are forced to convert another 
or many others and even themselves into a sign, by murder if necessary, 
if only to momentarily flash a small testament of their own existence on 
some platform’s program.34
Let us then at long last offer a definition of psychosis in the contem-
porary: The instrumental inscription of signs and images on the lives 
of others, at speeds and intensities that expropriate their potentials and 
foreclose their being in an effort to constitute oneself as the subject of 
archetypical desires purveyed in the informatic war waged by the global 
market. “The author of an atrocious undertaking ought to imagine he has 
already accomplished it, ought to impose upon himself a future that is as 
irrevocable as the past.” This rejection of any prior integrity of the tar-
get-object by representational programs is a repudiation of the Name 
of the Father in the analogical realm of the symbolic undertaken in 
order to preserve it as the law of white capitalist patriarchy within the 
visuo-informatic. It is white supremacy in excess of the discourse of 
white supremacy; it is a program running through discourse and also 
machine-mediated beyond its comprehension. It poses a Batesonian 
double bind, that requires cutting up or out aspects of the socio-linguis-
tic, in order to salvage a traumatized, and indeed schizoid sovereign ego 
by means of images and the imaginary. This schizoid psychosis is today, 
as a dominant formation, a sociopathic response to the blowback from 
historical racism, sexism, homophobia, colonialism, imperialism, now 
fractally distributed throughout the socius. Psychosis is the white-man’s 
only answer to global resistance, if he is fool enough or sick enough to 
want to remain a white man or to emulate his/capital’s mode of power 
through accumulation. White-identifying is symptom and result of 
attention economies built on the expropriating negation of those who 
look. It is a script available to all comers, however, as a virtual prosthetic 
white psychosis is cut statistically to favor those who can most easily 
identify with and conform to the affordances of whiteness. This psychotic 
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program means that for capital, and therefore for capitalists, the human 
species en toto has become a means to profit that requires this very mode 
of world-mediated machinic representation and visualization accom-
modated by schizoid recuperation. This mode engages in the practical 
deconstruction of being itself through the fractal dissemination of 
celebrity and other factors previously discussed. The corollary instantia-
tion of objects, targets and disappearances, as the vehicles for psychotic 
self-propulsion into micro-celebritydom must not be forgotten. These 
vehicles, fractionally or totally dispossessed are among the substrates of 
computational capital.
For capital the species as a whole has become the graduatedly enslaved 
substrate of a means of representation that as a programmed and 
programmable worksite is also a factory and a system of accounts. People 
and indeed the bios as a whole are functionalized by financialized media 
such that their sensuous capacities are monetized by means of capitalist 
informatic management and value extraction. This de-essentializing 
instrumentalization of the bios that grants it no integrity whatsoever, 
resonates with the dire pronoucement of Guy Debord: “in the spectacle 
all that once was directly lived has become mere representation.”35 But 
now representation is really an end in a double sense: first as the drive 
to which all human production accedes but second as a new program of 
alienated production that results for post-Fordist workers (and nearly 
everyone else) in what precisely Marx wrote 170 years ago resulted for 
the industrial worker alienated from his product, “the loss of reality.”36 
Today, in the near total ramification of mental life by distributed 
capitalist media, representational programming titrates the denial, the 
rejection, the negation, and finally the foreclosure of reality. Represen-
tation’s functioning is, in short, at once the process of dispossession and 
the mechanism of psychosis. No wonder that today, all the news is fake… 
it’s post-factual realism.
This hollowing out and recoding of the world of images and signs, 
long directed at the colonized and enslaved as a strategy of occupation, 
dispossession and domination that functioned by volatizing the referent, 
today is applied even to white people. (The horror!) Though this should 
give us no special cause for concern, it does illustrate that, as Malcolm X 
said, the chickens come home to roost. Antonioni, though without any 
critique of whiteness in mind, illustrated this homecoming clearly in the 
mode of “Art” with the sudden disappearance of his main character from 
the field of grass in the final second of Blow-Up, after his having, while in 
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pursuit of glamour, unwittingly undertaken an investigation into the vast 
universe of absence, denial and murder underpinning images. Blow-Up 
shows us that the reality is that, at least as far as computational capital is 
concerned, even white men are but a mirage, a placeholder, a function, 
and strictly speaking no longer exist. Well, that’s the theory anyway. If, 
as McLuhan said with the onset of the market economy the chicken 
was an egg’s idea to get more eggs, in the process (and the processing) 
since then, the caged chicken “himself ” has become by turns neurotic, 
psychotic-abject, and schizoid.
I have tried to indicate some of the major (infra)structural positions 
available for subjectification/desubjectification in computational capital. 
The list is not exhaustive. Under the regime of computational capital, 
programmable representation effects a wholesale production of nonbeing. 
This nonbeing is no mere metaphor. Like the state and the banks that are 
themselves constituted in it, representation—visual and linguistic—is 
structured by a matrix of pathologistical processes in which desires are 
welded to mechanisms of account that if stopped, even for a moment, 
would reveal themselves as totally bankrupt. The world is run by sick 
chickens that, from their cages target any alien whoever in a psychotic 
hope to become roosters or eggs. This desperate warding off of bankruptcy 
through the frantic constitution of investment worthy targets unfolds 
catastrophically even as it mounts various exploits and derivatives—
abstractions—to stave off a final accounting. This final accounting would 
be reparations, the payment of which would burn the entire 
computational-representational-psychotic infrastructure to the ground.
The white man not content to embrace the dissolution of his white 
privilege brought about by the very systems (and forms of resistance) he 
has endeavored to preside over, may only reconstitute himself as agent/
white through a psychotic embrace of reality denying negation and the 
instantiation of new targets. Racism mutates and “evolves.” If it sounds 
to you like I am saying that any self-identifying white person is sick, then 
you heard right. It’s time to end whiteness now. If psychosis, in service 
of the preservation of the historically and now evermore precariously 
constituted ego, entails the denial of reality, then speaking at all today 
in the mode of sovereignty risks being its number one symptom. Where 
representation is captured and foreclosed by computational capital, the 
only cure for psychosis is revolution. It almost goes without saying that 
such a revolution would require, along with the unmaking of whiteness, 
a thorough reimagining of sovereignty—and everything else.
9
The Capital of Information: Fractal 
Fascism, Informatic Labor, and M-I-M'
Image-Code-Financialization
With the undeniable rise of variants of fascism in the United States and 
around the world, an up to date account of the logistics of antidemo-
cratic mediations is urgent. Here as everywhere I take it as axiomatic 
that capitalism and democracy are structurally contradictory—both 
“capitalist democracy” and “democratic capitalism” are oxymorons. 
The strategic management of that contradiction by a system dedicated 
to conserving class power leads to what Walter Benjamin famously 
identified as the aestheticization of politics (“the processing of data 
in a fascist sense”), or what Orwell understood as a short-circuiting 
of thought (“doublethink”), and what some are calling “the politics 
of affect,” a term that among other things would indicate a schism—
and thus a mediation—between individual experience and systemic 
rationale. To a degree, the pathologistical vectors outlined in the previous 
two chapters provide an architectonics of an array of affective dispensa-
tions. Affect, the general term for a panoply of unnameable micrological 
emotions and sentiments, is an aesthetic category emergent in subjec-
tivities seeking adequation to a computer-mediated world. The affective 
field may not settle on paradigmatic structures iconic in the earlier psy-
choanalytic model; it is rather a distribution of possible emotive states. 
Everything discussed previously in terms of pathologistics with regard 
to the cinema can be generalized to the positioning of affect between a 
calculus of capital investment and capital return—most notably today 
by social-media. The logistics of affect, aesthetic and non-rational at the 
analogue level, can be ever more finally calculated, varied and calibrated 
when submitted to financializing digitization. The expansion of affect is 
in fact the expansion of sites of production.
By means of aestheticization and the preservation/re-invention of ritual 
(cult) values, Benjamin told us nearly a century ago now, the masses are 
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granted “not their right but instead a chance to represent themselves.”1 
Since the 1930s, the Führer cult and the celebrity, as both artifact and 
means of expropriation have obviously “evolved,” even as they provided 
the shape of things to come in what now appears as a kind of fractaliza-
tion of celebrity. Fractal variants would include the branded conversions 
of persons and objects into franchises on Instagram and Youtube; funda-
mentalisms from that of ISIS to the Alt Right, other racist nationalisms 
like Golden Dawn in Greece, Le Pen in France, and #45 or the NRA 
in the US; as well as many state nationalisms including (but unfortu-
nately not limited to) those of France, China, Israel, and the US. Such 
opportunistic occasions for representation—in which individuals, icons, 
scapegoats, guns and flags serve at once to figure collective authority and 
as points of narcissistic subjectification and phallic compensation for 
dividuals who are separated from any ability to transform hierarchical 
property relations and thus the very conditions of their existence—exist 
necessarily, through the suppression, that is, the unrepresentation and 
unrepresentability of others. The non-representation of most of us in 
these racializing and gendering iconographies of disavowal that, in the 
last instance, are written on our bodies and indeed on every body, is a 
condition of possibility for both the leveraged accumulation of private 
property and the star-commodity and provides a lingua franca for 
political struggle enframed by a capitalist imaginary. One level down from 
the iconicity of classical fascism, these transactions take place as affective 
accumulation. Here, with the body as a signifying surface, writing then 
means also the practical subjugation of peoples to meet the exigencies of 
hierarchical structures of representation—Debord’s spectacle in binary 
code. The accumulation of attention, cathexis and information are means 
to capture and sustain the hegemony of the universal form of value, 
capital. Thus, symptoms of such social suppression include not only the 
celebrity form (the authoritarian personality and its fractal multiplica-
tions on, for example, Instagram, who exist through the accumulation 
of our attention), but the various and dynamically evolving racisms, 
sexisms, and nationalisms, with their circulating, prejudices, hatreds and 
phobias.2 The plurality of fascisms, its fractalization, represents, quite 
literally if not quite intelligibly, the mutual competition at multiple scales 
among the many capitals.
The cultural field, as Marxists, Feminists, Anti-colonialists, Anti-
racists, Queer theorists, radical filmmakers, poets, activists, and many 
others have long recognized (despite our significant and often problematic 
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differences) is also a battlefield. Since Benjamin, and with the passage 
through what was called “postmodernism”—a periodization that retro-
spectively can be understood to have marked the real subsumption of 
the cultural by the economic—we have learned to understand culture 
not merely as a medium of politics, but as a means of socio-economic 
production and reproduction as well as of potentially radical transfor-
mation. Here I have in mind a broad range of phenomenon informed by 
radical imaginaries, found nearly everywhere we people seek freedom 
in cultural pursuits: from its trace presences in fan detournement in 
places like “An Archive of Our Own” to its concerted concentrations 
in a socio-critical work like Feldman’s Archives of the Insensible with 
its indefatigable critique of “dismediation,” “apophatic blurring,” and 
metaphysics as a medium of war.3 The forms of counter-culture are, of 
course, myriad, and every sentence made for this book owes an unsettled 
(and unsettling) debt to an infinity of struggle—I mention the archive 
because it indicates a topos for this struggle in addition to the more 
familiar notions of literature, cinema, ideology, etc.
The new situation of culture as means of production (and here 
we should probably say “cultures,” even though, given the situation, 
inclusivity is the last thing some of us want) is that “culture” has been 
largely functionalized by political economy. This historical repositioning 
of culture as on a continuum with the shop floor and the factory is an 
economic and technical result and extends the question of a technics 
of fascism to that of a technics of computation and racial computa-
tional capital. While it is usually understood that culture has a relation 
to economics and technology, what remains less well understood is the 
degree to which, from a hegemonic standpoint, culture has become a 
technical and economic relation.
Cultural practices are posited and presupposed as productive for a 
capitalism that was, as we have seen, itself already a computer (Digital 
Culture 1.0) and that today requires discrete state machines (Digital 
Culture 2.0) for its profitable and intensifying operations by which 
qualities are ever more intensively transformed into quantities. The rise 
of visual culture during the twentieth century, and the re-organization of 
the life world by that interface called the screen along with the calculus 
of the image, was a requisite step in the financialization of culture and 
its real subsumption by capital. The succeeding phase, for which DC2 
serves as both consequence and pre-requisite, marks a heavy investment 
in the extension of quantitative logics into the micro- and nano-logical 
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operations of the formerly analogue endeavors—all of which, including 
language, images, aesthetic form, philosophy, spirituality, the imagination 
and the like, fell under the auspices of the now defunct humanities and 
are today rigorously and almost inexorably submitted to background 
monetization.
This financialization of culture requires the informationialization of 
social practice, indeed, of the social metabolism. Managed by means of 
screens, information flows from users (and the used) to capital in a pattern 
that can be described by the sequence Image-Code-Financialization. In 
reality, this movement from image to code to financialization is recursive, 
reversible and continuous: … I-C-F-I-C-F-C-I-C-C-I-F, etc. Indeed, as 
we shall see in a moment it is the uptake of species metabolism through 
computational interfaces that drives the numbercrunching treadmill of 
informatics and thus capital accumulation.
Understanding the emergent relationships between image, code and 
discourse/culture/profit effectively exposes sites and possibly means by 
which to interrupt the expropriative valorization processes of capital-
ism—“valorizing information,” to use the term that Romano Alquati 
presciently used to describe workers’ contributions at Olivetti in the 
1960s—that is today everywhere extracted.4 It also suggests that despite 
the invisibility of an increasing proportion of machine operation in 
ultra-fast, ultra-small computation, in the internet of things and in 
what, as we saw, crypto-currency programmers call “the internet of 
value,” the screen/image retains key functions and is, in fact a necessary 
moment in the valorization process of capitalist computing. “Valorizing 
information,” was for Alquati, the workers’ micro-contributions in the 
Olivetti factory that improved the early computers made in the plant. It 
was their innovation and know-how absorbed by the firm. The analysis 
of the screen/image that at once serves as interface, factory-floor and 
site for production and abosrption of both data and meta-data raises 
the question of what it might mean to seize the means of production, 
particularly when many if not most readers here (just like most readers 
and non-readers everywhere) are experiencing a crisis of control not 
just over the management of the (built) environment, the workplace 
and its infrastructure, but over their attention, interiority, self-image, 
imagination, social practices, relationships, and time. Survival among 
these forms of precarity, remunerated or not, mediated by the irreversible 
intermingling of life and its “devices,” is at once bound up with the 
seeming impenetrability of informatics and algorithmic governance, 
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and is also the very means of production for capital. As I hope will be 
apparent, the struggle over the means of production then, includes 
the domain of socio-cultural analysis and conceptualization, as well 
as of culture and interiority. It also includes the more familiar notions 
of fixed capital and, we must today add, programming. Such a critical 
analysis provides a necessary, even if by no means sufficient, component 
of struggle.
If it can be said that fractal fascism and/or other contemporary 
antidemocratic state-formations legitimating hierarchizing modes of 
production depend upon leveraged value extraction, and that much if 
not all of that value passes through/as data and its organized transmission 
(number of hours worked, links clicked, pages viewed, posts made, 
money banked), then data flow disruption or redistribution—though 
tremendously varied and relatively unexplored through the lens of a 
critique of political economy—presents key tactics and perhaps strategies 
in an anti-fascist praxis. Indeed, it may turn out that any interruption 
or intervention in data flow is in fact a financial endeavor in addition 
to whatever else it may be, and that such “re-financing” (refinancing 
an image?) may have unexplored radical political potentials. Capital 
cannot maintain a monopoly on creative destruction. The flow of 
information-value up the value chain does not ordinarily trickle back 
down in equal amount either to populism’s mass participants or really to 
most content providers, but perhaps it could be made to do so. I would 
have liked to give a set of examples of partial or successful data-flow 
disruptions, and more pointedly to conceptualize forms of potential 
intervention through data disruption by analytically parsing the 
micro-dynamics of images and screens and the practices they organize, 
but that will have to wait for another time.
The programmable image, or, from M to M'
In an essay from 2016 entitled, “The Programmable Image of Capital: 
M-I-C-I '-M ' and the World Computer,” I argued that in order to correct 
the multiple misunderstandings in various “post-Marxist” analyses of 
capital that assume that value has become “immeasurable,” it is necessary 
once again to bring the labor theory of value up to date.5 Thinking about 
the programmable image I extended the earlier hypothesis of the attention 
theory of value offered in The Cinematic Mode of Production (in which 
“labor” was understood as a subset of the emergent yet more capacious 
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category of “attention” and, conversely, attention reduces to what used 
to be called labor at the sub-light speeds of non-screen-mediated 
production), by rewriting the general formula for capital, M-C-M ' 
(where M is money, C is the commodity, and M ' is a greater quantity of 
money realized in the sale of the commodity C), as M-I-C-I '-M '.
In this new equation, we replace commodity C with I-C-I ', where I is 
image, C is Code and I ' is a modified image). Where paradigmatically, 
labor had once been sedimented in the commodity-object, I had argued 
in The CMP that attention was sedimented in the image, and furthermore 
that commodities and images converged as image-commodity.6 In the 
cases of both labor and attention, sensuous activity produced surplus 
value for capital through dissymmetrical exchange. Here attention 
modifies image and code.  With the wage, as Marx clearly showed, 
workers put more value into the creation of commodities than they 
receive in their wages, with spectatorship, spectators do more to valorize 
and legitimate images, media platforms and the status quo than they 
receive in pleasure or social currency (gesture, know-how, anesthetiza-
tion, etc.). They also do work to transform themselves. In bringing the 
Industrial Revolution to the eye, the cinema opened up the mediational 
spaces of what would become known in autonomist Marxism as the social 
factory—albeit “known” in a manner that was, in that corpus at least, 
more or less blind to the technical and indeed techno-logical aspects of 
this very mediation. In my most recent work I demonstrate that forms 
of attention result in the modification of code on the pathway to market 
monetization. These modifications are themselves the absorption of 
attention as informatic labor. Whereas retrospectively the commodity 
can be grapsed as a moment of data-visualization, with new media the 
relationship between image and code has become the paradigmatic form 
of leveraged mediation in the distributed production and consumption 
of post-Fordist capital. Value extraction, instead of taking place only 
during wage labor as it was purported to do under industrial capital, 
can take place anywhere in a network in which modifying oscillations 
between image and code occur. The embodied entity, formally known 
as the “laborer” or the “human” is still the source of all value for 
capitalism, but they/we have, to use a cutting term from Sean Cubitt, 
been structurally reduced to a “biochip” in an increasingly ubiquitous 
computational armature that extracts and abstracts their/its activity.7 
The absorption and abstraction of value is thus no longer, paradigmati-
cally organized around a factory worker producing an object for a wage. 
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Rather it is organized around a dividually produced affect wrung from 
the “biochip” (and the rest is treated as externality).
In our era there has been an exponential intensification of the 
number, form, and distribution of sites of production as well as in the 
metrics of evaluation and remuneration. Production and valorization 
have become, “cellularized” as “‘Bifo’ aka Franco Berardi” puts it.8 This 
cellularized production means, in short, that our neurological activity as 
interfaced with images and ambient computation, functions to shift the 
states of discrete state machines. Like the mule tethered to the mill, we 
biochips drive the processors that crunch the numbers. Who knew that 
computation could so multiply, disburse and miniaturize the affective 
power of a carrot?
While it is patently true that hundreds of millions of people still work 
in much the same way as in the industrial age (on assembly lines, in 
factories, for subsistence wages, without safety nets) and the feudal era, 
it is also true that any and nearly all commodities (the iPhone, say) today 
rely on the integration of various moments of valorization: commodities 
are no longer paradigmatically objects with singular points of sale, but 
rather arrays of materially mediated images (imaginaries) tethered to 
financial derivatives and other forms of computable information, and 
anchored to a distributed info-material system with multiple points of 
interface. The iPhone is a particularly good example (though in truth even 
the small Indian farmer must hedge market risk all year long) because 
even as the A-side of its screen is immersed in networks and clouds 
that deliver numerous images and apps that themselves have affective 
and material effects, the B-side depends on a network of labor practices 
that are effectively forms of enslavement.9 Therefore, when considering 
informatic production in the world of the programmable image, think 
not just of Disney’s organization of the imagination through franchises 
and product lines of Frozen, but also of the share pricing of Apple and of 
Google with its tendrils in rare-earth mines, factory servitude, national 
and geo-politics, social-media, incubators, start-ups, schools and a 
rentier model of the general intellect. Think also of the background 
monetization of all activity all the time related to using a smartphone.
With this in mind we can see that early capital’s generalized quan-
tification/digitization that increasingly renders nearly all human 
practices computable in industrialization but also, and emphatically, 
through colonialism, is the pre-history of the current moment. As 
Simone Browne’s tour d’force recent book Dark Matters: On the 
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Surveillance of Blackness, brilliantly demonstrates, the technologies 
of racialization and enslavement were at once horrific technologies of 
capitalist production, bent as they were on the violent conversion of 
people into objectified beings and processes, and also the precursors to 
current technologies. The histories and practices of racial violence are 
embedded within technologies of, for example, shipping and branding, 
and they are perpetuated by their contemporary development into 
logistics of surveillance and transmission. Like the metrics utilized in 
the construction of slave ships, the ledgers of the East India Company, 
plantation management and monopoly cartels, the (bio-) metrics of data-
veillance too are precisely the modern metrics of valuation. They measure 
the very metabolism of a society organized by screens in a way that 
shows that computational capital and its biometrics of risk management 
is also computational colonialism: the informatic organization of life for 
profitable value extraction along vectors of social difference. Neither 
the racializing components nor the racial violence has disappeared. 
Postmodern screens interface the dynamic data-visualizations of com-
putational capital and differentially convert the general population into 
content providers. They are also worksites—points where attention is 
required to valorize capital through the production of new information 
and new discrete states. Types of work and forms of payment in social 
currency are structured according to a complex calculus of valuation 
that is, in effect, the real-time summation of computational function. 
Meanwhile the entire infrastructure produces and reproduces radical 
dispossession.
There is more to this formula and its functionality in the post-fordist 
milieu defined by computational capital, but I do not want to repeat all 
of the main points of the M-I-C-I '-M ' essay. I’ll just add here that fractal 
celebrity on social-media (and the currencies of “likes” and the like, 
are one of the salient features of the ways in which we (as individuals, 
dividuals, cellularized intensities, whatever) are enjoined to wager in 
the programmable image to get ahead in the thoroughly financialized 
market of daily life that has become inseparable from sociality itself. 
We are programmed by images and we program with images, all the 
while generating data, that is, modifying code. Significantly different 
from but less different than one might think from the plantation if one 
follows out the pre-conditions and consequences of this economy, this 
sense-/attention-/cognitive-/neural-/location-mediated modification of 
code is the paradigmatic mechanism of value extraction today; it is the 
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unhappy evolution of labor and the new expansive and all-encompassing 
form of work in what Matteo Pasquinelli terms “the society of 
metadata.”10 As with the regime of labor and cinematic attention, there 
are some pleasures involved both in the processes and as the results of 
computational capital, but their distribution is profoundly unequal. And 
as with prior regimes the majority of suffering that results from and is 
disavowed in the name of progress is at once unaccounted for and unrep-
resentable—a systemic externality. The 2 billion-person planet of the 
dispossessed (population Earth, 1929), for example, that are nonetheless 
living upon this planet, are both the condition and result of the com-
putational regime. The colonies were the first content providers. The 
Instagram porn star in Moscow or LA and the Syrian refugee struggling 
for survival, are each overdetermined if not almost fully absorbed in 
the ambient semiosis that is part of the precarity of informatic finan-
cialization, but the benefits of this (partial) self-empowerment via a 
struggle with info-servitude, computer mediated abstraction, and cor-
porealized signification accrue unequally along the lines of a hierarchy 
of historically negotiated codes and codifications—including those of 
race, gender, nation, class, citizenship, etc.—that are among the vectors 
of what is increasingly statistically imposed algorithmic governance.
As it turns out, given that, as shown in the chapter on Marx, 
information emerges in the footprint of the value form, the formula for 
capital in information society (the society of meta-data) can be written 
even more concisely as M-I-M', where I is now the more abstract category 
information. Rather than mediating leveraged value extraction through 
the specific case of wage labor and the commodity, the mediations 
between image and code produce new information, and it is this passage 
of species metabolism through informatic processing and conversely, 
informatics processing through species metabolism that best charac-
terizes capital accumulation today. This is the general case of leveraged 
value extraction for which wage-labor/commodity production was the 
first, specific, widely instituted case of the digitization of qualitative 
processes by capital logic, but is no longer the most advanced. Currently, 
with ubiquitous computation, the species metabolism runs (and runs on) 
the treadmill of the world computer. In other words, the shifts in discrete 
machine states are driven by life activities (labor) or the absorptive 
extraction by fixed capital of what Neferti Tadiar calls life-time.11 Thus 
we have in principle a formula for the capitalization of all difference that 
makes a difference—a fundamental law of the known universe and also 
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a simple yet clear description of the current limits imposed upon our 
knowing. This imposition of the framework of capital upon informatics 
labor and knowledge prevails because the machinic infrastructure that 
makes possible the acquisition, processing and storage of information is 
an integrated system, the exact antithesis of a commons. The communi-
cations infrastructure is fixed capital, and even pure theory, even pure 
information theory, along with everyday dreaming, feeds that regime. 
The differences that make a difference are social differences after all, but 
society as a whole does not benefit from informatic differentiation.
Capital is thus in effect an extended informatics-machine-mediated 
calculus of social difference, an algorithmic management of rights that 
differentially severs producers from the value they create. Its managerial 
infrastructure casts its networked epistemology, its means of production, 
to posit the cosmos as information and sets everyone to work generating 
more information in the name of sorting it out and oftentimes in the name 
of survival. Thus a book like Steven G. Marks’ The Information Nexus,12 
which argues that capital, long misunderstood, was always character-
ized not by the “cash-nexus,” but by what Marks calls the “information 
nexus” is on the mark, but for one important detail: Information, as we 
have seen, did not always exist. Marks’ discovery of the management 
of information at the center of capitalist “advancement” is in many 
ways elucidating and on point in as much as it insists that capitalism 
and its development of communications systems was key to increasing 
efficiency and to risk management. Marks suggests that what here we 
would call a mediological account provides a more compelling analysis 
of capital emergence. With this I agree, yet it is anachronistic to say that 
capital was organizing information all along. Information as such is an 
historical achievement of capital, a higher order (real) abstraction of the 
perceptual logic endemic to capital that, once instantiated, retroactively 
makes new sense of the history of capital. To not understand the historical 
emergence and the historical production of the concept of information 
from the value form itself is thus still to endeavor to comprehend capital 
by utilizing the instruments of its own self-idealization. One can no 
more understand capital by presupposing the existence of information 
than one can understand capital by pre-supposing the existence of 
private property. Such a lack of a historico-materialist analysis of the 
categories of account is precisely why it becomes as difficult as it seems 
undesirable for the apologists and legitimators of capitalism to see that 
the history of their concepts, like the history of capital itself, is bathed in 
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blood. Too often, the digital ideology, like the “German ideology” takes 
the effects of political economy as cause. Information, as we have shown, 
does not merely exist; it is not a Platonic form, an ontolotical condition, 
or a glimmering and transcendent divinity. Like private property, its 
history of formation is as violent as the history of capital itself, because 
its history is the history of capital itself.
Working for the blockchain
Given the everywhere present mediation of social processes by the 
computation of information, the list of new pathways from M-M' capable 
of capturing socio-subjective activity might be extended infinitely, but I 
will not attempt to extend it here. Elsewhere I will try to provide multiple 
instances where breaking the script/program leading from M-M ' yields 
unexpected results and surfaces new forms of community. In closing 
this volume, however, it is worth gesturing once again toward bitcoin 
and cryptocurrency in general as a significant development of the 
relationship between computation, mediation and the socius.
Bitcoin is a directly monetizing social medium; it is an abstraction 
and crystallization of contemporary financial logic, of the computa-
tional mode of production. As has been said, it signals the emergence of 
the internet of money—or as some say, the internet of value. Arguably 
(we have argued this here), money has always been social-media—an 
encoding and indeed an encryption of social relations. Money was and 
remains a platform that sheared off ungainly and difficult-to-abstract 
stuff like qualities and history in the practice of its own increasingly 
digital rationale, while simultaneously creating its own mechanisms 
of storage, retrieval, circulation and account.13 Historically, subjective 
activity was encrypted in commodities that were themselves encrypted 
by the value-form—this encryption was in fact the very condition of 
wage-labor and capital whereby exchange values could be represented 
in use-values and vice-versa. Money in its various determinations, as 
store of value, as medium of exchange and as capital, is currently being 
abstracted as user interface, platform and operating system.
Cryptocurrencies avail of the fact that money is inexorably a social 
and a computational relationship, and emphasize the possibility of 
developing a distributed proprietary relation to the encryption process 
itself, rather than leaving that surplus to banks, nations and states as they 
mint fiat currencies. With bitcoin, this proprietary relation to encryption 
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is engineered by mathematically formalizing every transaction and 
inscribing it into a permanent distributed public record known as the 
blockchain. All owners of bitcoin own a piece of its distributed com-
putational platform and thus of the sedimented computational history 
of the platform. The functioning of the platform generates coins and 
fees for “miners,” those whose computers work to solve a cryptographic 
hash puzzle. Whichever computer solves the problem (and the chance 
of solving it is random so it could be any computer running the code) 
becomes the leader and sets the order of the transactions as the next 
block in the blockchain. What is less well understood, and in fact 
almost completely unexplored is that each block is effectively a hash 
of the sociality percolating around the bitcoin blockchain in as much 
as it takes the transaction records (what was spent) of any given block 
as a summation of that sociality. The blockchain is the permanent, 
unforgeable public ledger of those interactions. Thus it directly monetizes 
social participation by abstracting it out from the social, and by creating 
a permanent record or ledger of a set of agreements regarding value 
transactions, agreements that are cryptographically verified and then 
computationally distributed without the need of banks or states.
One great advantage of the distributed blockchain is that it serves as 
a distributed and un-falsifiable public ledger, taking monetary issuance 
and accounting out of the hands of banks and states or “trusted” third 
parties, and putting it into mathematically verifiable computational 
protocol. The interest in this process alone (the collectively perceived 
socio-historical need) then sets people to work supporting the machines. 
Everyone who owns bitcoin is also a shareholder in the bitcoin 
blockchain, which is to say, the entire bitcoin system. This system now 
composes the largest computer in the world. The encryption process, 
which requires both subjective and fixed capital investment, includes 
the program-controlled issuance of monetary units (coins, asymptot-
ically approaching 21 million) by mining, as well as organizing their 
circulation, storage, and sites of exchange for other commodities. As 
the seven-year history of bitcoin attests, this cryptographic endeavor, 
which solves the double spend problem seemingly inherent in the 
easy copy-ability of digital files by creating a permanent ledger of each 
computation mediated transaction that cannot be duplicated or reversed 
without controlling more than half the computational power in the 
entire bitcoin system, is also an exploit of the monetary practices and 
sensibilities of the current conjuncture. First only visionaries, fanatics, 
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libertarians, those who had to send overseas remittances, and citizens of 
failing states were interested, but now, sensing the power of institutional 
dis-intermediation and instantaneous incontrovertible trade settlement, 
banks and states are also expressing interest—which is to say investing 
their own capital—in blockchain technology and, over the last couple 
of years, hundreds of new cryptocurrencies. This year the industry is 
valued at over 100 billion USD and that amount will only increase.
Admittedly, the absorption of already computational capital by 
a globally distributed discrete state virtual machine potentially has 
increased utility, higher resolution, and greater stability than earlier 
forms of money. For example, a distributed world computer could be 
far more stable than any existing nation-state. Here the stability and 
inexorability of distributed, machine-mediated computation will very 
likely take over the function of the state in securing currency and will 
eliminate the third party guarantor/beneficiary of the bank through 
the operation of its own “trustless” algorithm. But in spite of the real 
possibility of a Benjaminian work-of-art type of reading (Walter, not 
Franklin)—utopian with regard to the democratizing potentials of the 
distributed, immutable public ledger and the re-engineering of the social 
contract that is blockchain—bitcoin, though fundamentally anti-state, 
is not demonstrably anti-capitalist and given its mode of dissemina-
tion which disproportionately rewards early adopters with the funds 
of latecomers can likely be no more democratic than its predecessor 
monetary systems. This discussion could prove to be a long one opening 
as it does questions on the future of money and the political meanings 
of financialization, so I will simply state that, much as I would like to 
be proved wrong here, bitcoin appears to be a new type of anti-social 
social-media. As participants speculate on the increasing value (M-M') 
of a system that converts speculation, human zeal and computational 
energy (in March 2017 the bitcoin system directly used more than US 
$471,694 of energy per day), into a monetary platform in which the 
monetary units are themselves shares in the overall value of the platform, 
they accrue profits. Risk is rewarded by value extraction from others. 
We should note that this share in the platform represented by a bitcoin, 
is also true with other currencies (though few remark on this fact) with 
the important difference being that the platforms of fiat currencies are 
capitalist states—national economies characterized by all the opacity, 
militarism, and anti-democratic centralization that is implied by that 
term. With the state, values are sustained by economic prowess, military 
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might and PR, and profits are reaped (for states) by buttressing their 
economies, collecting taxes and printing money. Bitcoin is anti-state 
because its value is not “guaranteed” by a government, as in fiat 
currencies, but by the collective (machine-mediated) perception of and 
participation in its computer mediated utility as money and as capital. As 
it is not backed by gold or a state but is rather, mathematically secured 
proprietary access to a publicly encrypted quantity of a social relation, it 
suggests an increasing convergence of capitalization and computational 
sovereignty. The often vague perception of this convergence, in which 
government by the many (computers) will take over state functions, 
and agency will be enacted from the margins of distributed platform 
sovereignty, constitutes a large part of the discursive excitement and 
therefore of the general development surrounding this technology: as 
investors and enthusiasts say, buying bitcoin (limited to 21 million coins 
each divisible into 100 million units) is like getting in on the ground 
floor of the internet.
At this writing, the most recent notable development in crypto-
currency is Ethereum. Ether, the unit of value, is programmable money. 
It is different from bitcoin in that while it is blockchain based, it is fully 
programmable or, as its inventors and adherents say, Turing complete.14 
It offers the possibility of “trust-free smart contracts” that according 
to proponents will “disintermediate” the banks (destroy them) by 
making transactions and settlements one and the same—different from 
securities, for example, where the trade and the settlement are separate 
acts. Ethereum also allows for the creation of autonomous entities that 
could own themselves: to give a favorite example, a driverless car that 
services passengers and sees to its own fuel and repairs with the money 
it makes. More than likely though, rather than one car doing well and 
purchasing millions of other cars to become king of the road, the result 
will be that the car will yield “its” profits to its programmers/owners 
via an organization that is currently being called a DAO (Distributed 
Autonomous Organization)—unless, of course, someone figures out 
how to program the car to return its profits to the socius by purchasing 
carbon offsets and the like. Here again though, we see how even the need 
to get from point A to point B (in a car) modifies code and is converted by 
screen-mediated ubiquitous computation into value-productive activity 
by spurring programmers and investors to create automatons that will 
serve/harvest such needs in perpetuity: the very acting on a socially 
produced need is slated for informatic capture and monetization. We see 
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also that a technocratic transformation, even one that erodes state power, 
will by itself be inadequate to political revolution.
Both program and archive, as money, commodity, screen-image, 
interface, derivative, data visualization and capital, cryptocurrency is 
thus far an exploit that churns and swarms in, through and as our money, 
our code, our images, our words. In this respect it is paradigmatic—
shifting the computational ecology and infiltrating it by introducing 
new levels of programmed functionality and absorption to the already 
existing world-historical program of computational capital. As exhibit A 
of “the programmable economy,” bitcoin, and the blockchain technology 
on which it is built, was perhaps the paradigmatic incarnation of 
computational capital. Ethereum, which is developing partnerships 
with Microsoft and numerous banks, as well as spurring a whole new 
spate of start-ups, takes computational capital to the next level with 
“programmable money.” As the cryptocurrency exploits intimate, we 
inhabit a media-environment where capital circulation is grasped and 
abstracted as encryption and data visualization, and can therefore be 
consciously developed as production via the extraction of informatic 
labor (all the sociality organized around crypto) from people acting on 
historically produced needs.
But as it turns out, on a planet that has been completely transformed 
by computational finance, computational colonialism and the 
programmable image, everything else in circulation may have its 
informatic vectors, its media, its enumeration, including history’s dis-
possessions, enslavements, genocides, and massive accumulations of 
violence, violation and presently innumerable sufferings. Just as the 
mind and the senses may rebel against capital, so too perhaps might 
computation and informatic sensors. Where the plantation and the 
factory were once the paradigmatic sites of struggle, today, the sites 
are semiotics, visuality, information processing and perhaps finance—
though they may still very well be the semiotics, visuality, information 
processing and as it pertains to the still extant colonial plantation and/
or the proletarian factory. Despite the hostile, rampant practices of 
dismediation, perhaps everything that ever was leaves its informatic 
trace. Today we must ask: What are the anti-capitalist data-visualizations 
to which we might affix our energies? What non- and anti-capitalist 
resources remain ambient?
In a forthcoming book I will endeavor to lay out a possibility I see on 
the horizon. What if it were possible to use cryptocurrency and com-
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putational metrics to create value abstraction without value extraction? 
What if the expressivity of financial media could be made to express an 
anti-capitalist message and create cooperative platforms? Despite brutal 
and relentless colonization, consciousness as a world-historical product 
has its counter-hegemonic possibilities, its contingent pathways—so too 
does computation. What if it were becoming possible, through a democ-
ratization of financial tools and a decolonization of finance to create new 
economic spaces and within these spaces utilize subaltern and revolution-
ary cultural forms and practices to redefine what is valued? And what if 
it were also possible to create these spaces in such a way that they became 
interoperable, meaning that different radical enclaves could effectively 
trade with one another and indeed with society at large by means of 
currencies that abstracted value without extracting it from its producers. 
Today the surplus value extracted through wage-labor, attention and 
cognition is accumulated by capital, and the information and meta-data 
extracted in post-Fordism is likewise alienated and accumulated. This 
accumulation is alienated subjectivity, power, value—we know the story 
of this all too well. What if innovations in financial tools could take 
such tools out of the exclusive hands of banks and states and put them 
in the hands of migrants, activists, artists, radicals and poets such that 
we could keep the value that we produce for ourselves? I am suggesting 
that if the internet of value were in fact collectively owned, a commons, 
then M-I-M ' might be accomplished without exploitation and that we 
might enter a transitional period in which the metrics of valuation 
could be deployed to work against the gradients of exploitation. This 
would mean a hollowing out of capital from within by creating financial 
tools in accord with the needs not of capitalists but with all the rest. The 
design of such an eco-system, were it possible, would be as far reaching 
as prison abolition or the radical notion of an increasingly borderless 
world that still created spaces of dignity for all people and peoples—both 
necessary conditions of world peace. It would require the scale of social 
participation and change that is implicit in either of these or in other 
revolutionary movements. Indeed it is fair to say that it would require 
these other movements. While it may be a safer bet for media theory and 
even critical race media theory to stay cynical and say that oppression 
will intensify until the end of the world, it suddenly seems that many 
of the suppressed revolutionary histories might find a way to enter into 
computation not as amortized aspirations for life subsumed and erased 
in programs and infrastructure dominated by the capitalist value form, 
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but as guiding spirits that may remake that infrastructure. We might at 
last build machines that heed both the cries of the past and the calls for 
liberation from a more just future.
The fact that the message is murder has caused and continues to cause 
unfathomable pain; it has made genocidal dispossession the price of 
everyday communication. A re-conceptualization of financial tools that 
democratized them and enfranchised marginalized cultural practices and 
peoples in pursuit of equality and peace, would be a cultural, economic 
and computational undertaking that, if it would scale, could change the 
world. Make no mistake, bitcoin is not this solution, nor is Ethereum, 
but the publicly auditable, anti-state nature of programmable monetary 
platforms, opens the door to transnational currencies and controls that 
could limit or perhaps eliminate many exploitative relationships. There 
is a possibility that people no matter their situation could selectively 
participate in economies of their own choosing. Programming such 
new currencies and economic spaces might allow people to decide for 
themselves what and how they value what they do. A valorization of 
life that left its qualities intact, while also abstracting it without passing 
through extractive accumulation, would constitute an economic and 
cultural movement that might make critical, anti-racist, anti-sexist, 
social-justice values interoperable both culturally and monetarily. If so, 
it would finally bring the era characterized by the message as murder to 
a close.
What new programs might we engender? And how? Down and off the 
grid as we may be, we cannot do without some programs. Or without 
computers—they too are “our” history and “our” history is complex. 
Though we seek openness and liberated spaces, the revolution cannot 
leave everything to chance. The possible answers here are myriad and 
indeed already in the making. In a Gramscian mode we might predict 
that we will link the programmatic with the poetic in wagers of shared 
sensibility and historical (re-)affiliation ventured against the multiple 
forms of deferred justice and counter to the widespread, ongoing violence.
Appendix
From the Cinematic Mode of 
Production to Computational Capital: 
An Interview conducted by Ante Jeric 
and Diana Meheik for Kulturpunk
KP: The cinematic mode of production was the term by which you 
seemed to be introducing a new order of intelligibility into the historical 
experience of looking and, more broadly, living under capitalism. What 
is the relationship between the capitalist mode of production and 
cinematic mode production?
J.B.: The original title of The Cinematic Mode of Production was Towards 
the Political Economy of the Postmodern. In the late eighties I thought 
that I could try to build on Fredric Jameson’s insights, which powerfully 
elucidate a sea change that the intensification of capitalism brought 
about in our then current reality. In the Postmodernism essay, Jameson 
posed a challenge that called for a rethinking of political economy in the 
context of a transformed cultural logic—what he famously denominated 
“the cultural logic of late capitalism.” My work actually sought a method 
to undertake that project through trying to understand what appeared to 
me as the newest strategy of capitalist accumulation—though it had been 
nascent for some time—one that utilized culture itself as an economic 
engine of sorts. It seemed to me what was really going on now, with 
the flattening of language, the disappearance of the real and the crisis 
in representation brought about by the rise of simulation and virtuality, 
was a shift in not just the metaphysics but the physics of production. 
If I learned anything at Duke (and I did) it was that social production 
and reproduction were not merely the unthought of the object world, 
but of the cultural world as well—and these relations were inflected 
by exigencies of temporality, scale, presence and spectacle (as well as 
oppression), that had everything to do with the systemic requirements 
of capitalist expansion. The way I understood the transformed cultural-
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material world gelled for me in a recognition that the assembly line was 
no longer the paradigm of capitalist accumulation and the fact that the 
whole mechanical process of assembly line labor was being translated 
into a new paradigm that was directly addressed to the senses and 
furthermore that the paramount sensory input was now—or perhaps 
had long been—visual. Cinema, as I argued in that book, is not an 
incidental technology, but brings the Industrial Revolution to the eye 
and transforms looking by positing it as value-productive sensual labor. 
This all sort of takes place in the unconscious operations of the cinema 
as an industry. But, as I worked through the book, through revolutionary 
cinema, and simultaneously on another book about Philippine visual 
culture, I began to see that there were a lot of resistance practices in the 
visual which signaled a kind of corrective attempt to outflank capitalist 
accumulation strategies. Cinema was actually entering into the visual 
space in a revolutionary mode and it had to be reformatted by capitalism 
as a way of absorbing revolutionary energies and converting them into 
productive labor. I called these changes in which machine-mediated 
mass sensibility/expression was commandeered by capital “the cinematic 
mode of production” because it’s a way of recognizing the dialectics of a 
whole industry of the senses, of the visual, and of the imaginary that was 
historically necessary to develop new mental processes while forestalling 
revolution such that capital was allowed to preserve its accumulation and 
the necessary correlate of capital accumulation: hierarchical society.
KP: In your assessment of revolutionary cinema you have singled out 
Vertov and Eisenstein as major figures whose film practices did not fulfill 
their theoretical ambitions, but who recognized the visual sphere as a 
sight of revolutionary praxis and shaped our understanding of that which 
constitutes cinematic critique of capital and the revolutionary praxis. In 
which way do their respective approaches differ from one another?
J.B.: One of the things I was trying to do with the idea of cinema was 
to de-fetishize the platform by raising questions about the materiality 
and social embeddedness of cinema through apparatus theory. All 
these machines built for doing things with sight! I tend to understand 
that cinema is actually embedded deeply in myriad social practices—
mechanical, cultural, economic, psychological, aesthetic. Its ontology, if 
you will, is political and social and it can only be understood as a change 
in the way that representation functions. Part of that change is that 
practices of representation were being mechanized (and later electrified, 
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and rendered computational) while also being turned towards value 
accumulation for capitalism. The way I came to understand that was, 
strangely, through Eisenstein and Vertov. Their turn towards the visual 
as a sight of revolutionary praxis made me think about the necessity 
of moving into the space that was not yet necessarily foreclosed by 
the domination of capitalism. It was actually the alternative to extant 
production regimens that the visual provided that also provided an 
opportunity for revolution because the visual was still open in some 
ways—incompletely coded and colonized, at least from the standpoint of 
today. Eisenstein and Vertov pursued this opening, which was sensual, 
affective, epistemological and utopian, according to their own, very 
different, visions of revolutionary struggle. Vertov says that the film is “a 
factory of facts.” By being what Deleuze calls an eye in matter cinema can 
be everywhere (in places, times and things) and can bind itself cyber-
netically to human perception, allowing people to perceive the totality 
of the socius as well as its processes of production. You can see all the 
perspectives of production while sitting in the theater and understand 
that not only is each person working in the part of city on a part of 
this or that, but also that the very consciousness that you are having in 
the cinema is a result of the collective industrial formation. In Vertov’s 
work you are actually seeing through the totality and seeing through the 
collective when you are in the cinema—and you know it. It was a very 
beautiful and extraordinary thing which didn’t work out, but it was an 
amazing achievement on Vertov’s part to understand that cinema had 
this potential. The fact is that he failed and the fact is that the whole 
dialectics of cinema was foreclosed—even by Eisenstein who had a very 
different practice, also incredible, but in some ways more conventional. 
Hollywood was the one who was victorious. This Vertovian possibility 
was foreclosed precisely by the visual logic that became necessary, not 
as a supplement but as a central stage in the organization of the psyche 
and the social through visual understanding and the visual ordination of 
discourse and social practice. Vertov’s film and his revolutionary insights 
show us the opening of the visual and his failure allows us to mark its 
foreclosure. In the chapter of the book called “Dziga Vertov and The 
Film of Money” I argue how for Vertov cinema had the ability to become 
an alternative kind of currency. By taking the imprint of a commodity 
that would function very much like a price that allowed for the object’s 
circulation, cinema, rather than repressing the object’s history as does 
the market, would allow the object to carry it’s history along with it, thus 
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enabling one to see the social relations in each moment in their interde-
pendent, networked totality. It was actually the first attempt to transform 
perception in a way which would enable people to see dialectically. 
This attempt was intended to become a template for film practice and 
eventually for a mode of perception that would be adequate to industrial 
production by allowing all of the social relations to become visible by 
passing through those things (commodities) that we now perceive 
as objects. Reification and fetishism kind of won the day. Vertovian 
opening was foreclosed and, when you think of it, it had to be foreclosed 
visually. That’s why I said earlier that all these innovations in perception 
that were a result of industrial progress and had revolutionary, democra-
tizing possibilities, capitalism simply had to address in order to contain 
them. Cinema as we know it was the revolutionizing of the productive 
forces that gave bourgeois society its new life and current form. The 
whole advertising industry and “theater of the mind” was an attempt to 
use images to tap into human hopes and aspirations and convert them 
into precisely the thing that would foreclose the possibility of realizing 
these hopes and aspirations. People are being introduced to the regime 
of commodity consumption and educated to desire only commodities—
items that are presented as an answer to their problems but in fact they 
only create more problems.
For Eisenstein film was “a tractor ploughing over the audience’s psyche 
in a particular class context” which is to say that he recognized very 
directly that the filmmaker was an engineer of the soul as Stalin had said. 
He was in fact trained as an engineer and worked very self-consciously 
as an engineer dedicated to reprogramming and reformatting workers’ 
and spectators’ conditioned reflexes so that they could actually make the 
revolution. This was an avant-gardist practice, which without a doubt 
was radical in its way, but also quickly became kind of a reflexological 
Pavlovian paradigm for the emerging advertising industry. “The Specta-
torship of the Proletariat,” another chapter in The CMP, was really about 
the double-edged sword of organizing the revolutionary class through 
an avant-gardist perspective that fundamentally neither could nor can 
be democratic. It could have democratic sensibilities but it had come 
from above in some ways and stood as an appropriation of technology 
by subjective agents that, to some extent, foreclosed other kinds of 
subjectivity. The people are represented but did they create their own 
representation? Of course, that was always a problem with revolutions: 
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how do you constitute a form of agency in which a collective can express 
itself socially and practically? It’s still a problem.
KP: Marx in Capital does not determine labor in the immediate form as 
a source of wealth. The social substance of wealth or value in capitalism 
is abstract labor. It does not matter whether this abstract labor can be 
traced back to labor-power expended in the process of production, or 
to the transfer of value of used means of production. So, if we continue 
to treat abstract labor as the substance of value, then it is not clear why 
labor time can no longer be its intrinsic measure nor why production 
based on exchange value should necessarily collapse. I am lifting this 
already known objection addressed to the theorists of immaterial labor 
because in the course of your lecture you had pointed out that many of 
them hold the opinion that value has become immeasurable after which 
you expressed your disagreement with them on this matter. Can you 
clarify your position vis-a-vis the problem of value?
J.B.: What I used in my talk yesterday and what I find important to think 
about is what Marx said about the price-form. The Price-form posits 
an abstract labor content; it posits value, to pretty much anything it can 
be assigned to regardless of the way in which that thing was actually 
produced. The value may be real or imaginary but it can be treated as if 
it had abstract universal labor time. To me (and I may not answer this as 
well as I would like to in the given space and time) the fact that price still 
continues to measure something implies that abstract universal labor 
time has not disappeared as a standard. It only disappears as a standard if 
you forget that underneath the global capitalist production, underneath 
that which I call the World Media-System, is radical dispossession and 
that dispossession is integrated from the bottom-up in relationship to 
the production of value. The value-form is the dialectical antithesis of 
human exploitation. From the most abject, and from the rest, wealth 
is taken by profiteers of the derivative. What is not well understood is 
that—and this is why I used the logic of the derivative in what I was 
talking about yesterday regarding the nature of the commodity-form—
is that multitasking and the interface of the screen become the means 
of separating or chunking people’s temporal capacities and bundling 
them according to the requisites of the specific derivative. It’s a misun-
derstanding to think that the commodity form is necessarily or even 
fundamentally an object, and that misunderstanding, I think, is what 
leads people astray. Theorists who treat commodity-form as an object, 
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and observe that more and more people are no longer making objects, 
conclude that labor must be immaterial and that there must be no 
temporal standard, no abstract universal labor time, constituting what 
are now, admittedly, very-difficult-to-identify commodities. But if you 
think of commodity as an integrated product—made across a network 
rather than across an assembly line—that is made of chunks of subjective 
time that are re-bundled through a computational process—and capital 
is fundamentally such a process—you can see that human time, that is, 
sensual labor, or we could say attention, still underlines this system. It’s a 
question of metrics, which is precisely what is implied when the business 
folks talk about monetization. There is a need for the political project 
which would aim to articulate and track that process of separation and 
recombination. In this sense my commitment to abstract universal 
labor time is actually a political one. It makes it impossible to disavow 
exploitation, immiseration, and the Global South.
KP: Another distinguishing feature of your work in respect to aforemen-
tioned theorists is your emphasis on the role which the so-called Third 
World plays within the what you call World-Media System. You don’t 
seem to think that existence of slum dwellers or the informal proletariat 
is outside of and external to capital’s productive base. In which ways are 
the subalterns constitutive for the reproduction of capital?
J.B.: I want to register my complete disagreement that there is a 
fundamental disconnection between colonialism, imperialism, and 
the contemporary system of global apartheid and the accumulation of 
wealth in the Global North. As I said earlier, this is an integrated process. 
What is not well researched is the way this integration functions and 
also that this functioning depends upon the continual disappearance 
and resignifying of what used to be called “The Third World” by systems 
of account, which today no doubt include what Debord called “the 
spectacle” and, I would wager, every other system of representation that 
is materially linked to globalized production. What I argued in the short 
essay called Paying Attention that was published in Cabinet a couple of 
years ago is that the bodies of the dispossessed have become signifying 
surfaces for world media’s representational practices (politics), which is 
to say the lives of the dispossessed have become the material substrate 
for the spin practices that the media captains require in order to deliver 
the commodity that they are trafficking, that is basically value-produc-
tive human attention. Our leaders would like to be able to signify on the 
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surface of the global population in a way which would make legitimate, 
meaning to say produce legitimacy for requirements imposed by the 
sovereign banks and their states. Often it comes down to securing the 
expansion of business practices for associates who have huge investments 
behind them and necessitate a kind of market (for weapons, for example) 
or development (for fossil fuels, say). These exploitative vectors of 
desiring practice are injected through the psychology and the intelligence 
of the globe. People, the masses, in my understanding are forced to labor 
in the image that are in fact the machines that organize social relations 
and sociality itself, or, they are forced to live beneath these images (as 
refugees, terrorists, peasants, migrants, slum dwellers, non-entities) as 
a support network or signifying stratum, sometimes both. One has to 
labor to survive in the World Media-System which means s/he could 
easily end up being signified on or signifying on someone else’s back. 
In another essay I critique Agamben because of the disappearance 
(repression) of his own signifying practice from the concept of ‘bare life’. 
‘Bare life’ should always be written in quotation marks in order to, at the 
very least, mark the fact that you are signifying on the body which has 
been historically dispossessed and that you are engaging that body in a 
kind of representational politics. This may be an unavoidable practice to 
a certain extent because anyone who is enfranchised by the Global North 
is by definition beneficiary of the history of dispossession. Nevertheless, 
it is, I would say, only responsible (responsive) and also politically astute 
to recognize this relationship and try to transcend it by engaging it in 
a way which allows the creative agency of survival, that endures in the 
Global South, to be at once legible and resonant. There is one additional 
dimension of this relationship which complicates things further: Every 
discursive instance has a politics to it. There are no isolated spaces that 
are somehow separated from global production—for us, at least. The 
whole Virno idea of capital capturing our cognitive-linguistic capacities, 
brilliantly articulated in A Grammar of the Multitude, shows that the 
discursive ground itself has been captured by capitalist production, that 
we have become very good speakers for capital and that, no matter what 
else we do, our very negotiation of our own survival is in part complicit 
with the system of accumulation that perpetuates hierarchical society. To 
me an awareness, an abiding awareness, of this condition mandates a kind 
of politics that I call “the politics of the utterance.” It is a kind of haunting 
by the unrepresented and, under current conditions, perhaps unrepre-
sentable which (who) demand/s something from us. These agents are 
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not only extrinsic (as in beyond “our” borders) but also intrinsic (part 
of the very constitution of consciousness). I would say that one thing 
that is demanded is a recognition that our own signifying practice at 
the most fundamental level depends upon the history of dispossession 
and the logic of it and that whatever we say, will say or might say owes 
something to the invisibility and the foreclosure of the representation of 
the exploited global poor past and present.
KP: Your account of capitalist capturing devices clearly affirms the 
position that our thoughts, imagination and bodily practices are 
being increasingly governed by an ever-developing matrix of control. 
Nevertheless, as you hinted earlier in the course of the interview, 
throughout your work you have traced the emergence of all sorts of 
oppositional practices within cinematography. Since they are given 
special emphasis in your analysis of the Philippine cinema, it would be 
interesting to know more about the ways in which it helped you to refine 
your theoretical framework and informed your subsequent work.
J.B.: I went to the Philippines in the mid-nineties for a variety of reasons, 
but I saw my first two years there as an occasion to really test out ideas 
developed in the dissertation (the first draft of The CMP) and see how 
they stood up to what I felt as a kind of postcolonial critique of the things 
I was saying. My own dialectical practice had maybe just a little too much 
Eisenstein in it in some ways. The theory first appeared through the set of 
abstractions which were sort of burbling up in the Global Northish space 
of Duke’s Program in Literature in Durham, North Carolina, and not 
arrived at through the immersion in the mass. In the Philippines I was 
faced on a daily basis with what for me was a new reality and I needed 
to change in order to understand things from there. For the Philippines 
to become the place of understanding for me, it actually required a lot 
of changes in the way I thought, in the way my body works, the way in 
which I spoke to people on a daily basis, and many other things that I 
won’t go into here. The thing I really wanted to test in relation to the 
analytical intervention that I was trying to bring into focus was the idea 
that visuality was transformed by “the people” at least as much as by 
“capitalism,” and that capitalism really was one step behind the innovation 
of the collective. If the proletariat really is the subject of history, or a 
subject in the sphere of visual or cinematic culture, then it would be a 
terrible mistake to think that creativity resides primarily on the side of 
domination and on the side of power. I wanted to see if my ideas could 
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in some ways redefine themselves in relation to that. My analysis started 
from my interest in the work of the preeminent Philippine modernist 
painter H.R. Ocampo. He started out as a fiction writer and wrote a little 
known, serially-published novel called Scenes and Spaces in which his 
young main character ends up feeling humiliated and indeed unmanned 
by his experience in the English language classroom presided over by 
a female American teacher with whom he also fell in love. Ocampo’s 
character couldn’t construct himself as the agential subject in language, 
in large part because English was being used to erase Tagolog in accord 
with the U.S. imperial project begun there in the moments before the 
Philippine-American War, and the young man begins to cultivate hal-
lucinations as a kind of compensatory practice. These hallucinations, 
rising up (sometime right out of the ground) in the face of subjective and 
discursive failure, always provided some kind of revelation and transfor-
mation as well as sensual and intellectual pleasure. Years later, following 
Ocampo’s imprisonment during WWII for being a collaborator with the 
Japanese in the war against the Americans, H.R. Ocampo, the writer, 
stopped writing and became an abstract painter—he painted the hallu-
cinations cultivated by the young protagonist of Scenes and Spaces. I’ve 
gotten from this episode that he actually saw the visual as a space of 
possibility for the redemption of a Philippine nationalist struggle that 
was historically and therefore discursively foreclosed. The inability to 
realize himself narratively and discursively—the blockage of historical 
becoming—pushed him to the space of the visual where the possibility 
of pleasure, creativity, community and understanding became actual 
through creation of the biomorphic abstract forms that didn’t really have 
any specific figurations but were very mobile and capable of taking on 
many different possible configurations depending on the observer and 
this observer’s concentration or perspective. That extraordinary formal 
innovation, which depended in part on being able to shift foreground 
into background and vice versa, kept people from being locked into the 
set of discursive meanings that any way you sliced it could only mean 
colonization, and therefore inferiority and secondarity. With Ocampo’s 
paintings the painter and the observer were engaged in a kind of open 
play where agency and pleasure were shared and combined.
In the subsequent creation of a national abstract art by numerous 
Filipino Modernists, the visual was opened up as a new space of 
freedom which was then contested radically on the one hand by the 
unbelievable movement revolutionary social realist cinema represented, 
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spurred by the people like Lino Brocka, Ishmael Bernal, Mike de Leon 
and others and fascistically on the other by the Marcos spectacle. The 
social-realist filmmakers (and with them a new group of social-realist 
painters) launched an attempt to show that there was an abstract logic 
functioning within the concrete of visibility of social life, and that one 
had to go beyond the surface of mere appearances in order to understand 
the organizing force of the social in an intersubjective manner. Simply 
put, that means that none of the characters in some of Brocka’s films 
were able to realize their individual dreams or find in their own lives 
or even to perceive the solutions to the problems they were confronted 
with. Abstract forces were not merely at work in the picture plane of 
high art, but in the most banal and quotidian challenges faced by the 
masses. For the poor working-class protagonist, there was simply no 
answer on how to make more money in order to pay for the hospital 
care your lover needs without killing somebody else. At the level of what 
was socially given or perhaps “thrown,” that compulsion to violence was 
the only thing that was there. Narratively, however, in the films at least, 
stealing from a friend or killing somebody else in order to get the money 
you needed to survive led to your own destruction in the end, and often 
to the destruction of everything you loved. All too often the central 
characters were destroyed in Brocka’s films, so an audience, looking for 
answers—Brocka always said he was committed not to the great Filipino 
film but to the great Filipino audience—had to think beyond the concrete 
situations and beyond the world of appearances in order to begin to posit 
solutions to the problems these films so eloquently presented. Thinking 
a few steps further than given reality ordinarily allowed and envisioning 
social alternatives beyond the confines of formal narrative conventions 
lodged a radical change inside of the visually concrete problems that 
were being presented. Brocka’s films showed that an abstract logic that 
foreclosed people’s possibilities held sway, and that it would take a radical 
change in multiple circumstances, let us call them those circumstances 
that constitute the totality of the situation, in order to generate a space 
where the population of Philippines might receive some relief from the 
immanent tragedies of colonialism, imperialism and fascism, and at the 
same time achieve some kind of genuine autonomy.
KP: The opening and widening the space of possibilities for some 
different way of living you described accords well and is in fact grounded 
by your insistence that the real subsumption of life under capital can 
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never be complete if the talk of changing the existing state of affairs is to 
have any meaning at all. The concept you use to elucidate your point on 
this matter is wager. What does the wager mean to you?
J.B.: If everything that we are talking about is even close to being correct, 
metaphysical ground, meaning to say ontological “reality,” is not really 
an option. As we might learn from Ariella Azoulay’s brilliant treatment 
of photography (since many it seems did not properly learn it from 
Nietzsche or Derrida), all so-called ontology is political. As soon as you 
say that, then you are in a situation that requires movement and then 
the question becomes where, when and how? To me that’s a wager. It’s 
a bet that certain directions are more productive in struggle for trans-
formation than others. The wager is also—and this is another part of 
the concept that is equally important—what you do to survive. Gayatri 
Spivak used the term strategic essentialism to finesse that question of 
ground for would-be metaphysicians making their way in a post-colonial, 
post-structuralist milieu, but often the whole modality of metaphysics is 
an appurtenance that smacks of luxury. Brillante Mendoza has a really 
extraordinary film called Lola that is about two grandmothers who have 
grandsons. One grandson murders the other grandson and the murderer 
ends up in jail. The film is about a way in which two grandmothers have 
to seek some kind of justice, some kind of resolution, in a society that is 
completely indifferent to them, a society whose law and social relations 
are so overcoded by the logic of wealth, power and structural indifference 
to the poor that they don’t matter at all. These ordinarily invisible and 
most often unremarked personages are the subjects of the film. What 
happens is that they make wagers of their life energy and power in accord 
with their own aspirations towards achieving a life worth living. To me 
the wager comes from the existential question of whether or not there is 
a life worth living and, if there is one, what concrete form could it take? 
Here there are no ontological guarantees. Because we cannot know the 
answer, and because we as individuals will never solve the problem of 
capitalism by ourselves, we have to call on our collective knowledge and 
singular capacities to address the question and problem of life—and I 
mean that in a very complicated way. The collective knowledge is in each 
of us, because we are the repository of practices for which there really is 
no complete archaeology, there are so many historical forces operating 
between and within us, so many voices, that we selectively have to discover 
from which ones we can draw on in order to connect with everybody 
186 . the message is murder
else through cultural network, through socialization, through aesthetics, 
through our political practices, through who and how we love, through 
many, many things. The resources of the collectivity inhere in each of 
us to varying degrees, and the less obscured the collective in each of us 
is, by bourgeois forms of individuality, morality or the State, the more 
access we might have—and the more solidarity we might find. To me this 
question of the collectivity, of consciousness, of representation and the 
wager goes back to what I call the politics of the utterance. It’s a wager 
that some ways, some statements, some ideas, some connections and 
concerns are better than others. I know that sounds quite unsatisfying 
because there are no fast rules there that say ‘this way to the revolution’, 
but if we ourselves draw on progressive forces of our time and align 
ourselves with the people, and movements, and histories which have 
proven successes in a movement towards democratization, people’s 
autonomy and social justice, then we are in a good company: and that is 
something I would bet on.
KP: Does the vote today constitute one form of wager?
J.B.: To say that would be to make voting far more responsive and 
complex than it seems to be in current state practices. In a way the vote 
in most states functions as the most artificial of all choices. In the United 
States for example the vote may have some significance somewhere but 
the deeper meaning of it is the legitimation of the American system. 
Even Obama who brought so much promise—and was a genuine man-
ifestation of marginalized historical experiences making claims on the 
social and the state—has really become just another leader of Empire: 
his record on immigration is abysmal, he supports imperialistic modes 
of governance including incarceration, settler colonialism, and the 
ramping up of surveillance and drone warfare. The thing in question is a 
micrological process in which, with the refinement of thinking, discourse 
and even bodily practice, one can make choices which as much as possible 
forestall the practice of capital’s capturing of one’s productive capacities. 
Capital has become so vast an apparatus of enclosure and capture that is 
almost impossible to elide it, and of course computation has been central 
in increasing the granularity of its resolution and thus it’s co-ordina-
tion of expropriative value-production. But if you don’t think that it is 
possible to elide capital in some way or another then there’s no point 
to this conversation. If this conversation, as you reminded me earlier, is 
actually to be different from every other conversation in The Economist 
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or in Business Today, it has to posit a practice or practices that have a 
kind of negative capability in relationship to capitalist agendas. If one 
were to think of voting like that, as a metric of anti-capitalist contestation 
that might be applicable at a variety of scales, then voting would become 
much more interesting, then we would really have a model for agency, 
a kind of micrological agency of choice which can in some ways defy 
the way in which capital is capturing our senses and discourses. This is 
what flashed for a moment in Greece and is visible in petition forums 
like Avaaz, and even to a certain extent in entrepreneurial platforms 
such as Kickstarter, although there, the political vision is subsumed by 
corporatism. Capitalism operates ubiquitously and micrologically. We 
need to recognize that and we need to seek every opportunity, every 
moment, every nanosecond, as having an opportunity for transforma-
tion. Back to the politics of the utterance, we need to be voting against 
capitalism, against exploitation, against inequality, not just every four 
years, but all the time. And we need to build these ideas into the infra-
structure and the hardware, the very materials and machines of our 
society. It’s what used to be called a program and could be again, but now 
in a new sense.
KP: While delivering your lecture on computational capital you touched 
an idea of communist computing. Being curious where your future work 
may be headed, we are eager to discover more about what you mean by 
that phrase. Is there a concept behind it?
J.B.: I alluded to the couple of works published recently. One of them 
is Nick Dyer-Witheford’s Red Plenty Platforms and the other is Joss 
Hands’ Platform Communism, both published in Volume 14 of Culture 
Machine. One idea brilliantly laid out in Red Plenty Platforms is that 
planned economy was not able to outflank the market because the Party’s 
computational capacity was not adequate to the situation of production 
and distribution in the field. As Hayek claimed, it was not possible to 
figure out who needed what, when, where and how to distribute it in the 
way that matched the speed and the efficiency with which the market 
at that stage of technical development functioned. The idea that I am 
developing in Computational Capital, is that capitalism today functions 
like a computer, is, in fact, a computer. Early capitalism was really 
Digital Culture 1.0 and represented the imposition of large-scale quan-
tification upon the life-world. Famously, capitalism turns qualities into 
quantities. Digital Culture 2.0 with the advent of the Universal Turing 
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Machine becomes an intensification of that process of working on the 
world by means of numbers, in part through the ability to represent and 
manipulate any element whatever to the point at which both markets 
and galaxy formation can today be simulated by big digital computers. 
Seeing computation as emerging out of capital-logic marks the discrete 
state machine as another evolutionary moment, a kind of sea change, 
that I am tempted to say definitively confirms the need to change the 
way in which one thinks about the history of the screen and of cinema 
in accord with what I attempted in The CMP, and also places so-called 
digital culture (the pundits leave off the 2.0) where it belongs, that is to 
say at the very center of financialization. The fact is that computation has 
advanced to the point where it can and does track capitalist practices. For 
example, as Dyer-Witherford shows by citing Jameson’s characteristically 
unforgettable analysis of Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart handles and tracks more 
than 680 million items per week and 20 million customer transactions 
per day; that’s an unbelievable amount of information and it is used to 
increase both the efficiency of Wal-Mart’s distribution of use-values and 
the vast fortune of Waltons. Wouldn’t it be possible, Dyer-Witherford 
asks, to create communist agents or communist algorithms? I think that 
it is possible and necessary. If capitalism is actually organizing time in 
increasingly small fragments and discourse in increasingly small pieces, 
then it is functioning to program sight, sound and time; and if it is 
programming sight, sound and time, these can also be deprogrammed 
or reprogrammed—at the speed of life and in ways in which collective 
social knowledge organizes production and distribution. I don’t want 
this to sound like a cliché, but to a certain extent this intensification of 
communication is something that we want, this is, the collectivization 
of life is the other side of the real subsumption. Significant aspects of 
the processes of communication and interconnection which have been 
developed are actually, like visual culture before, consequences of the 
desire of people to talk to one another, to know one another, to be among 
each other: the desire for solidarity, mutual recognition, autonomy, 
peace. The problem has been that these technologies of exchange have 
been captured through the logic of private property. As “Bifo” might say, 
the general intellect is alienated—it is in search of a body. You have users 
of Facebook or Google left out of what could be the far more profound 
benefits of a Facebook or a Google, platforms that though collectively 
built are privatized and geared towards making profits to be shared 
only among shareholders. All that work of attention, all that infrastruc-
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ture provided by bodies and minds and their practical activities, new 
habits and desires, are stolen and then sold on the market. We need 
to understand and to rethink those practices. Communist computing 
would mean rethinking from the ground up the interface and the bios 
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